



Allocation of taxing rights in Tax Treaties between
Developing and Developed countries
Citation for published version (APA):
Garfias von Fürstenberg, G. (2021). Allocation of taxing rights in Tax Treaties between Developing and
Developed countries: Re-thinking principles. Maastricht University.
https://doi.org/10.26481/dis.20210331gg





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.











Allocation of taxing rights in Tax Treaties between 






Thesis presented at 
Maastricht University for 
the obtaining of the PhD 
degree on International 
Taxation, under the 
supervision of Prof. Dr. 
Rainer Prokisch and Prof. 


















First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisors, Prof. 
Dr. Rainer G. Prokisch and Prof. Dr. Hans van den Hurk, for their continuous support, 
patience, and mainly, for believing in this project. Both provided me with invaluable 
guidance, expertise, and the necessary freedom to do what I considered was right. They 
gave me constructive contributions and feedback during the whole process. I am also 
thankful to the assessment committee for spending invaluable time to read my 
manuscript and for their valuable comments on my dissertation. 
 
I am grateful to my colleagues and friends at Maastricht University, namely Dr. Sofia 
Ramiro, Mr. Goncalo Cardoso Pereira, Mr. Tonis Vahessar, Dr. Tiiu Albin, Dr. 
Esperanza Buitrago, Dr. Thomas Kipka, Dr. Frank Nellen, Dr. Mark Kawakami, Dr. 
Jiangqiu Ge, and Dr. Willem Loof.  
 
Moreover, I would like to extend my gratitude to all the colleagues I had the pleasure 
of working with in practice during these years, specifically Mr. Francisco Javier 
Allende, Ms. Carolina Gazitúa, Mr. Jose Luis Ibañez, Mr.  Felipe Allende, Mr. Andres 
Bustos, and Mr. Pablo Ibañez. All of them have supported me during the process, and 
I´m eternally and truly grateful.  
 
Lastly, I would like to express my heartfelt and loving gratitude to my wife María Paz, 
to my daughters Isidora, Olivia, and Inés, and to my parents Gonzalo y María Theresa, 
who have all unstintingly supported this endeavor and to whom I am dedicating this 
book. Their contributions to my life will be felt forever. 
 











IMPACT PARAGRAPH ................................................................................................................................ 6 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................... 9 
PART I – ECONOMY AND TAXATION ....................................................................................................... 19 
1.1 A FAILED ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK ........................................................................................................ 19 
1.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK - INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW .................................................................................. 21 
1.2.1 DTC EFFECTS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT ............................................................................................ 27 
1.2.2 SOURCE AND RESIDENCE PRINCIPLES – INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW ................................................... 38 
1.2.3 ECONOMIC AND JURIDICAL DOUBLE TAXATION ................................................................................. 43 
1.2.4 DTC ALLOCATION OF TAXING RIGHTS - ECONOMIC THEORIES ........................................................... 49 
1.2.4.1 ECONOMIC ALLIEGIANCE THEORY .................................................................................................... 53 
1.2.4.2 BENEFIT THEORY ................................................................................................................................ 55 
1.2.4.3 NEUTRALITY ....................................................................................................................................... 56 
1.2.4.4 THEORIES APPLIED TO PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME– LEAGUE OF NATIONS – OECD MTC – UN 
MTC ................................................................................................................................................................ 62 
1.2.5 WITHOLDING TAXES ............................................................................................................................. 72 
1.2.5.1 BRIC COUNTRIES AND WITHHOLDING TAXES IN DTCs ................................................................. 76 
1.3 UN MTC TREATMENT OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME ................................................ 78 
PART II – HISTORY TO DATE .................................................................................................................... 87 
2.1 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ CLAIMS OF TAXING RIGHTS – MTC CONTEXT .............................................. 87 
2.1.1 MEXICO MODEL ................................................................................................................................. 87 
2.1.2 DECISION 40 OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY ................................................................................... 90 
2.1.3 UN MODEL TAX CONVENTION .......................................................................................................... 92 
2.2 EXPERIENCES OF OTHER MTCS REGARDING TREATMENT OF PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME ............ 96 
2.2.1 - MODEL TAX CONVENTION LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1928 ................................................................ 97 
2.2.2 - OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ................................................................................................. 102 
2.2.2.1 – FISCAL COMMITTEE APPROACH – DIVIDENDS TAXATION ...................................................... 105 
2.2.2.2 - FISCAL COMMITTEE APPROACH – INTEREST TAXATION .......................................................... 108 
2.2.2.3 - FISCAL COMMITTEE APPROACH – ROYALTIES TAXATION ........................................................ 111 
2.2.2.4 - OECD MODELS FROM 1963 to 2015. ........................................................................................ 115 
2.3 CURRENT UN AND OECD MTCS RULES REGARDING PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME TAXATION ....... 120 
2.3.1 – TAXATION OF DIVIDENDS ............................................................................................................. 122 
2.3.2 - TAXATION OF INTEREST ................................................................................................................ 125 
2.3.3 - TAXATION OF ROYALTIES .............................................................................................................. 127 
PART III. UPDATING THE DEBATE .......................................................................................................... 132 
3.1 CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE MATTER ............................................................................................. 132 
3.1.1 EUROPEAN UNION EXPERIENCE ..................................................................................................... 139 
3.1.2 TAX SPARING CLAUSES / MATCHING CREDITS ............................................................................... 144 
3.1.3 BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND DOUBLE TAX CONVENTIONS ........................................ 149 
3.1.4 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS ................................................................................................................. 153 
PART IV. DIVIDENDS: TESTS, NEW PROPOSAL, DIVIDEND TAXATION AND THE UN MODEL .................. 165 
4.1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND FOREIGN PORTFOLIO 
INVESTMENT ................................................................................................................................................ 165 
4.2 PRIMARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GENERATING DIVIDENDS ................................................................... 170 
4.3 DEPARTURE FROM THE UN MODEL APPROACH ................................................................................... 174 
4.4 RENUNCIATION OF PRELIMINARY RIGHTS ............................................................................................ 175 
4.5 ECONOMIC-SUBSTANTIVE TEST ............................................................................................................ 180 
4.6 TEMPORARY TEST .................................................................................................................................. 184 
4.7     PROPOSAL FOR DIVIDEND TAXATION AND THE ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION ................... 185 
4.8 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSAL.............................................................................................................. 189 




5.1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSE FOR THE BORROWER, INCOME TAXED 
TWICE IN THE HANDS OF THE LENDER, NON-ECONOMIC DOUBLE TAXATION ......................................... 192 
5.2 PRIMARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GENERATING INTERESTS .................................................................... 200 
5.3 RENUNCIATION OF PRELIMINARY RIGHTS ............................................................................................ 203 
5.4 TESTS ...................................................................................................................................................... 207 
5.4.1 ECONOMIC-SUBSTANTIVE TEST ...................................................................................................... 207 
5.4.2 ARM’S LENGTH TEST ....................................................................................................................... 209 
5.4.3 AGREEMENT NATURE TEST ............................................................................................................. 211 
5.5     PROPOSAL FOR INTEREST TAXATION AND THE ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION .................... 212 
5.6 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSAL.............................................................................................................. 216 
PART VI.  ROYALTIES: TESTS, NEW PROPOSAL, ROYALTIES TAXATION AND THE UN MODEL ................ 218 
6.1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: DEFINITION OF ROYALTIES ............................................................. 218 
6.2 TOTAL ALLOCATION OF TAXING RIGHTS TO THE COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE OECD MTC ..................... 230 
6.3 PRIMARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GENERATING ROYALTIES ................................................................... 233 
6.4 RENUNCIATION OF PRELIMINARY RIGHTS ............................................................................................ 236 
6.5 TESTS ...................................................................................................................................................... 240 
6.5.1 ECONOMIC-SUBSTANTIVE TEST ...................................................................................................... 240 
6.5.2 ARM’S LENGTH TEST ....................................................................................................................... 243 
6.6     PROPOSAL FOR ROYALTY TAXATION AND THE ELIMINATION OF DOUBLE TAXATION ..................... 244 
6.7 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSAL.............................................................................................................. 248 
PART VII. CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 249 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................... 264 
ARTICLES AND REPORTS ..................................................................................................................................... 264 
BOOKS AND BOOK SECTIONS .............................................................................................................................. 278 
LAW, CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND LEGAL REGULATION ................................................................................. 281 






BEPS - Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
BITS - Bilateral Investment Treaties 
BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa  
CEN – Capital Export Neutrality 
CIN – Capital Import Neutrality 
DTCs – Double Tax Conventions 
EC - European Commission 
ECOSOC - United Nations Economic and Social Council 
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment  
FPI - Foreign Portfolio Investment 
GDP - Gross Domestic Product 
GRP – Goods, Rights, or Property 
IBFD – International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation 
ICC – International Chamber of Commerce 
IMF - International Monetary Fund 
LN – League of Nations 
MAP – Mutual Agreement Procedure  
MLI - Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base   
Erosion and Profit Shifting 
MNEs – Multinational Enterprises 
MOF – Minister of Finance 
MTC – Model Tax Convention 
OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OEEC – Organization for European Economic Cooperation 
PPT – Principal Purpose Test 
UN – United Nations 
US – United States  
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development  
WTO - World Trade Organization 
 
 6 




The aim of this doctoral thesis is to determine whether the criteria / principles which govern 
the treatment of passive investment income in double taxation conventions (DTCs) between 
developing and developed countries are effective and appropriate for the interests of 
developing countries. 
 
This research was conducted in a period totally overwhelmed by the concept of tax abuse, 
and therefore, cross-border erosion of countries’ tax bases. In that context and taking into 
consideration that I am strongly if not doggedly motivated to understand the underlying 
justification of the principles that history and society impose on us as natural truths, I exerted 
great effort to think out of the box regarding diagnostics, reality, and potential solutions. 
Moreover, the effort expended to avoid being influenced by the ideological pressure that 
international organizations have historically put on developing countries. The analysis and 
outcome travelled a unique route, granting independence in the intent of collaborating not 
only with developing but also with developed countries by offering fresh concepts that could 
help in the challenging task of grant fairness in DTCs between developing and developed 
countries. This was done with the understanding that, at least for developing countries, DTCs 
must help in the route to development. 
 
The study analysed the economic aspects underlying the principles that have governed the 
allocation of taxing rights in DTCs between developing and developed countries plus the 
historical evolution of those DTCs. Elements such as attracting foreign investment, access to 
useful foreign debt, and access to useful technology were considered by the author as the 
most relevant elements when questioning a DTC’s treatment of dividends, interests, and 
royalties, respectively. Relevant facts were discussed and examined, including that current 
international tax policy on this matter is focused on the developed world, and that historical 
concessions made by developing countries are the reason for the actual state of the matter. 
The right to development is also included in the analysis. The combination of elements 
demonstrates that a fair international tax equilibrium and sound tax policy therefore need to 
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be found. The author believes that the needs of developing countries to raise their economies 
and to protect their domestic tax base should not be disregarded or silenced. 
 
On the practical side, the research starts from the premise that DTCs between developing and 
developed countries do not contribute on the route of developing countries to development. 
The rationale behind this premise is that DTCs only focus their efforts on the elimination of 
international double taxation, a role well assumed as evidenced in the positive evolution of 
domestic laws in the last decades. This study questioned the historical tendency of developing 
countries’ negotiators who, when negotiating s DTC with developed countries, put as a 
priority the amount of taxing rights. The author criticizes this approach and puts development 
before taxation. Due to the lack of doctrine on the matter, it is possible to find, throughout 
the whole work, the author’s own ideas as a basis for proposals. If the proposals are executed, 
it is expected that benefits will accrue to all actors, i.e. to developed countries, to developing 
countries, to investors resident in developed countries, and to investors resident in developing 
countries. Special expectations are in relation with the assistance in the development process 
of developing countries through the increment of beneficial foreign investments, easy access 
to useful foreign debt, and easy access to beneficial technology/intangibles. Although DTCs 
alone cannot determine the success of economic growth and development, they can 
nevertheless aid in this process.  
 
The actual worldwide public health crisis that we are facing is hitting the whole world hard. 
Developing countries will be tremendously affected and economic inequalities will only be 
exacerbated. This crisis has already sharply exposed the global economy’s pre-existing 
weaknesses, setting back development progress around the world. The crisis will potentially 
make the goal of development for many developing countries fade into the background and 
generate a drastic change in the order of priorities. As most politicians and economists from 
the developing world are already commenting, focusing on recovering jobs, migration, 
health, and access to food will be the challenges of developing countries probably for the 
next decade. On this unfortunate scenario, this work can contribute to re-thinking 
international tax principles that govern the allocation of taxing rights in DTCs with direct 
effect on incentives to foreign investments, access to useful foreign debt, and access to useful 
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technology. The author is convinced that these changes could incentivize trade and 
investment and, therefore, help to enhance developing countries’ economies with the aim of 
staying true to the route to development. 
 
Finally, and regarding the proposals, all of them share the same principle: eliminate tax 
obstacles generated by DTCs in the interaction of developing and developed economies. The 
above can be achieved by taxing only at one level.  In simple words, the author proposes 
principles similar to those that sustain the taxation of dividends, interests, and royalties in the 
European Union – internal market - to be applied in DTCs between developing and developed 
countries. The criteria used by the author to determinate which country should keep the taxing 

























This research focuses on the rules concerning the taxation of dividends, interest and royalty 
income within the context of Double Taxation Conventions (DTCs) between developing and 
developed countries. The aim of this research is to determine whether the criteria / principles 
which govern the treatment of those incomes are effective and appropriate for the interests 
of developing countries. The development of developing countries and fairness regarding the 
allocation of taxing rights will therefore be the two core elements that are considered by the 
author throughout this research.  
 
Passive income refers to the income in respect of which, broadly speaking, the recipient does 
not participate in the activity that gives rise to the income, e.g., dividends, interest, rental 
income, and royalties.1 It is a term that is generally used to describe investment income when 
there is a lack of control or involvement over the source that actually generates the income. 
One economic definition of the term passive income is “cash flow obtained without 
continuous time involvement”.2  
 
This research defines the incomes that will be examined, i.e., dividends, interest and royalties, 
as “Passive Investment Income”. This concept is used so as to group these three different 
types of income into one single category, with the aim of streamlining references to them 
throughout the course of this examination. Within those categories, dividends can be, 
according to the level of control or involvement over the investment that generates the 
income, considered as dividends derived from business investments, when there is a certain 
degree of control / involvement (Foreign Direct Investment or FDI)3 or, by way of contrast, 
 
1 OECD Glossary of Tax Terms. Available at:  http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm  
2 Copeland, Thomas E., Weston J. Fred, and Shastri, Kuldeep. Financial Theory and Corporate Policy, 4th ed. 
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 1024. 
3 OECD Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions. “Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a 
category of investment that reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in 
one economy (direct investor) in an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an economy 
other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship 
between the direct investor and the direct investment enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the 
management of the enterprise. The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting power of an 
enterprise resident in one economy by an investor resident in another economy is evidence of such a 
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as dividends derived from capital investments (Foreign Portfolio Investment or FPI),4 which 
is also known as income that arises from holding securities such as foreign stocks, bonds, or 
other financial assets, none of which entails active management, control, or involvement on 
behalf of the investor.5 
 
Notwithstanding that, in the strict sense, we should not refer to income derived from business 
investments or income derived from an investment where there is some involvement 
associated therewith as passive income, and leaving the concept of passive income only to 
dividends derived from capital investments, interest, and royalties, this research nevertheless 
does so. The aim is to give more relevance to the real impact of the investment in the host / 
source / developing country and to disregard other factors. As such, this research will refer 
to all dividends as passive income and it will only differentiate between them as and when it 
is necessary to do so. 
 
The approach mentioned above is also influenced by the fact that the concept of control has 
not been incorporated in DTCs so as to actively differentiate between active and passive 
income,6 leaving the concept of active income to the income that is gained from the “activity 
pursued” – involvement – in the territory,7 and therefore not taxing the income derived from 
FDI / business investments as active income. 
 
 
relationship. Some compilers may argue that in some cases an ownership of as little as 10% of the voting power 
may not lead to the exercise of any significant influence while on the other hand, an investor may own less than 
10% but have an effective voice in the management. Nevertheless, the recommended methodology does not 
allow any qualification of the 10% threshold and recommends its strict application to ensure statistical 
consistency across countries.”.  Available at: https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/2487495.pdf  
4 OECD Glossary of Foreign Direct Investment Terms and Definitions.  “A portfolio investment in a company 
would be a holding of shares amounting to a small portion of the total shares of the company, e.g. less than 
10%. Portfolio investors may receive different tax relief or other treatment in respect of their dividends under 
tax treaties from those accorded to other direct investors”. Available at:  
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/2487495.pdf  
5 Edited by Boulle, Laurence; Laryea, Emmanuel; and Sucker, Franziska. International Economic Law and 
African Development. Siber Ink, South Africa, 2014.  
6 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction. University of Michigan Law School, 2007. 
Available at:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1048441. 




DTCs have been fashionable for several years. These types of international agreements 
supplement the domestic policy framework in order to achieve the respective economic goals 
of each country.8 As such, DTCs should be the result of sovereign and conscious policy 
decisions. Over time, however, such goals have naturally changed. While in the beginning, 
the idea was to remove obstacles to trade9 arising as a consequence of double taxation,10 
nowadays it can be said that DTCs serve other purposes, such as the prevention of tax 
avoidance and they can even assist in achieving non-tax goals, e.g., the detection of money 
laundering.11 
 
In general, citizens and scholars12 13 tend to believe that those international agreements 
prevent the undesired effects of double taxation while, at the same time, they believe that 
they are capable of promoting foreign investment.14 While the former is true in all cases, i.e., 
giving legal certainty to foreign investors in the fierce fight for attracting foreign investment, 
the latter goal is not always achieved.15 The complexity of the latter is due to the fact that it 
 
8 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Introduction, Origin: Paragraph 4: “The desirability of promoting 
greater inflows of foreign investment to developing countries on conditions which are politically acceptable as 
well as economically and socially beneficial has been frequently affirmed in resolutions of the General 
Assembly and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development.” 
9 Braun, Julia; and Zagler, Martin. An Economic Perspective on Double Tax Treaties with(in) Developing 
Countries. World Tax Journal, 2014. Available at:  
https://www.ibfd.org/sites/ibfd.org/files/content/pdf/wtj_2014_03_int_4-free-article.pdf 
10 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Commentary on Article 26. 
11 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Commentary on Article 26. 
12 Blonigen Bruce A.; and Davies, Ronald B. Do Bilateral Tax Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? 
Working Paper 8834, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002. Available at: 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w8834.pdf 
13  Vallejo Chamorro, José María; and Gutiérrez Lousa, Manuel.  Los convenios para evitar la doble imposición: 
Análisis de sus ventajas e inconvenientes, 2002. Available at: 
https://www.cepal.org/ilpes/noticias/paginas/2/11542/jmvallejo.pdf  
14 See Hearson, Martin. When do developing countries negotiate away their corporate tax base?. Journal of 
International Development, London School of Economics. Vol 20, 2018; and Blonigen, Bruce; and Oldenski, 
Lindsay. The Differential Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. 
Vol 6 N° 2, 2014. 
15 See: Zagler, Martin; and Zanzottera, Cristiana. Corporate Income Taxation Uncertainty and Foreign Direct 
Investment. 2012. Available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w8834.pdf ; Baker, Paul L. An Analysis of Double 
Taxation Treaties and their Effect on Foreign Direct Investment. International Journal of the Economics of 
Business, Vol 21, 2014; Blonigen, Bruce A.; and Davies, Ronald B. The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on 
U.S. FDI Activity. International Tax and Public Finance, Vol 11, 2004; and Egger, Peter H. and Larch, Mario 
and Pfaffermayr, Michael and Winner, Hannes. The Impact of Endogenous Tax Treaties on Foreign Tax 
Investment: Theory and Evidence. The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol 39, 2006.  
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very much depends on the economic flow of trade and investments16 between the countries, 
as well as of the reach of domestic tax law. Therefore, the terms of the agreement reached 
during the treaty negotiations are very important and so too are the provisions of domestic 
tax law. Due to the differences between the economies of developed and developing 
countries, and their different interests, the expectations in relation to DTCs vary between 
both groups of countries.17 
 
Developing countries, considered as an undetermined group of countries, follow the idea that 
DTCs help to increase economic growth and foster economic development.18 19 Many 
developing countries have entered into such agreements on the basis of ascertaining that 
expectation.20 21 The author considers the Human Development Index of the United Nations 
as the most accurate measure to determine the degree of development of countries.22  
 
This research casts aspersions over that paradigm. The study will focus on the tax treatment 
of passive investment income. In order to understand the actual framework regarding the 
taxation of passive investment income, the author – with the aim of contributing to this debate 
– will analyse (1) economy and taxation / concepts such as foreign investments and DTCs, 
among others; and (2) the history of the matter / the evolution of DTCs. If the study gives 
rise to any proposals, the expectation is to base those proposals on the examination of the 
economic link between the income and the country of source or the country of residence, 
complemented with the duty of attracting foreign investments and the access to useful foreign 
debt and technology in developing countries, as the core principles governing the design of 
 
16 Valencia, Alexis; Barreix, Alberto; and Videla, Luis. Impacto Fiscal en la Integración económica. 2003 
Available at: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/6161?locale-attribute=es& 
17 Vogel, Klaus. Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation. International Tax & Business Lawyer, Vol 4, 
1986. 
18 Neumayer, Eric. Do double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries? The 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol 43, 2007. 
19 Ibid., 9. 
20 Pickering, Ariane. Why Negotiate Tax Treaties?. 2013 Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/20130530_Paper1N_Pickering.pdf  
21 Baistrocchi, Eduardo. The Use and Interpretation of Tax Treaties in the Emerging World: Theory and 
Implications. British Tax Review, N° 4, 2008.  




a Model Tax Convention (MTC) for use in agreements between developing and developed 
countries. 
 
The majority of developing countries are high importers of capital and technology, but their 
exports in these fields cannot, regrettably, be compared to developed countries. This is a 
feature that is characteristic of many developing countries, and therefore their economic 
policies – including their tax policies – should not ignore this situation. Some references will 
be made to Africa and Latin America throughout the course of this study in order to illustrate 
certain points.  
 
This study refers to developing countries and contends that tax provisions, and in particular 
DTCs, may influence that status. There are few developing countries that are currently 
bridging the developing gap. However, what are known as the Four Asian Tigers23 and the 
BRICS are exceptions to this general rule.24 Historically, it has been easy to recognize 
developing countries on the basis of their participation and membership of international 
organizations. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) was 
regarded as the club for the developed nations. Nowadays, Chile25, Mexico26, and 
Colombia27, are OECD member countries, whereas Costa Rica28 is currently undergoing the 
accession process. Furthermore, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico are G20 members.29 This does 
not mean in any way, shape or form, however, that these emerging economies are developing 
at an equal pace when compared to other OECD countries.  For instance, Brazil is a BRICS 
member, i.e., one of the five major emerging economies, but it is not yet an OECD member, 
although it is considered to be a “key partner”.30 
 
 
23 Markle, Kevin S.; and Shackelford, Douglas. Do Multinationals or domestic firms face higher effective tax 
rates? Working Paper 15091 National Bureau of Economic Research, 2009. Available at: 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6646073.pdf  
24 O’Neill, Jim. Building Better Global Economic BRICS. Paper Goldman Sachs Global Economics, 2001. 
Available at:  http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf 
25 See: http://www.oecd.org/chile/  
26 See: http://www.oecd.org/mexico/  
27 See: http://www.oecd.org/countries/colombia/ 
28 See: http://www.oecd.org/latin-america/countries/costarica/  
29 See: http://g20.org.tr/about-g20/g20-members/  
30 See:  https://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/  
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The need for a coherent and coordinated approach from developing countries should be 
reflected in international tax policy.31 Currently, international tax policy focuses on the 
developed world: countries that have, with some exceptions, similar flows of trade and 
investment and that, due to the most recent economic crisis, need to be more transparent. 
Notwithstanding the efforts that have been made to include developing countries in the 
discussion32 of the OECD initiative of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (the BEPS Report) 
the process has been, beyond any doubt, predominantly driven by developed countries.33 34  
 
Following the BEPS Declaration at the 2013 Ministerial Council Meeting of the OECD and 
at the request of the Group of Twenty35 (G20), in July 2013, the OECD launched a BEPS 
Action Plan, identifying 15 specific actions that are needed in order to equip governments 
with the domestic and international instruments to competently address this challenge. This 
Action Plan was fully endorsed by the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors 
at their meeting in Moscow in July 2013, as well as at the G20 Heads of State at their meeting 
in Saint Petersburg in September 2013. For the first time ever in relation to tax matters, non-
OECD/G-20 countries were involved on an equal footing.36 The United Nations formed a 
BEPS subcommittee,37 a subcommittee mandated to draw upon its own experience and 
engage with other relevant bodies, particularly the OECD, with a view to monitoring 
developments on base erosion and profit shifting issues and to directly communicate such 
issues to officials in developing countries and through regional and inter-regional 
 
31 Shome, Parthasarathi. Trends and Future Directions in Tax Policy Reforms: A Latin American Perspective. 
Working Paper International Monetary Fund, 1992. Introduction. 
32 Baez, Andrés. El plan BEPS y Los Países en Vías de Desarrollo (BEPS and Developing Countries. 
Posdoctoral research fellow IBFD. University Carlos III Madrid, 2017. 
33 Crivelli, Ernesto; De Mooij, Ruud; and Keen, Michael.  Base Erosion, Profit Shifting and Developing 
Countries. International Monetary Fund Working Paper, 2015. Available at: 
 https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/Base-Erosion-Profit-Shifting-and-Developing-
Countries-42973 
34 Picciotto, Sol. Informe sobre Erosion de la base tributaria y deslocalizacion de beneficios BEPS. 
Implicancias para los países en vías de desarrollo. Tax Justice Network, 2014. Available at: 
https://www.world-
psi.org/sites/default/files/documents/research/es_tjn_briefing_beps_for_developing_countries.pdf 
35 The Group of Twenty is the premier forum for its members’ international economic cooperation and decision-
making. Its membership comprises 19 countries plus the European Union. G20 leaders meet annually. In 
addition, Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors meet regularly during the year to discuss ways to 
strengthen the global economy, reform international financial institute ions, improve financial regulation and 
implement the key economic reforms that are needed in each member economy. See in:  https://www.g20.org. 
36 See: http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps-about.htm  
37 See: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/tax-committee/tc-beps.html 
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organizations.38 Notwithstanding the fact that it seems that the matters discussed in the BEPS 
Report are not related to the allocation of taxing rights regarding passive investment income 
in DTCs between developing and developed countries, they implicitly are.39 Developing 
countries are called upon to be transparent, to enact “fair” tax laws, while the main issues, 
such as source versus residence / fair allocation of taxing rights and development, still have 
to be addressed.  The OECD/G20 efforts to combat the base erosion caused by shifting profits 
does not recognize that this topic very much falls within its scope.40 
 
The structure of DTCs exacerbates the conflict between residence and source principles, 
especially in DTCs between countries that are at different stages of development. Issues 
related to permanent establishments, the attribution of profits to permanent establishments, 
as well as the treatment of passive income are salient examples.  
 
A fair international tax equilibrium and sound tax policy therefore needs to be found. The 
needs of developing countries to raise their economies and to protect their domestic tax base 
should not be disregarded or silenced. The right to development41 of developing nations42 43 
should not be excluded because of the international policy of developed countries.44 DTCs 
should help developing nations to increase foreign investment, and to access foreign debt and 
technology. More importantly, the assistance of developed countries to the development of 
developing and less developed nations should not be limited to aid,45 but it should be 
commensurate with a sound economic global policy, including a tax policy for all and not 
only for a select group of developed countries. Since this ideal may be regarded as utopian, 
 
38 Ibid, 36.  
39 Brauner, Yariv. What the BEPS. Florida Tax Review, Vol 16, 2014. 
40 OECD BEPS Project, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting, 2013. Available at: 
https://www.oecd.org/ctp/BEPSActionPlan.pdf   
41 United Nations, General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development, document A/RES/41/128, 
Geneva, 1986. Available at:: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/41/a41r128.htm  
42 United Nations, Human Rights, The Right to Development at a Glance. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/events/righttodevelopment/pdf/rtd_at_a_glance.pdf  
43 Rich, Roland Y. The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right. Virginia Journal of International 
Law, Vol 23, 1983. 
44 Souza de Man, Fernando. Taxation of Cross-Border Provisions of Services in Double Tax Conventions 
between Developed and Developing Countries: A Proposal for New Guidelines. PhD Thesis Maastricht 
University, Faculty of Law, 2013. 
45 Braun, Julia; and Zagler, Martin. The true art of the tax deal: Evidence on aid flows and bilateral double tax 
agreements. World Economy, Wiley, Vol 41, 2018.   
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developing countries therefore need to strengthen their tax policies and coordinate their 
efforts in this regard.46  
 
Since the scope of proceeds derived from passive investment is ample, this research focuses 
on gross receipts from dividends (derived from shares of foreign companies’ / equity 
finance), interest (cross-border loans) and royalties (cross-border transfer of technology). 
And it does so in an approach to DTCs, in particular, to those proposed by international 
organizations, which are primarily premised on the United Nations Model Tax Convention 
(UN MTC).47 This model follows a classification and assignment method48 that is almost a 
copy of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Model Tax 
Convention (OECD MTC), which was built on the previous models and the work of the 
League of Nations (LN). As is stated in their titles, both MTCs are designed to guide the 
DTCs of developed or industrialized countries with developed, industrialized, or developing 
countries, and they are not designed for DTCs between developing and developed or 
industrialized countries. The UN MTC, however, is expected to fill this gap. 
 
From this perspective, alongside determining the rationale behind the actual criteria / 
principles, the specific goal of this research is to establish whether the UN MTC approach in 
relation to the taxation of passive investment income is appropriate for DTCs between 
developing and developed countries. 
 
Lastly, and regarding methodology and structure, the research method of this study departs 
from the premise that DTCs between developing and developed countries do not contribute 
on the route of developing countries to development. The rationale behind this premise is 
that DTCs only focus their effort on the elimination of international double taxation, a role 
 
46 Rodriguez, Saúl Alberto. La armonización tributaria en América Latina. UNMSM Lima, Vol 5, 1998.  
47 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Introduction, Origin of the United Nations Model Convention: 
Paragraph 1:“United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries (the United Nations Model Convention) forms part of the continuing international efforts aimed at 
eliminating double taxation; Paragraph 4: “The desirability of promoting greater inflows of foreign investment 
to developing countries on conditions which are politically acceptable as well as economically and socially 
beneficial has been frequently affirmed in resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.”  
48 Concept defined further in this study. See: 1.2.4 
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that has being well assumed by the positive evolution of domestic laws in the past few 
decades. For the same reason, the limitation to tax that source / developing countries assume 
under actual DTCs is no longer justified. The author supports this statement by combining 
historical and conceptual methodology in this research. The historical side was used to show 
that actual rules governing allocation of taxing rights in DTCs between developing and 
developed countries were justified in the first stage of evolution of Model Tax Conventions 
but, due to the positive evolution already mentioned, it can be stated that today those rules 
shift taxable profits from the source country to the residence country. The conceptual side is 
present in the whole research. The author, due to the lack of doctrine on the matter, took the 
challenging path of analysing the original theories that governed the allocation of taxing 
rights, but also, of including his own abstract ideas as bases to support the proposal. The 
premise of this conceptual approach was the one that allowed the author to develop a 
completely new approach to govern the allocation of taxing rights in DTCs between 
developing and developed countries, an approach that includes development as one of the 
main goals.  
 
The work is divided in VII Parts. Part I analyses economy and taxation, giving a general 
description of the economic worldwide environment of the past years and the relation of the 
above with the location of developing countries in the economic map. Part I also provides an 
overview of the influence of the legal framework and international tax law on developing 
countries’ stage of development. The core elements of analysis are the role of DTCs as a 
factor in increasing foreign investment, source and residence principles, economic and 
juridical double taxation, the principles governing allocation of taxing rights in DTCs, and 
the UN MTC treatment of active and passive investment income.  Part II makes a full 
historical review of the evolution and principles governing the allocation of taxing rights in 
DTCs. This Part gives special value to developing countries’ influence in the Mexico Model, 
the Decision 40 of the Andean Community, and the UN MTC. In terms of historical sources, 
this Part also analyses the treatment of passive investment income in the MTC of the League 
of Nations 1928, the OECD MTC and the UN MTC from 1963 and 1980 respectively, until 
today.  Part III provides a proper update of the debate. Among other things, this Part conducts 
an in-depth doctrinal analysis of DTCs and developing countries and the causal relation 
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between DTCs and the increase of foreign investments. Topics such as the EU experience, 
tax sparing clauses and matching credits, and bilateral investment treaties, are closely 
examined and analysed. Special reference is made in this Part to the latest developments 
related to the matter, i.e. the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Reports, the Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting, and the Principle Purpose Test. Parts IV, V and VI apply tests to dividends, interest, 
and royalties, respectively, and as an outcome, contain the proposals regarding allocation of 
taxing rights for these three types of incomes in DTCs between developing and developed 






















PART I – ECONOMY AND TAXATION 
1.1 A FAILED ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK  
 
 
The world economy has been engulfed in crisis for the last decade. According to the World 
Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the recovery is still weak and 
precarious.49 An analysis of the indicators is worrying, particularly for developing countries. 
The actual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth in 2020 shows that, whilst the value of 
the annual percentage change in the European Union is 4.7, in the Asian region (Asean/5) it 
is 8.1 and in the Latin America and the Caribbean regions is 3.6.50 The regional inward direct 
investment positions by region, as of the end of 2019, show that South American countries 
are at the bottom of this list, with African countries occupying the lowest positions. 51 No 
country from either of these regions features in top ten of the Inward Direct Investment 
ranking.52 The same applies regarding Outward Direct Investment. 53 
 
Furthermore, according to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), the road to global FDI recovery is bumpy and long, especially given the low 
growth rates.54 55 
 
This status is particularly worrying, especially when one considers its causes and impact. 
One of the impeding factors for inclusive growth is the competitiveness gap that exists 
between regions. As the data show, the competitive position of Latin America, as a good 
example of a group of developing countries, is not very good in this respect.56 According to 
 




50 International Monetary Fund, DataMapper. Real GDP growth annual percent change. Available at: 
http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD  
51 See: http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=60564265  
52 See: http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227425  
53 See: https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=61227425  
54 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2015. p. 2. Available at:  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf  
55 UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2017. p. 10. Available at:  
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf  
56 World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report, 2016–2017. p.11. Available at:   
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the World Economic Forum, growth rates in the region have fallen, productivity has been 
falling on average during the last 20 years, exports have not recovered, and several countries 
are now on the verge of falling into a recession.57 
 
Another factor to consider is the FDI imbalance. FDI is fundamental for economic growth – 
for both developed and developing countries.  Its importance is so crucial that it is considered 
a key driver in financing the post-2015 development agenda.58 The patterns of FDI inflows 
and outflows show that the situation for developing nations is not particularly ideal. 
According to the 2020 UNCTAD Report “developing economies are expected to see the 
biggest fall in FDI because they rely more on investment in global value chain intensive and 
extractive industries, which have been severely hit, and because they are not able to put in 
place the same economic support measures as developed economies”59. The Report also 
states that “overall, 54 economies introduced at least 107 measures affecting foreign 
investment in 2019; threequarters were in the direction of liberalization, promotion and 
facilitation, with developing countries and emerging economies in Asia most active”. 
Investment flows in Africa fell by 10% to US$45 billion and Latin America and the 
Caribbean are expected to halve in 2020 from the $164 billion received last year. In 2019, 
FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean grew by 10 per cent to $164 billion, driven by 
increased flows to Brazil, Chile and Colombia.  
 
In addition to the above, the different models of the digital versus the traditional economy 
are also worth mentioning. The 2016 UNCTAD Report points out that developing and 
transition-economy MNEs are slowly closing the productivity gap. According to the report: 
“The involvement of MNEs from developing and transition countries in the digital economy 
and related equipment manufacture is resulting in the narrowing of the productivity gap with 
developed-country MNEs. Improving labour productivity is especially evident in industries 
 
https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-global-competitiveness-report-2016-2017-1.  
57 Ibid, 56 p. 20. 
58 UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2015. p. 120. The importance of sustainable revenue bases as the 
largest, surest and most sustainable way of funding development.  





such as computers, electronics, electrical equipment, textiles and apparel, construction and 
trade”.60  
 
The success of the digital economy seems to be exceptional. The improvement in the 
technological development of developing countries is, however, questionable. In developing 
nations, apart from the Asian nations, the number of patents, models and similar intellectual 
property granted is very limited and the data are not comparable with the numbers granted in 
developed economies.  
 
The statistics pertaining to the internationalization of MNEs worldwide show that their 
performance in the developing and transition economies is slowly improving, however. 
 
More factors and issues could be pointed out in this regard. This, however, would fall outside 
the scope of this research. Instead, the aim of this research is to establish how international 
tax measures, in particular those that are related to the international taxation of passive 




1.2 LEGAL FRAMEWORK - INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW  
 
 
Although corporate taxation is seen as part of the “set of international public-good 
problems”,61 the role that has been played by international taxation in that failure has not 
been the subject of much analysis, except for the attention paid by the OECD in recent years 
to tax avoidance and tax evasion and its consequences for the erosion of countries’ tax bases. 
According to the UNCTAD World Investment Report, tackling tax avoidance is at the apex 
of the policy principles, as the image below shows.62  
 
 
60 UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2016. p. 31. 
61 Ibid, 48. 





There have been a number of international tax-related issues in the crisis over the last few 
years, in particular regarding the incomes that are the subject of analysis in this research.  For 
instance, according to the IMF, “Debt bias’ (tax provisions favouring finance by debt rather 
than equity) is now widely recognized as posing a stability risk”.63 The impact of tax 
technology-related provisions (e.g. patent boxes), is an example of a tax technological 
measure that has been challenged by the BEPS Report,64 requiring alignment of the benefits 
of these regimes with substantive research and development activity.65  
 
Furthermore, structural approaches to income taxation in developed countries may make 
useless the many tax technological incentives offered by developing countries in order to 
 
63 International Monetary Fund, Tax Policy, Leverage and Macroeconomic Stability, 2016. Available at: 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2016/100716.pdf  
64 OECD BEPS Project: Final Report Action 5: Countering Harmful Tax Practices More Effectively, Taking 
into Account Transparency and Substance, 2015. Available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/tax/countering-harmful-tax-practices-more-effectively-taking-into-account-
transparency-and-substance-action-5-2015-final-report-9789264241190-en.htm 




attract FDI.66  In this scenario investors benefit from DTCs due to the certainty and equality 
of treatment associated with them.67  
 
The role of DTCs in attracting FDI should not be underestimated. Until very recently it was 
not very common to find statistics regarding the connection between DTCs and foreign 
investment. Legal scholars normally took for granted the fact that DTCs are beneficial to the 
economy of the source country. However, the latest figures in the UNCTAD World 
Investment Report suggest otherwise. The fiscal contribution of foreign affiliates of MNEs 







66 Toaze, Deborah. Tax Sparing: Good Intentions, Unintended Results. Canadian Tax Journal, Vol 49, 2001.  
67 Ronald B. Davies. Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential versus Performance. International 
Tax and Public Finance. Vol 11, 2004.  
68 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2015. p. 185. 
 
 24 
According to the 2014 UNCTAD World Investment Report on Substantial Development 
Goals (SDG): “[t]axation is also an important policy tool to correct market failures in 
respect of the SDG impact of investment”. The burden is placed on developing countries to 
broaden their tax base, improve tax collection capabilities and combat tax avoidance.69 
Although UNCTAD stresses the importance of ensuring policy coherence and the interaction 
of policies (including investment, trade, tax, amongst others),70 it is not clear how this is to 
be achieved in practice. For the time being, the concerns of both developed and developing 
countries relate to the erosion of the tax base due to tax avoidance and tax evasion. The BEPS 
Report focuses its efforts on those matters, and in particular, on profit shifting. The role of 






69 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2014. p. 180.  
70 Ibid, 70. 
71 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2015. p. 190. 
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Related to this matter, the European Commission (EC) published a plan to strengthen the 
fight against tax fraud and international tax evasion (COM (2012) 722/2 73 and C (2012) 8806 
74) on 6 December 2012 which, amongst other measures, included recommendations to the 
EU Member States to limit aggressive planning through clauses in both domestic law and 
DTCs, subjecting the tax treatment of income or of expenses in other states in order to ensure 
taxation in one or both Member States. As was stated by the EC, this plan also represents a 
general contribution to the wider international debate on taxation and its aim is to assist the 
G20 and the G8 in its on-going work in this field.75 It also recommended the adoption of a 
general anti-abuse rule so as to allow tax authorities to pursue artificial transactions which 
lack economic substance. On 20 June 2016, the Council of the European Union adopted 
 
72 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2015. p. 201. 
73 European Commission. COM (2012) 722/2. Communication from the Commission to the European 




74 European Commission. C (2012) 8806. Commission Recommendation.   Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/files/docs/body/c_2012_8806_en.pdf 
75 Ibid, 74. 
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Directive (EU) 2016/116476 establishing rules against tax avoidance practices that directly 
affect the functioning of the internal market. The Directive contains five legally-binding anti-
abuse measures which all Member States should apply against common forms of aggressive 
tax planning.  
 
The BEPS Report deals with a number of actions that intend to combat profit shifting that is 
mainly caused by aggressive tax planning in the channelling of income to low tax 
jurisdictions. A number of proposed actions relate to passive investments income, due to its 
very nature (e.g., Actions 377 – 478 – 679). Although BEPS does not intend to deal with issues 
relating to the allocation of income, actions related to income from passive investments 
ensure that current issues in relation to the allocation of such income become salient.  
 
As stated, although developed and developing countries are involved,80 their degree of 
involvement is based on different reasons. All countries believe that by combating profit 
shifting, the erosion of tax bases can be prevented. This, however, may not prove to be true. 
The reasons are the same as those discussed in this research regarding developing countries 
and DTCs: although a number of actions are needed to improve the coherence of international 
taxation, the erosion of the tax base will continue, in particular for developing countries, on 
the basis that they are source countries, and because the application of the rules focuses on 
the protection of countries of residence of the investors, creditors, or technology/patent 
 
76 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164, 12 July 2016. Laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market. Available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32016L1164  




78 OECD BEPS Project: Final Report Action 4:  Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments, 2015. Available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/tax/limiting-base-erosion-involving-interest-deductions-and-other-financial-payments-
action-4-2015-final-report-9789264241176-en.htm 
79 OECD BEPS Project: Final Report Action 6: Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 
Circumstances, 2015. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/preventing-the-granting-of-treaty-benefits-in-inappropriate-circumstances-action-6-
2015-final-report-9789264241695-en.htm  





developers. This is, on the one hand, due to the unresolved conflict between source and 
residence countries, and on the other, by not considering the attraction of foreign investment 
as a goal of DTCs and international tax policies. 
 
 
1.2.1 DTC EFFECTS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
 
DTCs, as a determinant factor in increasing foreign investment and achieving development, 
were recognized by the UN in 1967 through the United Nations Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) by stating that it was: “(…) confident that tax treaties between developed and 
developing countries can serve to promote the flow of investment useful to the economic 
development of the latter, especially if the treaties provide favourable tax treatment to such 
investments on the part of the countries of origin, both by outright tax relief and by measures 
which would ensure to them the full benefit of any tax incentive allowed by the country of 
investment”.81  The above was ratified by the most recent version of the Manual for the 
Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties of the UN.82  
 
The increase in investments between treaty partners is, in theory, and at least for developing 
countries, an economic starting point in the decision to sign a DTC. 83 84 The benefits that are 
offered to investors from one treaty partner should, in theory, be compensated by the same 
benefits given to that country’s own investors by the other treaty partner.85 86 The system to 
 
81 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1273 (XLIII), E/4429, 1967. 
82 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management. Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2019.  
83Baggerman-Noudari, Khadija; and Offermanns, René. Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries: 
Some Tax Considerations and Other Related Legal Matters. IBFD, Bulletin for International Taxation, 2016. 
84 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Introduction, Origin of the United Nations Model Convention: 
Paragraph 4: “The desirability of promoting greater inflows of foreign investment to developing countries on 
conditions which are politically acceptable as well as economically and socially beneficial has been frequently 
affirmed in resolutions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations 
and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.” 
85 Barthel, Fabian; Busse, Matthias; and Neumayer, Eric. The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign 
Direct Investment: Evidence from large dyadic panel data, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol 28, 2010. 
86 Easson, Alex. Do We Still Need Tax Treaties, IBFD, Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol 54, N°12, 2000.  
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limit the source country’s taxation rights in relation to passive investment income and give 
residual taxing rights to the residence country mostly have a neutral impact in treaties 
between two countries that are at roughly the same level of economic and industrial 
development, due to the existence of similar investment and income flows so that neither 
country receives a grossly disproportionate share of the tax revenue.87 Moreover, as long as 
the capital flows are more or less reciprocal, DTCs can reduce the administrative burden of 
imposing withholding taxes, and the net revenue will be more or less the same.88 In that case, 
the OECD MTC approach of sharing taxing rights in relation to passive investment income, 
by following the reciprocity principle, regarding the imposition of withholding taxes – only 
regarding interest and dividends – can be justified due to the neutrality that such an MTC 
creates, if it is followed by countries with similar investment flows. The above leads to the 
result that the benefits of DTCs – the elimination of juridical double taxation and the 
reduction of administrative complexities – can promote the increase of foreign investments 
in a more or less reciprocal way. 
 
Whilst the above is interesting for countries with similar levels of investment flows, it is 
certainly not when there are dissimilar investment flows.89 The treatment of passive 
investment income in the UN MTC mostly follows the approach that was designed by the 
OECD for DTCs between developed countries. When there are no similar investment flows, 
the host / source country – in a DTC that follows the UN MTC approach, this is typically the 
developing country – is forced to limit its taxing rights regarding passive investment income. 
If it is not signed in a context in which there is reciprocal passive investment income 
generated / sourced in the developed country, which can be taxed by the developing country 
as a residence country, the result is an undesired shift of tax revenue from the developing to 
the developed country. When the relationship is similar in terms of investments – usually in 
DTCs between developed countries – the source country does not incur tax costs, because the 
tax revenue they lose on inward foreign investment flows is offset by the tax revenue they 
 
87 Barthel, Fabian; Busse, Matthias; and Neumayer, Eric. The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign 
Direct Investment: Evidence from large dyadic panel data, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol 28, 2010. 
88 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction, University of Michigan Law School, 2007. 
Available at : http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1048441.  
89 Bloningen, Bruce A. A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants. Atlantic Economic Journal, 
Vol 33, 2005.  
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gain from outward foreign investment flows. 90 This statement does not apply in the context 
of a DTC that has been concluded between countries with dissimilar investments flows.  
 
The effort of renouncing the ability to collect revenues in relation to passive investment 
income – income that will be taxed by the residence country recognizing only a credit for the 
limited withholding tax at source - does not seem to be worthwhile if the DTC is not able to 
positively attract foreign investment. The cost is only granting foreign investors legal 
certainty and stability.91 
 
The traditional belief of developing countries that a DTC with a developed country will 
increase foreign investment has not been consistently proven by scientific research. The only 
empirical evidence is the fact that as the size of asymmetry of foreign investments grows, the 
scope for cooperation decreases, and negotiated withholding taxes tend to be higher as a 
result,92 thereby distorting the analysis of which country the economic activity that gives rise 
to the income belongs to. The above statement regarding the increase in withholding taxes is 
seen by developing countries as a conventional solution to the problem of the allocation of 
taxing rights and development. Withholding taxes distort the economic logic of the 
agreement, and they do not tackle the real problem, which is the voluntary limitation of 
developing countries’ legitimate rights to tax passive investment income in pursuance of a 
superior goal, namely development.   
 
Richard Chisik and Ronald Davies’ work in this field93 is based on data from US and OECD 
bilateral tax treaties up until 1992. As a consequence, it does not apply to the UN MTC and 
to the reality of DTCs between developing and developed countries, at least in theory. 
Nonetheless, what can definitively be concluded from that work is the fact that: “As the size 
of asymmetry of foreign investments grows, reciprocity principle regarding withholding 
 
90 Baker, Paul L. An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and their Effect on Foreign Direct Investment. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol 21, 2014. 
91 Davies, Ronald B. Tax Treaties and Foreign Direct Investment: Potential versus Performance. International 
Tax and Public Finance. Vol. 11, 2004.   
92 Chisik, Richard; and Davies, Ronald B. Asymmetric FDI and tax-treaty bargaining: theory and evidence, 
Journal of Public Economics, Vol 88, 2004. 
93 Ibid, 93. 
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taxes over passive investment income does not achieve justice anymore”.94 This conclusion 
also holds true in relation to DTCs between developing and developed countries that are 
based on the UN MTC. 
 
These facts must be taken into consideration by developing countries when agreeing to a 
DTC with a developed country, especially due to the harmful effects of limiting their taxing 
rights in relation to passive investment incomes.  
 
The research conducted by Eric Neumayer in 200695 claimed that: “Developing countries 
with more Double Tax Conventions with major capital exporting developed countries benefit 
from a higher overall Foreign Direct Investment stock and share of stock and receive more 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows as well as a higher share of inflows”. However, the 
research stated that such a conclusion was only valid regarding middle-income countries96 
and not, therefore, to low-income countries.97 The above conclusions open a window to an 
objective conclusion, i.e., that if we have to differentiate between developing countries, then 
it may be done according to the level of development of the country. In the same vein, it may 
be an option to opt for an alternative approach, namely not to differentiate according to the 
level of development of the country, but to focus on the real impact of the investment in the 
host / source / developing country.  
 
 
94 Ibid, 93. 
95 Neumayer, Eric. Do double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?. The 
Journal of Development Studies, Vol 43, 2007.  
96 Ibid., 96. Appendix 1. Middle-income countries (Gross National Income in 2001 more than $745): Albania, 
Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cape 
Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic , Dominica , Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt , El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Fiji, Gabon, Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, 
Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea (Rep.), Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia FYR, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Seychelles, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. 
Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, and Venezuela. 
97 Ibid., 96. Appendix 1. Low-income countries (Gross National Income in 2001 less than or equal to 
$745):Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Kyrgyz Republic, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe.  
 
 31 
Notwithstanding how conclusive Neumayer’s research seems to be, in the analysis of the 
allocation of taxing rights in relation to passive investment income in the UN MTC, that 
conclusion cannot be used as a valid argument for developing countries to justify concluding 
DTCs with developed countries under the current rules. Firstly, this is so because the research 
was not based on treaties that only followed the UN MTC98 and, secondly, because 96% of 
low-income countries that were considered in that research – to which the results do not apply 
– are members of the UN,99 and it is likely that most of them intend to use the UN MTC in 
the negotiation of a DTC with a developed country.    
 
Furthermore, Paul L. Baker, in his research entitled “An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties 
and their Effect on Foreign Direct Investments”100 claims, by using a segmented data set and 
matching econometrics, that DTCs have no effect on foreign investment from developed to 
less developed countries. The reason for this is because developed countries unilaterally 
provide for relief on double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion, regardless of the 
treaty status of the host country.  
 
Finally, and by way of contrast to the tendency in the literature regarding the small or even 
negative effect of DTCs on foreign investment, recent research carried out by Arjan Lejour 
from the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, entitled “The foreign investment 
effects of tax treaties”,101 arrived at a different conclusion. That research concludes that new 
DTCs increase bilateral FDI by 21% if the tax treaties include geographic variables. After 
ten years, the effects are less. The analysis was based on bilateral treaties which specifically 
dealt with taxes on profits and returned earnings such as dividends, interest income and 
royalties. Notwithstanding how relevant the conclusions of Arjan Lejour’s work are for 
developed countries, his research and conclusions are unfortunately not applicable for 
developing countries. Based on data covering all bilateral foreign investment information of 
reporting OECD countries to all their partner countries, between 1985 and 2011, i.e., 34 
 
98 Ibid, 96. p. 6.  
99 United Nations, List of UN Member States.  Available at: http://www.un.org/es/members/  
100 Baker, Paul L. An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and their Effect on Foreign Direct Investment, 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol 21, 2014.  
101 Lejour, Arjan. The foreign investment effects of tax treaties. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis, 2014.  
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OECD countries reporting inward and outward stocks of 233 partners countries, it is not 
possible to apply the conclusions of that research to developing countries.  
 
The actual status of the UN MTC does not provide incentives for foreign investment in any 
special way. The UN effort has been more related to a discussion on the source-residence 
distinction, instead of on designing tax rules that aim to incentivize foreign investment in 
developing countries.  
 
The fact that the UN MTC reinforces source country taxation more than the OECD MTC 
does not mean that the UN MTC has achieved more fairness in relation to the allocation of 
taxing rights. It only means the application of a non-economically justified principle that is 
stated in the UN Manual for Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties as follows: “The United 
Nations Model Convention represents a compromise between the source principle and the 
residence principle. However, it gives more weight to the source principle than does the 
OECD Model Convention (...)”. There is no explanation of how “giving more weight” will 
allow the model to achieve the deserved fairness.  
 
Therefore, when a developing country decides to negotiate a DTC with a developed country, 
the most important factors to be analysed are the potential loss of tax revenue versus the 
increase in foreign investment. This is because the realities of a developing country do not 
fit into a system that is based on the assumption that there are similar investment flows 
between treaty partners.  
 
The OECD MTC solves this problem on the basis of the expected reciprocity of investment 
flows. The policy is based on the premise that taxing rights between the two treaty partners 
will be balanced. According to this premise, DTCs between two developed countries are 
expected to have little revenue effect on either country.102 The above cannot be said regarding 
investments flows between developing and developed countries that are, in essence, highly 
 
102 Christians, Allison. Tax Treaties for Investment and Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa: A Case Study  in The Effect 
of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and 
Investment Flows. eds. Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs. Oxford University Press, 2009.  
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asymmetric. Entering into a DTC under those conditions often leads to a loss of tax revenue 
for the developing country.103 
 
The OECD MTC approach, and therefore that of the UN MTC, is based on the assumption 
that a reciprocal reduction of withholding tax plus a tax credit will increase fairness and avoid 
juridical double taxation, while promoting an increase in foreign investment.104 This 
statement is definitely not applicable for DTCs between developing and developed countries.  
 
If DTCs do not increase foreign investment from developed to developing countries,105 the 
traditional fear of developing country negotiators, that is the necessity to conclude DTCs in 
order to attract foreign investment, loses sense. This misunderstanding surely comes from 
the fact that the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries106 states that the encouragement of economic growth by addressing 
international double taxation and other barriers to cross-border trade and investment is one 
of the objectives of the UN MTC. The fifth paragraph of the introduction to the 2017 UN 
MTC stresses that “(…) the growth of investment flows between countries depends to a large 
extent on prevailing investment climate. The prevention or elimination of international 
double taxation in respect of the same income, the effects of which are harmful to the 
exchange of goods and services and to the movement of capital and persons, constitutes a 
significant component of such a climate”. 
 
Notwithstanding the statement above, the UN MTC, instead of designing rules to prevent or 
eliminate double taxation that concomitantly promote the growth of investment, decided to 
follow the OECD MTC in this regard.  
 
103 Barthel, Fabian; Busse, Matthias; and Neumayer, Eric. The Impact of Double Taxation Treaties on Foreign 
Direct Investment: Evidence from large dyadic panel data, Contemporary Economic Policy, Vol 28, 2010. 
104 United Nations, Handbook on Selected Issues in Administration of Double Tax Treaties for Developing 
Countries. Edited by Alexander Trepelkov, Harry Tonino and Dominika Halka. 2013. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/UN_Handbook_DTT_Admin.pdf 
105 Baker, Paul L. An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and their Effect on Foreign Direct Investment. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol 21, 2014. 
106 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management. Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 





Theoretically, the creation of the UN MTC in 1980 was aimed at reinforcing the position of 
developing countries in DTC negotiations between themselves and with developed countries. 
In 1968, one year after the UN undertook the work in the field of international taxation, the 
Ad Hoc Group of Experts on DTCs between Developed and Developing Countries started to 
formulate guidelines for the negotiation of bilateral DTCs between developed and developing 
countries, which were adopted over the course of seven meetings that took place until 1977. 
The guidelines were published in 1979 in the Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax 
Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries.107 The following year, the UN 
published the UN MTC. That publication included an MTC and attached commentaries, both 
of which were prepared and approved by the Group of Experts. 
 
In the 1970s, the problem was even greater than it is today. A large number of 
disadvantageous DTCs were concluded by newly independent countries as part of the general 
assumption of rights and obligations from their former colonial powers.108  
 
The conclusion of DTC agreements by developing countries with developed countries, as 
well as DTCs that apply residence taxation of passive investment income without a revenue 
benefit for them, must be based on the belief that there is something to be gained. Developing 
countries normally have a weak and vulnerable bargaining position in the negotiation of these 
kinds of agreements and developed countries refuse to make concessions during the 
negotiations. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable when they are recipients of 
indispensable capital and technical assistance from developed countries with which DTCs 
have been or are to be negotiated. In conclusion, it seems that there is a belief among 
developing countries that tax revenues must be forgone, due to the acceptance of DTCs with 
a preference for residence taxation.109 110  
 
107 Lennard, Michael. The Purpose and Current Status of the United Nations Tax Work. IBFD, Asia-Pacific Tax 
Bulletin, Vol 14, 2008. 
108 Irish, Charles R. International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation. The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 23, 1974.  
109 Braun, Julia; and Zagler, Martin. The true art of the tax deal: Evidence on aid flows and bilateral double tax 
agreements. World Economy, Wiley, Vol 41, 2018.    




The Manual for the Negotiation of Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing 
countries guides and informs developing countries when they are negotiating DTCs with 
developed countries, considering the tendency that developed countries policies often 
outweigh those of the developing countries due to their weak position in terms of knowledge, 
information and bargaining power. For the purposes of this research, this line of 
argumentation seems to be obsolete. Notwithstanding that there are still some countries for 
which knowledge and information are lacking and their bargaining position is weak, the 
majority of developing countries are involved in international commerce, and they 
understand the effects of double taxation, and have understood those effects for more than 
three decades.  
 
Whilst developed countries tend to have a big net of DTCs, developing countries have fewer 
DTCs, thereby leaving the taxation of an international transaction under the scope of the 
domestic provisions.111 112 There are not many differences as a result.  Countries, and 
especially developed countries, have incorporated rules that are analogous to those set out in 
their MTCs into their domestic tax systems.113 In fact, for developing countries the lack of 
DTCs may actually have a positive impact on their tax revenues.114  Instead, developed 
countries are the ones that, at least in theory, benefit from DTCs signed with developing 
 
111 Byrne, Peter. Los Convenios Internacionales para evitar la doble tributación. Política Fiscal, 1999. 
Available at: http://www.ifaperu.org/uploads/articles/46_06_CT24_PDB.pdf   
112 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2003: “Conclusion of a treaty between two developed countries is facilitated by their 
approximately similar levels of development so that the reciprocal flows of trade and investment — and hence 
the respective gain or loss of revenue to the parties from reducing taxes on those flows — have been relatively 
equal in magnitude. The presumption of equal reciprocal advantages is not valid when the negotiating parties 
are at vastly different stages of economic development. Consequently, developing countries have, generally 
speaking, been reluctant to entered into tax treaties unless they can reasonably assume that the treaties will 
ensure that those detriments are likely to be offset by benefit flowing from the treaty.”  
113 Watson, John. Multinational And The Great Tax Debate. Tolley & Lexis RPSL Tax, 2013. Available at: 
https://www.taxjournal.com/docs/article-files/multinationals-and-the-great-tax-
debate.pdf?sfvrsn=29996e20_2   
114 Serrani, Esteban; with the collaboration of Falco, Adrian. Acuerdos para Evitar la Doble Tributación en 
América Latina. Análisis de los vínculos entre los impuestos, el comercio y las finanzas responsables.  






countries by receiving a share of the tax revenue attributable to foreign source income. 
Furthermore, almost all countries have unilateral rules in place to avoid double taxation, 
either through the exemption of foreign source income or by granting a foreign tax credit or 
providing a deduction for foreign taxes paid abroad.  
 
In a scenario where there is no DTC in force, the domestic law of capital importing countries 
– developing countries – will tax passive investment income obtained by non-residents 
without any conventional limitation. Capital exporter countries – developed countries –  will 
normally tax and eliminate double taxation under domestic laws. This does not mean a higher 
tax burden to the investor than that which it would face in a scenario with a DTC that follows 
the current UN MTC. Since the adoption of credit system, which was recommended by the 
UN MTC for the elimination of double taxation in relation to passive investment income, this 
is part of a shared system of taxation where not only the residence country, but also the source 
country, has a right to tax. Ultimately, unless in the case of a participation exemption (which 
in practice is the approach followed by the majority of developed countries regarding 
dividend income derived from business investments/FDI), with or without a DTC in force, 
passive investment income will be taxed at the rate imposed by the residence country, or 
higher, if there is an excess of credit.    
 
Until now, the best bargaining position of developed countries in treaty negotiations with 
developing countries has been related with a matter of knowledge and information. The 
bargaining position of developing countries has been underestimated as a result.  
 
The weakness of developing countries in this field leaves these countries in a position in 
which they must agree, if it is possible, to the terms of the UN MTC as it is currently designed.  
In other words, the actual UN MTC has become the lesser of two evils, upon which to base 
a DTC between a developing and a developed country, even though there is no necessity to 
agree to such terms due to the lack of incentives for investors to invest in the host / source 
country and the known harmful effect of shift of tax revenue from the host / source to the 




The literature has considered the UN MTC to be an excellent representation of the intention 
to re-balance the allocation of taxing rights regarding the taxation of passive investment 
income,115 without considering that by distorting the application of the economic allegiance 
theory, the only real consequence has been the limitation of the discussion about fairness 
regarding the taxation of passive investment income to the rate of withholding tax to be 
charged at source.  Such an approach, no doubt created by the decision to follow the OECD 
MTC and adjust some features and accordingly reinforce taxation at source, has left behind 
what should really matter for developing countries when concluding a DTC with a developed 
country. Those adjustments can solve some unjustified positions of the OECD regarding the 
taxation of passive investment income, but they do not achieve fairness regarding the benefits 
that a DTC must bring to the signatories.  
 
The UN Guidelines116 formed the basis of the 1980 UN MTC. Therefore, the sources used in 
the creation of the guidelines indirectly influenced the creation of the MTC. The Group of 
Experts decided to use the OECD MTC as the main source, with the aim of taking advantage 
of the technical expertise that was embodied in that convention and from its commentaries. 
Moreover, the UN argued in favour of using this source for reasons of practical convenience, 
which stemmed from the fact that the convention was being used by OECD member countries 
in the negotiation of tax treaties, not only with each other but also with developing 
countries.117 The above argument is, however, slightly worrisome. The argument that the 
OECD MTC was to be used because it was used in the negotiations between developed and 
developing countries is meaningless, when the aim is to develop an MTC without the 
mismatches that the OECD MTC has when it is applied for agreements between a developing 
 
115 See: Moreno Uribe, Heriberto; and Arce Vargas, Jorge. Importancia de establecer un acuerdo para evitar 
la Doble Tributación México-España.  Mesa Estrategia Empresarial. V Encuentro estatal de investigación en 
las ciencias económico administrativas y primer encuentro de integración y articulación de la investigación. 
Universidad Autonoma del Estado de Hidalgo, 2010; Daurer, Veronika. Tax Treaties and Developing 
Countries. Intertax, Vol 42, 2014; Dornelles F, The Relevance of Double Taxation Treaties for Developing 
Countries. Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol 43, 1989; and Qureshi, Asif. Tax Treaty Needs of Developing 
Countries, in UN Draft Model Taxation Convention. IFA Congress Seminar Series 31, Vol. 4, Wolters Kluwer 
Law, 1979. 
116 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management. Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2019. Available at: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/manual-
bilateral-tax-treaties-update-2019.pdf 
117 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Introduction.  
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and a developed country. It seems that the aim was to consider the OECD MTC to be 
adequate to be used by developed countries when negotiating a treaty with a developing 
country, instead of building an exclusive and fair MTC that could be followed by developing 
countries when negotiating treaties with developed countries.  
 
Notwithstanding that the introduction to the UN MTC states that: “(...) it was fully understood 
that there was no presumption of correctness to be accorded to the OECD Model Convention, 
and that the decisions of the Group were in no way required to be governed by the OECD 
text”, the result is a similar approach to the OECD MTC. The UN MTC was created using 
the OECD MTC as the main reference text,118 with the consequence that the criteria regarding 
taxation of passive investment income were also included in the UN MTC.  
 
Since no specific target withholding rates were established in the UN MTC, the approach 
regarding passive investment income simply relies on the expectation that DTCs based on 
the UN MTC would include a positive withholding rate on royalties and that the withholding 
rates on dividends and interest would exceed the rates recommended in the OECD MTC.119  
 
 
1.2.2 SOURCE AND RESIDENCE PRINCIPLES – INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW 
 
 
The principles of source and residence are the two main principles that underpin the design 
of any tax system. For countries, the jurisdiction to impose taxes is an expression of 
sovereignty that is normally based on the application of one, or a combination of both 
principles. This normally results in the decision of “limited and unlimited tax liabilities”,120 
 
118 Ibid, 118. 
119 McIntyre, Michael J. Developing Countries and International Cooperation on Income Tax Matters: An 
Historical Review, 2015. Adapted and Updated from Appendix B of Richard M. Bird, William F. Fox, and 
Michael J. McIntyre, Tax Policy for Developing and Transitional Countries. Unpublished manuscript, 2003.  
Available at:  
https://docplayer.net/17186435-Developing-countries-and-international-cooperation-on-income-tax-matters-
an-historical-review.html  
120 Schreiber, Ulrich. International Company Taxation: An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Principles. 
Springer Texts in Business and Economics, 2013. p.13.  
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i.e. an intentional extension of the jurisdiction to tax by taxing the foreign income of residents 
(worldwide income taxation) and / or the source income of non-residents.  
 
DTCs serve to resolve the conflicts generated by the superposition of the principles of source 
and residence at the domestic level. Although DTCs also follow the principles of source and 
residence, it adds another dimension to this equation. Taxing rights are allocated to one of 
the contracting states, either the source country or the residence country, or to both 
contracting states. Regarding passive investment income, DTCs tend to limit the source 
country’s rights to tax only up to a certain threshold, thereby allowing unlimited taxation to 
the residence country after a deduction in the form of a credit of the tax that has been paid 
abroad. 
 
In both the UN MTC and the OECD MTC, the allocation of taxing rights results from the 
application of the economic classification and assignment approach,121 in which the 
classification is made according to a one-sided interpretation of where the primary economic 
activity that gives rise to the income belongs – economic allegiance. This results in the 
existence of differences between both MTCs regarding the allocation of taxing rights. If that 
methodology is neutrally applied, it should probably result in: (1) the allocation of taxing 
rights in relation to active income to the source country, and (2) the allocation of taxing rights 
in relation to passive income to the residence country.  
 
The UN MTC’s treatment of passive investment income overrides that principle by trying to 
increase source countries’ rights to tax.  
 
In many countries, DTCs prevail over domestic law. This can be the result of the application 
of a constitutional rule stating such precedence – formal integration – or the application of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which states that a party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty,122 as well as 
 
121 Concept defined further in this study. See: 1.2.4  




the international principle of “pacta sunt servanda”123  in order to avoid overriding a treaty 
obligation.124 
 
DTCs do not interfere with a country’s sovereignty whether or not to choose to tax, or to tax 
by considering either the source or the residence principle of taxation as the basis for tax 
jurisdiction. DTCs only re-allocate taxing rights between treaty partners when solving 
problems of juridical double taxation by applying those principles in a different context. The 
re-allocation of taxing rights between a developing and a developed country, which is usually 
achieved unilaterally by domestic legislation without affecting the source country’s rights to 
tax, must be seen, according to this research, as an agreement that is caused by a superior 
goal.  
  
In DTCs, international equity should be measured by considering much more than the direct 
division of the right to tax between two countries. It must be the result of a global allocation 
of actual and expected revenue and benefits, which requires much more than the simple 
increase of taxation at source of passive investment income. By considering the increase of 
foreign investment, i.e. access to foreign resources, as one of the goals of a DTC, more 
development and wealth will be enjoyed by the host / source developing country.      
 
Specifically, regarding passive investment income, the domestic law of the host / source 
developing country normally applies source taxation, taxing the source income of residents 
and non-residents, while DTCs reduce source countries’ rights to tax and allocate the taxing 
rights to the home / residence country. As a consequence, the home / residence country retains 
its right to tax passive income when signing a DTC with a developing country.125 Overall, 
the allocation of taxing rights to the source country is very limited in the current DTC 
structure. Such an unbalanced situation should not be problematic if comparable benefits 
 
123 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969. Article 26. Available at: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201155/volume-1155-i-18232-english.pdf  
124 Thuronyi, Victor. Comparative Tax Law. Kluwer Law International, 2003.  
125 This statement is not applicable to the case of DTCs that depart from what the UN Model states by using the 
participation exemption system as the method to eliminate double taxation regarding dividends income. The 
statement is applicable in the case of DTCs that follow the UN Model regarding taxation of dividends. It is also 
applicable in all cases regarding taxation of interest and royalties.   
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arise as a result of the accession to a DTC. Since that is not the case, such an unbalance has 
not been really addressed, at least not in a satisfactory manner. The global movement towards 
tax transparency126 is not really focused on fairness or equity and the situation of countries 
that are importers of capital and technology is simply disregarded, left to its own devices, as 
was the case in the Mexico MTC. 
 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah justified the source / residence duality in his publication “The 
Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification”,127 arguing that, when 
there is no DTC in force, the source country / host country has no assurance that the income 
will in fact be taxed by the residence country and therefore it allocates to itself the taxes that 
should otherwise be paid to the residence country. This is, however, disputable because in 
the absence of a DTC, the host / source country will most likely tax on the basis of the 
economic link between the income and the jurisdiction, and not because of the risk of double 
non-taxation. Source countries levy taxes on passive investment income because they 
consider that the source of the income is there - linked to their territories. The problem is not 
the avoidance of double non-taxation, i.e. that the income will not be taxed by the resident 
country either.  Under current MTCs, the above situation is perceived more as an agreement 
with developed / residence countries whereby host / source developing countries completely 
or partially relinquish the imposition of taxes on passive investment income - amongst others 
- to which they have legitimate rights to tax. Notwithstanding the above, as Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah also points out, it is clear that a source / host country has fewer taxing rights over 
passive investment income when there is a DTC in force.   
 
The innovation in the allocation of taxing rights approach regarding passive investment 
income become a reality in the 1963 OECD MTC, followed by the UN MTC and by the 
OECD MTC, by maintaining the approach of granting most taxing rights to the residence 
country, leaving only limited rights to tax to the host / source country in the case of dividends 
and interests in the OECD MTC, and in the case of dividends, interest and royalties in the 
UN MTC. That change has always been seen as an improvement regarding host / source 
 
126 OECD BEPS Project.  
127 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. The structure of international taxation: A proposal for simplification, Texas Law 
Review, Vol. 74, 1996.  
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countries’ rights to tax, especially when compared to the rights to tax that were granted by 
the LN MTC. However, in doing so, the UN MTC fixed a negotiation line between 
developing and developed countries, a limit that, according to this research, has affected the 
evolution of the UN policy regarding the design of a fair MTC between developing and 
developed countries. The reason for this is simple. The sharing of taxing rights between the 
host / source and the home / residence country – passive investments income treatment in the 
UN Model – as well as a credit system to eliminate juridical double taxation consequently 
neutralizes the effects of source taxation in relation to foreign investments, leaving behind 
an analysis of the potential benefits of those investments. Since the adoption of the innovative 
OECD approach to sharing taxing rights, the increase or decrease of source taxation of 
passive investment income no longer positively or negatively affects a foreign investor’s tax 
burden.  
 
As has already been remarked, and due to the evolution in practice, i.e. participation 
exemption, the same cannot be said regarding dividends that are derived from business 
investment / FDI. Since most developed countries have started applying the participation 
exemption system, with the result that the unilateral reduction of source taxation over those 
dividends becomes a real incentive to foreign investors.  
 
Unilateral methods regarding interest and royalties have not evolved accordingly. Taxation 
at source is justified by the benefit theory – the benefit that the host / source developing 
country implies for the lenders and technology providers, and by the benefits that debt capital 
and technology provide to developing countries. The actual allocation of taxing rights 
approach stays there and does not incentivize the access to foreign debt capital and the 
transfer of technology from developed to developing countries.  Both resources – debt capital 
and technology – assist wealth creation in host / source developing countries, and in turn 







1.2.3 ECONOMIC AND JURIDICAL DOUBLE TAXATION  
 
 
Double taxation is one of the barriers that developed countries need to eliminate in order to 
achieve fruitful trade and investment with developing countries. 128  According to the OECD, 
the harmful effects of double taxation on cross-border trade and investment are so well 
known that it is necessary to stress the importance of removing the obstacles that double 
taxation engenders for the development of economic relations between countries.129 When 
two developed countries feel the need to eliminate barriers so as to increase trade and 
investment, DTCs become the optimum tool in that pursuit. Due to the approximate balance 
in the reciprocity of investment flows and, therefore, rights to tax, DTCs do not force an un-
reciprocal limitation on one of the two contracting states. The OECD MTC achieves this by 
improving the market conditions so as to facilitate and increase the amount of trade and 
investment between the two contracting states.  
 
Since international law places few limits on the sovereign power of countries to tax, the same 
event / income may be taxed in two or more countries. Therefore, the combination of the 
above situation, alongside the increase in the volume of international trade and investment 
during the last century, has resulted in an increase of international juridical double taxation, 
which is defined as: “The imposition of comparable taxes in two - or more - States on the 
same taxpayer in respect of the same subject matter for identical periods”.130 That increase 
naturally gave rise to an increase in economic double taxation, which could be understood as 
as: “The imposition of comparable taxes in two - or more - States on different taxpayers in 
respect of the same subject matter for identical periods”. The latter only occurs regarding 
dividend income. The income arising from interest and royalties are deductible expenses at 
source; dividends, however, are not.    
 
 
128 See: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2019.; United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double 
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries, 2017.; OECD, Model Tax Convention on 
Income and Capital, 2017.  
129 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Introduction.  
130 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Introduction.  
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Graetz and O’Hear, in their work on “The Original Intent of U.S. International Taxation”,131 
described the basic dilemma of international taxation that each country faces as follows: 
“Despite the seismic changes in the world economy that have occurred in the last seven 
decades, the fundamental dilemma of international taxation that confronted Thomas Sewall 
Adams, his Treasury colleagues, and the Congress in the infancy of the income tax remains 
essentially unchanged. When income is earned in one country by a citizen or resident of 
another country, both the country where income is earned -the source country- and the 
country where the investor or earner resides -the residence country- have legitimate claims 
to tax the income. The basic task of international tax rules is to resolve the competing claims 
of residence and source nations in order to avoid the double taxation that results when both 
fully exercise their taxing power”.  
 
DTCs only focus their efforts on the elimination of juridical double taxation. When the UN 
MTC was designed, the elimination of juridical double taxation was, with minor exceptions, 
a task exclusively reserved to DTCs. The situation is different today, however, due to the 
positive evolution of domestic legislation through the promulgation of legislation to 
eliminate juridical and even economic double taxation.132 
 
Juridical double taxation133 may occur for any of the following reasons:  
 
(1) Two taxing jurisdictions adopt different, and therefore overlapping, criteria for 
determining liability to be taxed on worldwide income – typically in relation to residence 
status – such as, in the case of corporations, the discrepancy between the place of 
incorporation and the place of effective management. For example, a corporation may be 
treated by country A as a resident because it is incorporated there, whereas country B may 
treat that corporation as its resident because it is managed there. 
 
 
131 Graetz, Michael J.; and O’Hear, Michael M. The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation. Duke Law 
Journal, Vol 46, 1997. 
132Olivier, Lynette; and Honiball, Michael. International Tax: A South African Perspective, p. 6, 5th ed., 2011.  
133 Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997. 
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(2) Two taxing jurisdictions apply different, and therefore overlapping, jurisdictional 
principles (source or residence) according to which the income or the capital in question can 
be taxed. For example, imagine that country A and country B tax income, both at a rate of 
50%. Imagine that a resident of A derives 100 units of income with source in country B. In 
this case, that income could first be taxed by B at 50% – therefore the resident will pay 50 
units in taxes at source – and the remaining income of 50 units could be taxed by A at 50% 
– paying taxes of 25 units – on the basis of residence jurisdiction. So, the taxpayer would be 
left with only [100-50-25] = 25 units, therefore paying an effective tax rate of 75%. 
 
(3) Two taxing jurisdictions invoke the source principle of taxation to tax the same item of 
income, but how they determine the source of income under domestic law differs. For 
example, the domestic law of country A may provide that the sales income of a non-resident 
corporation is taxable in that state, if the sale is made through an office located in that state.  
In contrast, the law of country B may tax income derived from sales by a non-resident 
corporation, if the transfer of possession of the goods sold takes place within that state.  
 
(4) In some cases, a country may have a source-residence conflict with one country and a 
source-source conflict with another country. For example, assume that company X is a 
corporation that is resident in country A. It also has an office in country B and makes sales 
from that office into country C. Under their domestic laws, country A taxes income from 
those sales under the residence principle, while countries B and C tax that income under the 
source principle. A DTC between country A and country B is likely to solve the residence-
source conflict, but it is probably not able to solve the source-source conflict. If country B 
and country C also have a double tax convention, however, the source-source conflict may 
also be solved.  
 
The relief for this kind of double taxation – juridical double taxation – can take a variety of 
forms. Firstly, when there is an overlap of residence criteria, normally the only way to resolve 
the conflict will be to apply the rules of the DTC, whereby preference will be given to certain 
criteria which may or may not reflect the criteria that are used in domestic law. As an 
example, the UN MTC and the OECD MTC resolve the conflict of the residency of a person 
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other than an individual by determining that, the competent authorities of the Contracting 
States shall endeavour to determine by mutual agreement the Contracting State of which such 
person shall be deemed to be a resident for the purposes of the Convention, having regard to 
its place of effective management, the place where it is incorporated or otherwise constituted 
and any other relevant factors. In the absence of such agreement, such person shall not be 
entitled to any relief or exemption from tax provided by this Convention except to the extent 
and in such manner as may be agreed upon by the competent authorities of the Contracting 
States.134 135 
 
Secondly, and concerning the overlap of jurisdictional principles under which countries tax 
the income or the capital in question, typically unilateral acts – domestic law – and bilateral 
acts – DTCs – provide suitable solutions in this regard. Unilateral and bilateral acts can 
reduce or eliminate double taxation only if the country of home / residence is prepared to 
bear all the financial costs of granting that relief. That is why the approach in DTCs under 
the UN MTC and the OECD MTC are so important to home / residence developed 
countries.136 137  
 
Thirdly, when there is an overlap of the source criteria, normally the only way to solve the 
problem is through a DTC between the countries involved.138 139Domestic law has evolved in 
such a way where situations (1) and (3) above are left almost without a solution. This very 
much resembles what is mentioned in the guidelines published by international institutions, 
such as the UN and the OECD. 
 
Going back to the origin, it is important to think back to the time when there were no DTCs, 
where the only way to eliminate double taxation was through domestic legislation, 
 
134 See Article 4 of the United Nations, Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries, 2017.  
135 See Article 4 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017.  
136 See Articles 23 A and 23 B of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed 
and Developing Countries, 2017. 
137 See Articles 23 A and 23 B of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017.  
138 See Article 25 of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2017.  
139 See Article 25 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. 
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specifically named as “unilateral measures”. The unilateral measures adopted to prevent 
double taxation differed amongst countries. Essentially, a taxpayer could obtain relief from 
juridical double taxation140 141 142 by three methods:  
 
(1) The exemption method, where the residence country does not tax the foreign source 
income; 
 
(2) The tax credit method, where the residence country taxes foreign source income, but 
allows domestic taxes payable in the resident country to be reduced by the foreign taxes paid 
in the source country; and, 
 
(3) The deduction method, where the resident country taxes foreign source income, but 
allows the resident to deduct foreign taxes paid on foreign income from their assessable 
income in the resident country. Unlike the exemption and the credit methods, the deduction 
method fails to fully eliminate the existence of double taxation.  
 
The juxtaposition or overlapping of source and residence criteria gives, according to 
international consensus, a primary right to tax to the host / source country due to the direct 
link between the income and the territory of the country. Consequently, the right of the 
residence country to tax the foreign income of their residents normally comes with the 
responsibility to relieve double taxation, meaning that the source principle is of primary 
importance whereas the residence principle is only residual. 
 
The above statement has been recognized only in relation to active income by countries that 
are OECD members and which agree that the country of source / host – the nation where the 
income is generated – enjoys the primary right to tax active income, while the residence 
country retains, at most, a residual right to tax such income. In the case of passive investment 
income, the lack of a link between the territory and the income has been the historical reason 
 
140 Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997.  
141 Avery Jones, John. Avoiding Double Taxation: Credit vs Exemption, The Origins, Bulletin for International 
Taxation Vol 66, N° 2, 2012.  
142 Blanluet, Gauthier; and Durand, Philippe J. General Report in Key practical issues to eliminate double 
taxation of business income.  Cahiers de droit fiscal international 96b, International Fiscal Association, 2011. 
 
 48 
as to why primary taxing rights have been granted to the residence country and only limited 
taxing rights to the source country. However, considering that income tax rates have 
substantially decreased in the last century, very often source / host countries retain an 
important part of the split revenue, therefore sacrificing fewer rights / less revenue than was 
historically the case. This approach of granting partial rights regarding dividends and interest 
to the host / source countries was followed without substantial restrictions by the UN MTC, 
considering the OECD criteria regarding the re-allocation of taxing rights suitable for a DTC 
between a developing and a developed country. Furthermore, the UN MTC increased source 
taxation in relation to passive income by granting source countries rights in relation to royalty 
income.  
 
Since taxation is expected to be neutral, the question that arises pertains to whether such 
demands are also economically neutral in an international context. An historical approach to 
MTCs allows the author to highlight two major incidences that will guide the analysis in this 
section. The first incidence regards works that were accomplished before the European 
Organization for Economic Development drafted its models, and before the OECD took over 
in this ambit. By that time, the MTCs helped to overcome the lack of unilateral measures to 
avoid juridical double taxation, while the credit method was very much in fashion at that 
time. The second incidence concerns developments in domestic law: the adoption of the 
participation exemption method by developed countries in their domestic laws. The impact 
of taxing dividends at source became enormous as a result.  The situation is different for 
interest and royalties, as well as for DTCs signed by home / resident developed countries that 
still use the credit method as the system to avoid cross-border juridical double taxation in 
relation to dividends. When the participation exemption regime applies, it is necessary to 
analyse if double taxation is effectively eliminated. Corporate taxation (first tier taxation) in 
the host / developing country plus the second tier taxation of business profits in the form of 
dividends at source – withholding tax – plus exemption at corporate level, but taxation at the 
level of the ultimate beneficial owner in the residence country and without any credit does 
not seem to be an effective approach. The UN must consider not only juridical double 
taxation but also economic double taxation as a restriction to investment flows. Moreover, 
an additional harmful element is that this second tier of taxation over business profits in the 
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form of dividends is determined on a gross basis, and therefore, it does not allow for the 
deduction of expenses.  
 
If DTCs do not offer an ideal scenario, it is very important to establish what the domestic law 
offers if there is no DTC in force. The answer is straightforward: in most cases, juridical 
double taxation will be eliminated by the state of residence. As consequence of this “status 
quo”, the primary right to tax of the source country is naturally reinforced and the residence 
country may need to provide relief from the effects of double taxation. This means, in other 
words, that both the exemption method and the credit method to eliminate juridical double 
taxation at the domestic level recognize the right to tax of source countries as primary and 
the one of resident countries only in a residual manner.  
 
Consequently, the main question that developing countries’ governments have probably 
asked themselves during the last decades in relation to the conclusion of DTCs is: if in a 
market without DTCs, the elimination of double taxation is an international duty mostly 
assumed by residence countries, and in the relationship between developed and developing 
countries where in the majority of cases the developing country is the source country, why 
should developing countries conclude DTCs with developed countries and limit their right to 
tax passive investment income at source? Notwithstanding the fact that the majority of  
domestic tax systems in developing countries have the main aim of raising revenue and 
protecting the domestic tax base, it is essential to understand that in a globalized world, that 
aim should be tempered by the need for a country to have more trade and international 
investment that ensures that its economy remains strong.  
 
 
1.2.4 DTC ALLOCATION OF TAXING RIGHTS - ECONOMIC THEORIES  
 
 
Many countries have found it necessary to supplement their unilateral measures so as to 
relieve double taxation by entering into a network of DTCs with their principal commercial 




When two countries agree on the conclusion of a DTC, they accept an international law 
obligation: they commit themselves to relinquish, completely or partially, the collection of 
taxes in specific situations. The convention is subject to the rules of public international 
law.143 A DTC is, by its very definition, a joint act of two contracting states and one of its 
main objectives is to avoid the juridical double taxation that is caused by the overlapping of 
jurisdictional principles.  
 
As was indicated before, source and residence principles manifest themselves in a different 
way in the context of DTCs. For instance, in the following three cases, such principles play 
a major role: (1) on the subjects eligible for treaty benefits – subjective scope of the treaties. 
In the UN MTC, the relevant article reads as follows: “This Convention shall apply to persons 
who are residents of one or both of the Contracting States”; (2) on the allocation of taxing 
rights to the source or to the residence country; and (3) in the methods used to eliminate 
double taxation: credit and exemption.  
 
Source and residence principles are of great relevance for developing countries in order for 
them to agree to fair terms as to what extent they have the right to tax, i.e. until which point 
should developing countries assume limitations to their sovereignty to tax passive income. 
No general consensus has been achieved on this point. For some legal scholars, the solution 
embodied in DTCs – which has remained unchanged since their adoption in the 1920s until 
now – is that “(…) jurisdiction to tax is assigned to either the source country or the residence 
country for different kinds of income”144 and this represents the outcome of bargains in which 
conflicting tax claims have been traded off against each other on a case-by-case basis. 
Therefore they are no more than a set of arbitrary rules that were carefully drafted to support 
a specific compromise.  
 
The supposedly strong source position of the UN MTC, which grants more revenue regarding 
some specific types of income, has been justified by the UN as an issue of particular 
 
143 Lang, Michael. Introduction to the Law of Double Taxation Conventions, 2nd ed. Linde, 2010. 
144 Graetz, Michael. Taxing international income: inadequate principles, outdated concepts, and unsatisfactory 
policies. Tax Law Review, Vol 54, 2001. 
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importance for developing countries, especially in view of their development goals.145 
Unfortunately, it is not clear if the UN MTC has actually achieved its goals. 
 
As was already stated, the international treaty framework regarding the allocation of taxing 
rights has been mainly governed by the economic classification and assignment approach, 
which is applied in order to determine the economic allegiance of the taxpayer with the 
country. The economic allegiance theory, proposed by George Schanz in 1892, may ensure 
a fair and equitable distribution of tax revenues between countries in a treaty context. 146 147 
 
Until now, and especially regarding passive investment income, the application of the 
economic classification and assignment method has been limited to the withholding tax rate 
that the host / source country can impose. The attraction of foreign investment has not played 
a major role in this respect. MTCs neither incentivize nor increase (as a consequence) foreign 
investment, 148 149 150 easy access to debt, or the transfer of beneficial technology in the host 
/ source developing country.  
 
 
145 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2019. 
146 von Schanz, George.  Zur Frage der Steuerpflicht (Regarding Tax Liability), Vol 9, Finanzarchiv, 1892.  
147 Brooks, Kim.  Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries: A Comparison of 
Canada and Australia’s Policies. EJournal of Tax Research, Vol 5, No. 2, 2007. Available at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1078738 
148 Neumayer, Eric. Do double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?. 
The Journal of Development Studies, Vol 43, 2007: “Blonigen and Davies (2002) in an analysis of bilateral 
FDI outflows and outbound stocks from OECD countries to other countries over the period 1982 to 1992 find 
that the existence of DTTs is associated with larger bilateral FDI flows and stocks in ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation. However, when older DTTs, which have often been concluded many years before the start of 
the study period, are distinguished from newer DTTs, which were concluded during the period of study, then it 
appears that these newer treaties have no positive effect on FDI in OLS estimation. In fixed-effects estimation, 
based on the within-variation of the data only such that old treaties concluded before the start of the sample 
become irrelevant, the effect is even negative. Similarly, Blonigen and Davies (2004) in an analysis of US 
inbound and outbound FDI over the period 1980 to 1999 find that treaties concluded by the US during this 
period had no statistically significant effect at best and a negative effect at worst on inbound and outbound FDI 
stocks.3 Davies (2004) confirms the non-significant and negative findings of both studies and, additionally, 
finds non-significant results if looking explicitly at treaty renegotiations. Egger et al. (2004) also find a negative 
effect of newly implemented DTTs in a differences-in- differences analysis of two years prior and two years 
after treaty conclusion using dyadic FDI data over the period 1985 to 2000”.  
149 Lejour, Arjan. The foreign investment effects of tax treaties. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis, 2014.  
150 Baker, Paul L. An Analysis of Double Taxation Treaties and their Effect on Foreign Direct Investment. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol 21, 2014. 
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In addition to the above, it is important to note that developed countries may potentially 
increase their revenue expectations to the detriment of source countries’ rights – normally 
developing countries – when signing a DTC that is based on the UN MTC.  This is mainly 
due to two reasons: (1) without a DTC in force, the residence country will normally be forced 
to eliminate double taxation in relation to passive investment income and the source country 
will normally tax that income without limitations, and (2) because the UN MTC, instead of 
creating an incentive for foreign investment in the developing country as a counterpart for 
the agreed limitation of sovereignty of the source country – developing country – as a 
consequence of the DTC, mainly follows the OECD MTC approach by restricting source 
country taxation up to a fixed withholding tax and forces the residence country to grant a 
credit for the taxes paid at source as the best way to eliminate double taxation. In this context, 
and regarding passive investment income, by concluding a DTC based on the UN MTC, 
residence countries – developed countries – increase their taxing rights compared to the 
taxing rights they would have in a scenario where there is no DTC. As an aftereffect, source 
countries – developing countries – diminish their taxing rights in relation to those incomes, 
compared to the rights they would have in a scenario where no DTC has been signed. 
 
DTCs are instrumental in enforcing the residence principle through the allocation of taxing 
rights among countries,151 and they do so by reducing withholding taxes on passive 
investment income at source. This then results in the undesirable effect of shifting tax revenue 
from host / source countries – normally developing countries – to home / residence countries 
– normally developed countries. This can happen in a treaty between a developing and a 
developed country that has incorrectly followed the OECD MTC, but it nevertheless occurs 






151 Ligthart, Jenny; Vlachaki, Mina; and Voget, Johannes. The Determinants of Double Tax Treaty Formation. 




1.2.4.1 ECONOMIC ALLIEGIANCE THEORY 
 
George Schanz proposed the economic allegiance theory in 1892 as a principle to ensure the 
fair and equitable distribution of tax revenues between countries. 152 153According to this 
theory, a country’s rights to tax arise when a person is economically related to that country. 
The economic allegiance to a state can be based on mere consumption or on business or 
investment criteria.154 While in the first scenario, the residence country enjoys the allocation 
of rights, in the second scenario, the rights are allocated to the source country. If the person 
is economically linked to his country of residence and to another country due to business 
activities or income arising therein, Schanz deems the allegiance to the source state to be 
more important than the link to the country of residence.155 156  For Schanz, in this situation, 
the state of residence to which the taxpayer is connected through consumption should get its 
share, but it should be less than the share of the source state where the income is produced. 
His solution was to divide the tax base. Three-quarters of the income in question should be 
taxed in the state of source and one-quarter should be taxed in the state of residency.157      
 
For a good understanding of the economic allegiance concept, an approach to the concepts 
of political and personal allegiance is required.158 Political allegiance is the relationship with 
the country due to nationality or, in some instances, by some supranational political 
integration e.g., the European Union. Personal allegiance has its principal manifestation in 
the concept of effective residency. By differentiating both allegiances, the economic 
allegiance is the result of relatively intense taxpayer participation, who is neither a national 
 
152 von Schanz, George.  Zur Frage der Steuerpflicht (Regarding Tax Liability), Vol 9, Finanzarchiv, 1892. 
153 Brooks, Kim.  Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries: A Comparison of 
Canada and Australia’s Policies. EJournal of Tax Research, Vol 5, No. 2, 2007.  
154 Vogel, Klaus. Worldwide vs source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of arguments. Intertax 
Vol 16, 1988. 
155Pinto, Dale. E-commerce and source-based income taxation. International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation, 
Doctoral Series Vol 6, 2003. 
156 Vogel, Klaus. Worldwide vs source taxation of income – A review and re-evaluation of arguments. Intertax, 
Vol 16, 1988.  
157 Ibid.,156.  
158 Souza de Man, Fernando. Taxation of Cross-Border Provisions of Services in Double Tax Conventions 
between Developed and Developing Countries: A Proposal for New Guidelines. PhD Thesis Maastricht 
University, Faculty of Law, 2013 
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nor a resident in the country in which the production, movement or consumption of the wealth 
took place.159 
 
Economic allegiance offers countries the proper justification to tax as a way to pay for public 
costs in exchange for advantageous social, economic or political realities. Hence, this 
allegiance defines a country’s right to tax all those who engage in taxable activities in its 
territory and, consequently obtain the advantage of being part of the community and usufruct 
of its goods or public services.160 The determinant factor is the involvement or participation 
of the taxpayer in the economic life of the source country, rather than the benefits that have 
been received as a result of that participation.  
 
The economic link between the taxpayer and the country was interpreted by the four 
economists of the League of Nations161 as the consequence of the link between the income 
and the country – achievable through the application of the economic classification and 
assignment approach – as the suitable approach to apply when international double taxation 
was discussed at DTC level.  
 
It is not only the involvement or participation, but also the economic relationship between 
the income and the country, which directly leads to the concepts of passive and active income. 
Without a clear justification, it can be stated that the UN MTC distorts the analysis by 
increasing the source countries’ rights to tax in relation to passive investment income instead 
of respecting the fact that neither the taxpayer nor the income, in these cases, is only linked 
to the source country’s economy, and if they are strongly linked to the source country 
economy, they are, at least in the case of dividends, taxed at first tier by that country as 
business profits.  
  
 
159 Rosembuj, Tulio. Personal and Economic Allegiance under the Personal Income Tax and the Corporate 
Tax in Spain. Intertax, Vol 26, 1998.  
160 Ibid, 158. 
161 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir 




Although the Group of Economists of the League of Nations considered the concept of 
economic allegiance in the international allocation of taxing rights to be appropriate,162 the 
LN, the OECD and the UN used a methodology that led to the application of a concept that 
was substantially different from Schanz’s proposal. While the economists concluded that the 
best recommendation was to exempt income going abroad,163 the Technical Experts ended 
up including an apportionment approach in the Model.164 The above, for the purposes of this 
research, could be considered as the starting point of the modern approach to international 
taxation in DTCs regarding the allocation of taxing rights over passive investment income. 
By comparing the treatment of dividends, interests and royalties in the 1928 Models of the 
League of Nations, the OECD MTCs that have been drafted since 1963, as well as the UN 
MTC since 1980, it is possible to realize how this approach has been distorted over time. The 
emphasis of the UN MTC in its intent to serve as basis for the negotiation of a DTC for a 
developing country, as one of the DTCs contracting states, does not seem to be as positive as 
is claimed. This is because, at least for this research, the principle of economic allegiance has 
been left behind in the determination of the allocation of taxing rights over passive 




1.2.4.2 BENEFIT THEORY 
 
 
The benefit theory has played a minor role in the allocation of taxing rights in DTCs, 
especially when compared to the economic allegiance theory. According to the benefit 
theory, the power to tax should be related to the benefits received from government 
expenditures.165  For this purpose, it is necessary to establish the distribution of benefits from 
 
162 Ibid, 160. 
163 Ibid, 160. 
164League of Nations, Technical Experts to the Economic and Financial Committee.  Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion. Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee, 1925.  
Available at:  http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
165 Hines, James R. Jr. What is benefit taxation?. Journal of Public Economics, Vol 75, 2000. 
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public goods. The difficulties of correctly assessing the benefits received by taxpayers makes 
this theory less strong in comparison to the economic allegiance theory.  
 
The theory serves to justify both source and residence taxation. Source taxation for income 
derived in one country by non-residents. Residence taxation because of the benefits derived 
by the residents of a country. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the economic link, from a 
substantive and realistic perspective, is much more feasible than the residence link.166 Given 
the difficulties that are inherent in implementing this theory, the achievement of fairness is 
also compromised. Even if it were practicable, since taxes levied by any government ought 
to be apportioned among the people according to the benefit which each receives from the 
protection that the government affords each person, this is impossible to be concretized.167  
 
The application of the benefit theory to the allocation of taxing rights in DTCs between 
developing and developed countries would lower or even exempt taxation in relation to 
foreign investors. It cannot be considered as an incorrect approach, but it definitively needs 
to be combined with the concept of reciprocal benefits in order to be applied as a basis for a 




Relief from double taxation finds its economic support in the concept of neutrality. On this, 
it is necessary to analyse the relationship between the credit and exemption methods,168 and 
 
166 Souza de Man, Fernando. Taxation of Cross-Border Provisions of Services in Double Tax Conventions 
between Developed and Developing Countries: A Proposal for New Guidelines. PhD Thesis Maastricht 
University, Faculty of Law, 2013. 
167 Krauss, D. T. The Benefit Theory of Taxation. Tennessee Law Review, Vol 11, 1932. 
168 Larkins, Ernest. Double Tax Relief for Foreign Income: A Comparative Study of Advanced Economies. 




the economic concepts of Capital Import Neutrality (CIN)169 and Capital Export Neutrality 
(CEN).170 171 172 173 
 
The exemption system could be considered as a system that provides an economic incentive 
for investors to invest in low-tax countries because the source tax is almost an ultimate / final 
tax. The exemption system does not interfere, as the credit system does, in the repatriation of 
benefits from the host to the residence country. From a sovereignty perspective, the 
exemption system is an expression of respect for the tax legislation of independent countries. 
  
Some countries, in order to prevent taxpayers’ abuse of the exemption regime by lowering 
the rest of their income that should be taxable at higher marginal rates,174 tend to apply the 
exemption with a progressive method, which is a deviation from the full exemption method. 
This method allows the residence country – the country of the investor – to take the exempted 
foreign income into account when calculating the amount of tax on the remaining domestic 
income and it necessarily presupposes the adoption of a progressive tax regime at the 
domestic level.  
 
Under the full credit method, the residence country allows the deduction of the foreign source 
tax from the tax calculated on the worldwide income of the taxpayer, leaving the investor 
country tax rate as the final tax rate, which protects the resident country’s rights to tax the 
income that arises from cross-border transactions. The effect of the full credit system can be 
altered when the tax rate of the country in which the investment is made is higher than that 
of the investor country. To prevent investors from offsetting domestic income against foreign 
 
169  OECD Glossary of Tax Terms. CIN: Public finance concept to describe a situation where investments within 
a country are subject to the same level of taxes regardless of whether they are made by a domestic or foreign 
investor. The exemption method of relieving international double taxation is often considered to illustrate this 
principle. Available at:  http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm  
170 OECD Glossary of Tax Terms. CEN: Public finance concept to describe a situation where investors are 
subject to the same level of taxes on capital income regardless of the country in which income is earned. The 
credit method of relieving international double taxation is often considered to illustrate this principle. Available 
at:  http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm  
171 Shaheen, Fadi. International Tax Neutrality: Reconsiderations. Virginia Tax Review, Vol 27, 2007. 
172 Shaheen, Fadi. International Tax Neutrality: Revisited. Tax Law Review, Vol 64, 2011.  
173 Knoll, Michael. Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality. Tax Law Review, Vol 64, 2011. 
174 Beveridge, Fiona. The treatment and taxation and taxation of foreign investment under international law: 
Towards International Disciplines. Manchester University Press, 2000. 
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credit without limits, countries tend to apply the ordinary credit method that in turn limits the 
foreign credit to the amount of domestic tax that would be imposed on the foreign-source 
income, if no credit for foreign tax were given. The origin of this limitation is the United 
States Revenue Act of 1921 proposed by Thomas Sewall Adams in order to limit the foreign 
tax credit that was enacted as a result of the United States Revenue Act of 1918. At that time, 
the prevalence of source countries was already acknowledged.175  
 
If the tax rate of the host / developing country is lower than that of the investor country, this 
method, in the case of direct investment, ends by forcing an economic incentive for foreign 
investors to re-invest in the source / host country the income earned produced by the 
subsidiary in the host / developing country. In a sharing system of taxation, as is proposed 
by the UN MTC, this is certainly something that should be of interest for developing 
countries. In this line, the approach of a few developed countries, such as the United States 
until its latest tax reform in 2017,176 was to eliminate double taxation through a credit method 
and that therefore incentivizes an unlimited deferral for income generated by foreign 
subsidiaries regarding foreign business operations. This approach could be considered as 
beneficial for developing economies. In order to tackle abusive deferrals, countries have 
developed the “controlled foreign companies’ rule”.  The system created by Thomas Sewall 
Adams was adjusted in 1962 with the incorporation of specific legislation designed to tackle, 
under certain circumstances, deferrals.177  
 
CIN means that all investors in a country – whether foreign or domestic – face the same 
effective tax rate on income from their investments sourced in that country. CEN means that 
resident investors face the same effective domestic tax rate, regardless of whether they invest 
at home or abroad. Both principles should be viewed from the perspective of the investor 
country. For example, most European countries have chosen to utilize a capital import neutral 
method for substantial direct investments – business dividend income – by using the 
 
175 Graetz, Michael J.; and O’Hear, Michael M.. The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation. Duke 
Law Journal, Vol 46, 1997.  
176 United States of America, Public Law 115-97 known as “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017”. New Code section 
245A.  
177 Unites States Internal Revenue Code, 952. Subpart F.   
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participation exemption, while countries that opt for a capital export neutral method typically 
opt for the credit method.  
 
In a commercial relationship with a developing country – assuming that that is the country 
where the investment took place, as this is the most common scenario – and a developed 
country – assuming that that is the country where the investor is resident, as this is the most 
common scenario – the relevant legislation regarding CIN or CEN is the legislation of the 
developed country, namely the residence country. Thus, if the residence country decides to 
follow the CEN principle, it will probably avoid double taxation under domestic or 
conventional legislation by crediting the tax paid in the source state on foreign income against 
the tax that should be paid in the resident state.178 The result will be that residents of the home 
/ resident country will be forced to face their country’s tax rate, being a neutral choice 
between local investments in their country – developed country – or international investments 
in the other country – developing country.179 This nullifies a developing country’s ability to 
attract foreign investment by lowering taxes for investments made by non-residents. 
However, if the resident country decides to follow the CIN principle, it will probably avoid 
double taxation under domestic or conventional law by exempting the foreign income from 
the resident tax base. The result is that all the investments in the source country – the 
developing country – are subject to the same tax rate, regardless of the investor’s residence.  
 
In DTCs, the credit method has typically been used by Anglo-US countries and the exemption 
method has typically been employed by continental European countries. Both systems are 
recognized in the UN MTC and in the OECD MTC for the elimination of double taxation, 
but in both frameworks the approach is to follow the credit method with regard to passive 
investment income. Specifically regarding dividends,180 interest181 and royalties,182  the UN 
 
178 Knoll, Michael. Reconsidering International Tax Neutrality. Tax Law Review, Vol 64, 2011.  
179 Pistone, Pasquale; and Goodspeed, Timothy J. Rethinking tax jurisdictions and relief from international 
double taxation in relations with developing countries: Legal and economic perspectives from Europe and 
North America. International Tax Coordination, An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Virtues and Pitfalls, edited 
by Martin Zagler, 2010.  
180 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017, article 10.  
181 Ibid, 181, Article 11.  
182 Ibid, 181, Article 12.  
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MTC adopted a CEN approach by limiting source countries’ rights to tax to a certain 
threshold by fixing the withholding tax and granting residual taxing rights to the residence 
country through the mandatory application of a credit system. This approach avoids juridical 
double taxation – paragraph 2 of Article 23 A and Article B. As was stated, this does not 
apply to dividends when the resident countries domestically apply the participation 
exemption method. 
 
The evolution of domestic legislation has proven that source countries can be sovereign 
regarding their own legislation.  The incorporation of the participation exemption system has 
changed the status quo regarding taxation at residence and at source for dividends that arise 
from substantial direct investments. The incorporation of the participation exemption method 
dates back to the 19th century. New Zealand was the first country to do so (via the Land and 
Income Tax Assessment Act of 1981). Since then, a further 27 OECD countries have adopted 
this approach. 183 
 
One deviation from the OECD MTC and the UN MTC approach regarding how to eliminate 
double taxation is the case in Germany. Germany includes an “activity clause” in its DTCs 
which in turn grants greater taxing rights to the source country in relation to active income 
and only limited taxing rights in relation to passive income, as well as granting residual taxing 
rights to the residence country in relation to passive income. The German activity clause 
normally relates to business income from permanent establishments abroad – including 
income from the alienation of movable and immovable property that can be attributed to such 
a permanent establishment – and to intercompany dividends on substantial shareholdings – 
participation exemption.184 The German approach illustrates that it is possible to incorporate 
a rule that runs counter to the traditional paradigms of taxation of passive investment income.  
 
Domestic and conventional approaches do not need to be coherent: there are numerous 
examples of countries that follow, for example, a credit system under domestic law and an 
 
183 Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Luxembourg, Austria, France, Portugal, Italy, 
Denmark, Hungary, Australia, Iceland, Spain, Germany, Sweden, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland,  
Norway, Slovenia, Turkey, Japan, United Kingdom, and Greece.  
184 Lüdicke, Jurgen. Germany: Exemption and Tax Credit In German Tax Treaties – Policy and Reality. Bulletin 
for International Taxation, Vol 64, 2010. 
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exemption system under treaty law. Nonetheless, if the choice is exactly the opposite, such 
as if a country follows an exemption system under domestic law and a credit system under 
treaty law, the non-aggravation principle must prevail, so that when the treaty imposes a 
higher burden than the domestic law, the domestic law nevertheless remains applicable.185    
 
Germany and Hungary are examples of countries that have combined both systems. They use 
the credit system in their domestic legislation and the exemption system in treaty legislation. 
However, both countries usually exclude specific items of income from exemption186 – 
generally interest, dividends that arise from non-substantial shareholdings and royalties – 
and apply a credit method to such incomes. Under some German tax treaties, the exempted 
incomes are conditioned on one important requirement for the exclusion, this is, the taxability 
of the relevant income in the other treaty state, so called, subject to tax clauses.187 
 
Treaty policy in exemption countries is generally more consistent with the domestic law 
choice than the treaty policy of credit countries. The Netherlands and Belgium are, in effect, 
fairly consistent in this respect.188 
 
185 Lang, Michael; Pistone, Pasquale; Schuch, Josef; Staringer, Claus;  Storck, Alfred; and Zagler, Martin. Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics. IBFD, 2010. 
186 As an example, Germany exempts business income attributable to a foreign permanent establishment 
including gains on the sale of assets belonging to the permanent establishment, foreign personal service income, 
both independent and dependent, and income from foreign real property including gains on the sale. 
187 Protocol of the Double Tax Convention between the United States of America and the Federal Republic of 
Germany (1989), Example N° 21: “With reference to Article 23 (Relief from Double Taxation) and Article 25 
(Mutual Agreement Procedure) The Federal Republic of Germany shall avoid double taxation by a tax credit 
as provided for in paragraph 2 b) of Article 23, and not by a tax exemption under paragraph 2 a) of Article 23, 
a) if in the Contracting States income or capital is placed under differing provisions of the Convention or 
attributed to different persons (other than under Article 9 (Associated Enterprises)) and this conflict cannot be 
settled by a procedure pursuant to Article 25 and aa) if as a result of such placement or attribution the relevant 
income or capital would be subject to double taxation; or bb) if as a result of such placement or attribution the 
relevant income or capital would remain untaxed or be subject only to inappropriately reduced taxation in the 
United States and would (but for the application of this paragraph) remain exempt from tax in the Federal 
Republic of Germany; or b) if the Federal Republic of Germany has, after due consultation and subject to the 
limitations of its internal law, notified the United States through diplomatic channels of other items of income 
to which it intends to apply this paragraph in order to prevent the exemption of income from taxation in both 
Contracting States or other arrangements for the improper use of the Convention. In the case of a notification 
under subparagraph b), the United States may, subject to notification through diplomatic channels, 
characterize such income under the Convention consistently with the characterization of that income by the 
Federal Republic of Germany. A notification made under this paragraph shall have effect only from the first 
day of the calendar year following the year in which it was transmitted and any legal prerequisites under the 
domestic law of the notifying State for giving it effect have been fulfilled.”. 
188 Lang, Michael; Pistone, Pasquale; Schuch, Josef; Staringer, Claus;  Storck, Alfred; and Zagler, Martin. Tax 




For developing countries, the discussion about the fairness in DTCs concluded with 
developed countries has always been centred on whether or not it results in a benefit in the 
allocation of taxing rights approach adopted, forgetting the importance of how the residence 
country eliminates double taxation and the effects that such a mechanism can generate.  
 
In South America - a geographic area that consists of both developing and less developed 
countries - this discussion was important in the 1970s and 1980s, especially due to the work 
of the influential Professor Ramón Valdes Costa.189  
 
The combination of Articles 10, 11 and 12 of the UN MTC with the use of a credit system, 
the approach laid down in paragraph 2 of Article 23 A and by Article 23 B of the MTC, is 
the only way to solve the eclectic approach of sharing taxing rights in relation to passive 
investment income. There is no need to continue with that approach if the UN MTC actually 
manages to provide developing countries with what they really need, namely incentives to 
attract foreign investment and, therefore, development.  
 
1.2.4.4 THEORIES APPLIED TO PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME– LEAGUE OF NATIONS – 
OECD MTC – UN MTC 
 
 
The allocation of passive income proves to be an acute issue, particularly in DTCs between 
developed and developing countries. The choices for tax allocation on interest, dividends and 
royalties range from a total ban to full taxation at source. 
 
The OECD MTC and UN MTC approaches vary according to the differences among their 
member countries. Developing countries normally claim a partial allocation of passive 
 
189 See: Valdés Costa, Estudios de Derecho Tributario Internacional, Montevideo, 1978; Estudios de Derecho 
Tributario Latinoamericano, Montevideo, 1982; Instituciones de Derecho Tributario, Buenos Aires, 1992; 
Curso de Derecho Tributario, Bogotá, Buenos Aires and Madrid, 1996; Ponencias y comunicaciones presented 
at the XVII seminars ILADT,  Montevideo, 1997; and in Ramón Falcón y Tella, Tendencias actuales en los 




investment income whenever they are the source country. For more than 40 years, many 
DTCs have been signed that follow this idea. In this period of time, very few developing 
countries have improved their degree of development or matched the objectives indicated for 
each kind of income.  
 
While the UN MTC grants more taxing rights, i.e., benefits, to the source country, the OECD 
MTC does not. However, in respect of passive investment income, the only relevant 
difference between both concerns the treatment of royalties. The UN MTC displays a source 
approach.190 As to the OECD MTC, 191 royalties are taxable in the hands of the recipient and 
no taxing rights are allocated to the source country, i.e., the country where the technology /  
intellectual property under the scope of the royalty provision has been used. On the contrary, 
the UN MTC allocates taxing rights to the source country through a limited withholding tax. 
This different approach in the UN MTC seeks to avoid a hypothetically unjustified loss of 
tax revenue for the source country,192  which could theoretically follow from the application 
of the OECD MTC.  Royalty payments are typically tax deductible in the source country and 
therefore the prohibition on taxing at source could lead to a loss of tax revenue.  
 
The UN MTC also differs from the OECD MTC because of the possibility to set the 
percentage of the withholding tax on passive investment income to be charged by the source 
country during DTC negotiations. An analysis of the treaties in force shows that, in treaties 
based on the UN MTC, withholding tax rates are not higher than the ones recommended by 
the OECD MTC. In fact, in these cases, whenever the withholding taxes are too high193 and 
a country fears losing foreign investment, the agreements result in similar or even lower tax 
rates than the rates proposed by the OECD MTC.  Daurer and Krever proved the above in a 
 
190 See Article 12 of the United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2017.  
191 See Article 12 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. 
192 Gerendy, Zoltan. The future of source taxation at passive income in Tax treaty policy and development. 
Vienna: Linde Verlag, 2005.  
193 This statement assumes that the resident country avoids double taxation by granting a credit as is stated in 
paragraph 2 of Article 23 A and Article 23 B of the UN MTC. If one country departs from that approach, i.e. 
exempting dividends from taxation at the recipient level, the statement is not therefore applicable. In this last 
situation, the increase of withholding taxes at source definitely affects foreign investment. 
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study concerning a number of African countries.194  They demonstrated that even though the 
UN MTC leaves the withholding tax rate for dividends open, for the purposes of dividends 
derived from business investments – FDI – many of the target countries repeatedly stick to 
the 5% rate contained in the OECD MTC or even lower rates in some cases. The withholding 
tax rate for portfolio dividends set forth in the OECD MTC is currently 15%. The treaties 
signed by Burundi, Ethiopia and Rwanda are dominated by withholding tax rates lower than 
15%. Mozambique, Uganda and Zambia consistently include either the OECD rate or a lower 
rate. In Uganda and Zambia, the higher rates are mainly included in treaties with OECD 
countries and the lower rates are typically found in treaties with non-OECD or other African 
countries. Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe have been more successful in negotiating a 
withholding tax rate that is higher than 15% in more than half of their treaties.  
 
Regarding interest, 11 of the countries that were tested in Daurer and Krever’s study have 
mainly adopted the 10% withholding tax rate that is stipulated by the OECD MTC. Ethiopia 
seems to have negotiated less source taxing rights in half of its treaties (mainly with African 
or non-OECD countries) and has included a withholding tax rate that is lower than 10%. 
Kenya and Tanzania, by way of contrast, were more successful in adopting higher tax rates 
than the OECD MTC ones. Thus, the difference mentioned above between the MTCs can be 
seen as no more than a formal difference.  
 
With regard to the allocation of taxing rights approach that was adopted in DTCs on passive 
investment income, an international consensus appeared in the 1920s and it has remained 
unchanged until now. Defined by Peggy Musgrave as “international equity”,195 the topic has 
been extensively studied by her, Richard Musgrave,196 Klaus Vogel197 and by the four 
 
194 Daurer, Veronica; and Krever, Richard. Choosing between the UN and the OECD Tax Policy Models: an 
African Case Study. European University Institute, Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 
Working Paper RSCAS 2012/60.  
195 Musgrave, Peggy B. United States taxation of foreign investment income: issues and arguments. Cambridge: 
International Tax Program, Law School of Harvard, 1969. 
196 R. Musgrave. Criteria for foreign tax credit. Taxation and Operations Abroad. Symposium. Ed. Russell 
Baker, 1960. P. 83. 
197 Vogel, Klaus. Worldwide vs. Source taxation of income: A review and reevaluation of arguments. Influence 
of Tax Differentials on International Competitiveness. VIII Munich Symposium on International Taxation, 
Kluwer law and Taxation Publishers, Deventer – Boston, 1990. p. 119. 
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economists198 that were appointed by the LN in the 1920s. The LN’s work in this regard, as 
well as adherence to the underlying theory of economic allegiance, are important for 
understanding the development of this topic.  
 
As mentioned, a group of economists concluded the LN Report on double taxation in 1923. 
This report dealt with the problem of double taxation by applying the economic allegiance 
theory, which underlies the modern discussion on tax jurisdiction. The report analysed, at 
length, the problems connected with the choice of either residence or source taxation as the 
basis for tax jurisdiction. It pointed out that an income tax based on the ability to pay does 
not answer the question of whose ability to pay is to be considered in each taxing jurisdiction. 
The group of economists considered that the individual whole’s faculty should be taxed – the 
aim of the “ability to pay theory” – but that it should be taxed only once and that the revenue 
should be divided among the tax districts according to the relative interest of the taxpayer in 
each district.199   
 
When the first DTC was concluded more than 100 years ago,200 the distribution of taxable 
income between treaty partners was done by allocating the right to tax to only one of the 
contracting countries, thereby making the income tax exempt in the other country. That 
approach started to change at the beginning of the 20th century, when the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom introduced a tax credit in their domestic legislation as the 
method to eliminate cross-border juridical double taxation. The credit approach became 
popular and it was subsequently introduced into the OECD MTC, and therefore into the UN 
MTC, as the appropriate method to eliminate double taxation in relation to passive 
investment income.  
 
Nowadays, notwithstanding that both the OECD MTC and the UN MTC use the credit 
method to eliminate double taxation of passive investment income, 28 out of the 34 current 
 
198 Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp.  
199 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir 
Josiah Stamp. Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee, 1923. Available at: 
http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/. 
200 Treaty between Austria-Hungary and Prussia for the Avoidance of Double Taxation. 1899. League of 
Nations Document E.F.S. 40 F. 15, RGBI 158/1900. 
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OECD member countries use the participation exemption system (the other internationally 
accepted method to eliminate juridical double taxation and that does not mean a territorial 
system) in relation to qualifying dividends received from foreign subsidiaries that are resident 
in some or all countries. Out of those 28 countries, 20 countries exempt 100% of the 
dividends and eight countries exempt between 95% and 100% of the dividends. As a 
consequence, the tax treatment in this regard by most OECD members deviates from the 
approaches that are contained in both the OECD MTC and the UN MTC.201 
  
 
Worldwide taxation with Exemption on qualifying 
dividends 
 
Worldwide taxation with 
Foreign Tax Credit 
Australia Japan Chile 
Austria Luxembourg Ireland 
Belgium Netherlands Israel 
Canada New Zealand Korea, Republic of 
Czech Republic Norway United States 
Denmark Poland Mexico 
Estonia Portugal  
Finland Slovakia  
France Slovenia  
Germany Spain  
Greece Sweden  
Hungary Switzerland  
Iceland Turkey  
Italy United Kingdom  
 
The LN economists tried to establish the location of the true economic interest of the 
taxpayer. For this purpose, they developed an elaborate test that aimed to define the true 
meaning of economic allegiance and then defined the ways in which economic allegiance 
should be allocated. The report considered two out of the four bases to determine economic 
allegiance as being the most important: (1) the acquisition of wealth “origin” or source, and 
(2) the consumption of wealth “domicile” or residence. The other two remaining bases refer 
 





to the place where the wealth is located and where the rights in relation to the wealth can be 
enforced.  
 
The next task for the group of economists was to address “the evil consequences of double 
taxation”.202 The underlying question was: “(…) which Government should give up revenue, 
and to what extent?”203 The methods explored by the economists were: (1) deduction for 
income from abroad,204 (2) exemption for income going abroad,205 (3) division of the tax,206 
and (4) classification and assignment of income.207  
 
The recommendation made by the LN group of economists was to exempt income going 
abroad. By bypassing that approach, the Technical Experts in their first report in 1925208 
opted to give more value to the “classification and assignment of income” method by 
remarking that: “All the treaties concluded between the Central European States both before 
and after the war in the main followed quite definitively the last system mentioned by the 
economists, namely, the system of the assignment of income, that is to say, apportionment 
according to country of origin”.209 Even though the Technical Experts210 openly stated that 
 
202 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir 
Josiah Stamp. Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee, 1923. Available at: 
http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/. 
203 Ibid, 203. 
204 Ibid, 203. 
205 Ibid, 203. 
206 Ibid, 203. See also Musgrave, Richard A. Fiscal Systems, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969. p. 238  
207 Ibid, 203.  
208 Technical Experts. Report and Resolutions on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion submitted to the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations, 1925. Available at:  http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
209 Coates, W. H. Double Taxation and Tax Evasion. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol 88, 1925.     
210 Dr. Salvador Oria, Secretary of State in the Minister of Finance, Member of the board of the National 
Mortgage  Bank, Argentina – replaced at the third session by M. Julian Enciso, Councillor of Legation, Geneva;  
M. Ch. Clavier, Director-General Direct Taxation and Land Survey in the Minister of Finance, Belgium; Dr. 
Vladimir Valnicek, Chief of Section in the Ministry of Finance - replaced at the third session by HE Dr. Bohumil 
Vlasak, Minister Plenipotentiary, Head of Department in the Ministry of Finance, Czechoslovakia; M. Borduge, 
Councillor of State, Director-General of Taxation and Registration, Ministry of Finance, France; Dr. Herbert 
Dorn, Director in the Ministry of Finance, Germany; Sir Percy Thompson, Deputy Chairman, Board of Inland 
Revenue, Great Britain; Professor Pasquale d' Aroma, Vice-Governor of the Bank of Italy, late Director-General 
in the Ministry of Finance. Assistant Dr. Gino Bolaffi, Head of Section in the Ministry of Finance, Department 
of Direct Taxation, Italy; Mr. Kengo Mori, Financial Commissioner of Japan in London - replaced by Mr. 
Takashi Aoki, Representative in London of the Bank of Japan. Assistant M. Yamaji, Japanese Delegation to 
the Reparation Commission, Japan; Dr. JHR Sinninghe Damste, Director-General of Taxation. For Colonial 
questions: Dr. LJ van der Waals, Director in the Colonial Department, The Netherlands; Professor Stefan 
Zaleski, Professor of Political Economy at the University at Posen. Assistant - for questions of succession duties 
- M. Edouard Werner, Head of Department, Ministry of Finance, Poland; M. Hans Blau, Director of the Federal 
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their conclusion was made “(…) for purely practical purposes and no inference in regard to 
economic theory or doctrine should be drawn from this fact”,211 this to date nevertheless 
remains as the appropriate approach and governs most DTCs in force.  
 
As previously mentioned, that decision can be considered as the origin of the historical 
problem of the allocation of taxing rights for developing countries when they sign DTCs. 
That approach must be complemented with the doctrine of economic allegiance, which was 
recommended by the economists’ report in order to ascertain the location of the individual’s 
true economic interest,212 with the main aim being the determination of the allocation of taxes 
between the two contracting states. This is confirmed by the fact that the early works of the 
LN only considered the interests of developed countries.  
 
The concerns of developing countries, however, arose during the negotiations of the MTC in 
Mexico. In this meeting, the Latin American countries challenged the criteria adopted in 
previous works. The majority of their approaches to passive investments were later rejected 
by the London MTC. 
      
Historically, developing countries have had doubts as to the benefits of this traditional 
approach (e.g. LN, OECD and UN). The traditional approach was applied in the “1928 
Geneva Model Conventions”. It was also recommended, with some minor changes, by the 
OECD MTC in 1963 and by the UN MTC in 1980.  
 
Peggy Musgrave’s early works also addressed the problem of international equity. For her, 
international equity was based on the rights of the home / resident and the host / source 
 
Taxation Department, Switzerland; Professor Thomas S. Adams, President of the American Economic 
Association, former Economic Adviser to the USA Treasury Department, Professor at Yale University. 
Assistants: Mr. Mitchell B. Carroll, Chief of Tax Section, Department of Commerce and Miss Annabel 
Matthews, Attorney, attached to the Board of Inland Revenue, Treasury Department, United States of America; 
Dr. Federico Alvarez Feo, Professor of Finance at the University of Caracas, Venezuela. 
211 Ibid, 203. 
212 This phrase must be understood as the application of the economic allegiance theory according to League of 
Nations, supra note 200. The committee pointed to four elements in the concept of economic allegiance: (i) 
where the yield is physically or economically produced? [production of wealth]; (ii) where the final results of 
the process are actually to be found? [possession of wealth]; and (iii) where does the wealth reach the final 
owner [disposition of wealth]?  
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countries in terms of an equitable division of national gain and loss.213  The underlying idea 
was that a taxpayer’s home country has rights in relation to the taxpayer’s foreign income 
because the home country has an initial interest in all of its taxpayers’ capital and income. 
Thus, a tax imposed by the host country results in a loss to the home country.214  
 
Peggy Musgrave’s most recent theory departs from that former approach, considering it as a 
ground for the solution the national “entitlements” of the home and the host countries. While 
the entitlements of the home country address the right to tax residents’ worldwide income, 
the entitlements of the host country address the right of source countries to tax income that 
arises within its geographical borders.215 Musgrave addresses the fact that international 
equity concerns the extent of the source country’s entitlement, i.e. the host country’s share 
of international income.216 Specifically, and regarding the share of international income,217 
Musgrave argues for an agreed rate schedule for corporate tax and withholding tax, where 
tax rates would relate inversely to per capita income in the host country and directly to per 
capita income in the home country. She supported this approach by recognizing that: (1) the 
right of the host country is based on the territoriality principle, tempered by the principle of 
non-discrimination; and (2) the right of the home country is based on the following 
principles:  
  
(a) the taxpayer’s tax allegiance to the home country arising from their legal rights as citizens;  
 
213 Musgrave, Richard A.; and Musgrave, Peggy B. Inter-nation Equity in Modern Fiscal Issues: Essays in 
Honor of Carl S. Shoup, edited by Richard Bird and John Head, Toronto, 1972. 
214 Li, Jinyan. Globalization and the Impact of Tax on International Investments: A Symposium in Honour of 
the Memory of the Late Alex Easson. Queen’s University, 2008. Introduction. Alex Eassons’s statement: “There 
is no real agreement as to what would be a proper division of the [international] tax base, nor is there any 
obvious principle of fairness that can be invoked to justify any particular distribution of revenue. The present 
division has been a more or less accidental result of the attempt to eliminate double taxation, and is principally 
a product of the various model double taxation treaties that have been adopted over a period of some 60 years. 
Since the principal architects of these model treaties have been the major capital-exporting countries, it seems 
reasonable to suppose that, to the extent that the existing arrangements are inequitable, they operate to the 
prejudice of countries that are primarily importers of capital ... and as the great majority of lesser-developed 
countries fall into this category, there is the  further  consideration  that  some redistribution in favour of source 
countries would on balance be desirable and would promote a form of vertical equity among nations.” 
215 Musgrave, Peggy B. Consumption Tax Proposals in an International Setting. Tax Law Review, Vol 54, 
2000-2001.  
216 Kaufman, Nancy H. Fairness and the taxation of international income. Law and Policy International 
Business, Vol 29, 1998. 




(b) the necessity to achieve inter-individual equity;  
(c) the home country’s tax sovereignty in relation to the property of residents which may be 
considered to be national resources; and  
(d) the benefit theory, which considers taxation as a payment for the benefits provided by the 
country of residence to its own factors of production prior to their transfer abroad.218  
 
Musgrave’s approach focuses on the host country’s share of the worldwide income, 
understanding that the home country’s right to tax worldwide income is “untouchable”. Such 
an approach is the one that is followed by the OECD MTC and by the UN MTC regarding 
the taxation of passive investment income, at least since the first OECD MTC that was 
adopted in 1963, as well as with the first UN MTC in 1980. By exempting qualifying 
dividends, developed countries – most of them home or resident countries in DTCs with 
developing countries – have unilaterally given up their taxing right in this regard.   
 
Ascertaining the location of the true economic interest of the taxpayer based on an economic 
classification and assignment approach is a valid method for allocating international income 
between countries that are party to a DTC. However, such an allocation method must 
consider that: (1) domestic legislation usually does the same,219 and (2) the existence of 
mostly unilateral investments flows in relations between developing and developed 
countries.  
 
It is valid to question whether the economic classification and assignment approach inherited 
from the 1928 Geneva Model is suitable for the negotiation of a DTC between developing 
and developed countries. The immediate effect for developing countries when they sign a 
DTC with a developed country is the resignation of sovereignty, i.e. rights to tax, and this 
loss is not properly compensated.  
 
 
218 Kaufman, Nancy H. Fairness and the taxation of international income. Law and Policy International 
Business, Vol 29, 1998.  
219 Azzi, John. Policy Considerations in the Taxation of Foreign-Source Income. Bulletin for International 
Fiscal Documentation, Vol 47, 1993.  
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The traditional argumentation of developing countries against this harmful effect is the 
decrease in fiscal revenues that result from the application of DTCs, compared to scenarios 
where there is no DTC. Taking this line of argumentation as a starting point, DTCs between 
developing and developed countries must not only solve the problem of double taxation –
that is quite often solved unilaterally by domestic legislation – but they must also provide an 
incentive to increase the attraction of foreign investment, access to foreign debt and access 
to beneficial technology.  
 
In a scenario where there is no DTC between a capital-importing country (which is typically 
the host / source state, i.e. the developing country) and a capital-exporting country (in the 
majority of cases the home / residence state, i.e. the developed country), source countries will 
tend to fully tax all income that is sourced within their jurisdiction. This leaves the residence 
country only with a residual right to tax. Nowadays most developed countries, namely 32 out 
of 35 OECD Members, unilaterally avoid cross-border juridical double taxation in their 
domestic legislation.220 221  
 
220 Information obtained from the IBFD Tax Research Platform. Available at: https://research.ibfd.org/  
221 Australia: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force 
(last reviewed January 1, 2015); Austria: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the 
need of having a DTC in force. Exemption with progression for active income and credit for passive income 
(last reviewed January 19, 2015); Belgium: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the 
need of having a DTC in force. Tax Exemption or Tax Credit (last reviewed January 14, 2015); Canada: Yes. 
Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Tax Credit for 
active and passive income. Indirect Tax Credit for dividends. (last reviewed January 19, 2015); Chile: Yes. 
Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax 
Credit with some restrictions, and deduction. (last reviewed January 1, 2015); Czech Republic: No. Juridical 
Double Taxation is not unilaterally avoided (last reviewed January 12, 2015); Denmark: Yes. Juridical Double 
Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed 
January 12, 2015); Estonia: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having 
a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed January 22, 2015); Finland: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation 
is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed January 
12, 2015); France: Partially. Juridical Double Taxation unilaterally only partially avoided by deduction (last 
reviewed January 16, 2015); Germany: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need 
of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed January 19, 2015); Greece: Yes. Juridical Double 
Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed 
January 23, 2015); Hungary: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having 
a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit/ Limit until 90% Foreign Tax. (last reviewed April 1, 2015); Iceland: Yes. 
Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax 
Credit. (last reviewed January 21, 2015); Ireland: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without 
the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit or Deduction. (last reviewed January 20, 2015); Israel: 
Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax 
Credit. (last reviewed January 19, 2015); Italy: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without 
the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed January 15, 2015); Japan: Yes. Juridical 




1.2.5 WITHOLDING TAXES  
 
 
In a DTC, a withholding tax is the most common mechanism that is used to tax non-residents 
in relation to source income. This requires the payer – the withholding agent – to withhold 
and pay, in the name of the non-resident taxpayer, the source country tax in relation to the 
source passive investment income. Withholding taxes derive their name from the way they 
are collected: by being withheld by the debtor and paid directly by him to the government.222 
 
The historic agreement since the 1963 OECD MTC until now of sharing taxing rights 
between the source and the residence country regarding passive investment income223 results 
in this method of taxation at source – the withholding tax – being the most widespread 
 
Deduction. (last reviewed January 30, 2015); Korea: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided 
without the need of having a DTC in force. (last reviewed January 30, 2015); Luxemburg: Yes. Juridical Double 
Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit or Deduction. 
(last reviewed January 15, 2015); Mexico: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the 
need of having a DTC in force. (last reviewed January 1, 2015); Netherlands: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation 
is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Tax Credit, Exemption, and Deduction. (last 
reviewed January 12, 2015); New Zealand: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the 
need of having a DTC in force. (last reviewed January 1, 2015); Norway: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is 
unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed January 
12, 2015); Poland: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in 
force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed January 1, 2015); Portugal: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is 
unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed April 7, 
2015); Slovak Republic: No. Juridical Double Taxation is not unilaterally avoided (last reviewed February 1, 
2015); Slovenia: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in 
force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed January 30, 2015); Spain: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is 
unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit and Exemption. (last 
reviewed March 1, 2015); Sweden: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of 
having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit and Deduction. (last reviewed January 13, 2015); Switzerland: 
Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Exemption 
and Deduction. (last reviewed March 1, 2015); Turkey: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided 
without the need of having a DTC in force. Ordinary Tax Credit. (last reviewed January 1, 2015); United 
Kingdom: Yes. Juridical Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. 
Ordinary Tax Credit or Deduction. (last reviewed February 20, 2015); United States of America: Yes. Juridical 
Double Taxation is unilaterally avoided without the need of having a DTC in force. Direct and Indirect Tax 
Credit. (last reviewed January 1, 2015). 
222 Zimmer, Frederik. Withholding taxes. University of Oslo, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/public/Withholding%20Tax1.doc  
223 Regarding Royalties, the approach of share taxing rights between the source and the residence country was 
only included in the United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation 




method to tax non-residents in relation to source income, even if it goes against the main 
objective of DTCs, which is the avoidance of juridical double taxation. This apparent 
contradiction can be caused because the decision to grant taxing rights to the source country 
through withholding taxes could be considered as a reaction to the problem of tax evasion – 
the avoidance of double non-taxation – rather than on the elimination of double taxation. At 
the same time, and from a perspective of revenue, the increase of international capital 
mobility with highly integrated operations has increased the importance of withholding taxes 
as the easiest source taxation system in relation to passive investment income. Lastly, a 
withholding tax offers the tax authorities of source countries a relatively effective means of 
collection, which is justified on the grounds that the courts of one jurisdiction are reluctant 
and usually decline to enforce the revenue law of another jurisdiction. Even if foreign courts 
were willing to enforce source countries’ legislation, the additional effort and expense of 
having to enforce judgments in a foreign jurisdiction would be a major disincentive to 
collection.224 Thus, the mitigation of tax evasion, the simplicity of the implementation and 
the effectiveness of capturing passive income flows crossing national borders are the 
arguments that have been posited in favour of containing withholding taxes in DTCs.225 
 
Each passive investment income has special and different features that serve to justify (or 
not) the existence of source taxation. Regarding interest, the primary economic justification 
for taxation at source has always been that interest payments are deductible expenses in the 
source country. Unlike taxing interest at source, withholding taxes on dividends cannot be as 
compellingly justified on economic grounds, since the underlying profits from which 
dividends are paid have usually already borne the corporate income tax of the source 
country.226 Regarding royalties, the UN justified the difference with the OECD MTC as the 
way to solve an unjustified position for the source country in the application of treaties 
founded on the OECD MTC since, according to the same logic that is applied to interest, 
royalty payments are typically tax-deductible items in the source country and, as has already 
 
224 Greig, John A. Aspects of Interest Withholding Tax. Revenue Law Journal, Vol 3, 1993. Available at: 
http://classic.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/RevenueLawJl/1993/4.pdf 
225 Zee, Howell H. Taxation of Financial Capital in a Globalized Environment: The role of withholding taxes. 
National Tax Journal, Vol 51, 1998. Available at: http://www.ntanet.org/NTJ/51/3/ntj-v51n03p587-99-
taxation-financial-capital-globalized.pdf.  
226 Ibid, 226.  
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been stated, the prohibition on taxing at source leads to a hypothetically unjustified loss of 
tax revenue for the source country.227  
 
There is no consensus between developed and developing countries regarding the existence 
of withholding taxes in relation to all passive investment income and, even if there is partial 
consensus, it has been impossible to agree on the rate of each of those withholding taxes.  
 
It seems that withholding taxes have never been an adequate method to allocate taxing rights 
and, in their defence, this should not be their responsibility.  At least not in the way that they 
have been used in the UN MTC. The main purpose of withholding taxes in DTCs is to avoid 
double non-taxation, which they achieve by generating juridical double taxation and 
consequently distorting equity.  
 
So far, withholding taxes have been instruments to mitigate tax evasion, simplify source 
taxation of non-residents and improve the collection of taxes in relation to passive income 
flows. Source countries insist on protecting their rights by raising withholding taxes.228 The 
UN MTC has not been able to stipulate fixed rates of withholding taxes due to the different 
expectations of developing and developed countries in this ambit.  
 
In addition to the above, the main problem of withholding taxes is probably the fact that they 
tax on a gross basis instead of on a net basis. Consequently, it leads to excess credits and 
hence double taxation. High withholding taxes at source, with or without a DTC in force, 
may damage, due to the risk of excess of credit, the foreign investor’s position. Withholding 
taxes try to arrive at the amount of tax that would have been imposed on net income if an 
adequate cross-border allocation of deductions were possible. The above scenario is even 
worse when the MTC – that should in theory recommend the best rules for DTCs between 
 
227 Gerendy, Zoltan. The future of source taxation at passive income in tax treaty policy and development. 
Vienna: Linde Verlag, 2005. 
228 See: Alm, James; Martinez-Vasquez, Jorge; and Rider, Mark (eds). The Challenges of Tax Reform in a 
Global Economy. Springer, 2006. p. 142; and Bird, Richard M.; and de Jantscher, Casanegra. Improving Tax 
Administrations in Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund, 1992. p. 33.  
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developing and developed countries – leaves the tax rate of withholding taxes regarding 
passive investment income open to treaty negotiations.229    
 
Withholding taxes are not only used in DTCs. In domestic situations, withholding taxes do 
not ultimately lead to a problem if, as is generally the case, the difference is refunded where 
the final tax bill is less than the tax that has been withheld.230 However, in the international 
context this is not the same, specifically regarding the taxation of passive investment income, 
since countries imposing withholding taxes on non-residents do not, as a rule, make refunds 
based on the recipient’s tax position.231 This not only affects the attraction of foreign 
investment income and therefore development, but it also conflicts with the non-
discrimination principle that is contained in Article 24 of the UN MTC.232 
 
It could be said that the UN MTC follows the approach of sanctioning discrimination in 
Article 24 and creating discrimination in Articles 10, 11 and 12. It is a common treaty practice 
to levy withholding taxes on the gross income in relation to dividends, interests and royalties 
– certainly over royalties if the treaty follows the UN MTC – which in the majority of cases 
differs from the tax treatment of resident taxpayers who are assessed on a net basis. The only 
way to diminish the impact of this contradiction is to reduce withholding tax rates to zero. 233 





229 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Articles 10, 11, and 12.  
230 Larking, Barry; and van der Jagt, Robert. The case for withholding tax on a net basis within the EU. 
International Tax Review, Vol 21, 2010. 
231 Ibid, 231. 
232 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Article 24 paragraph 1:  “Nationals of a Contracting State shall 
not be subjected in the other Contracting State to any taxation or any requirement connected therewith which 
is other or more burdensome than the taxation and connected requirements to which nationals of that other 
State in the same circumstances, in particular with respect to residence, are or may be subjected. This provision 
shall, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, also apply to persons who are not residents of one or both of 
the Contracting States.”. 
233 Farrel, Jennifer E. The Interface of International Trade Law and Taxation. IBFD, Doctoral Series 26, 2013.  
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1.2.5.1 BRIC COUNTRIES AND WITHHOLDING TAXES IN DTCs 
 
 
Brazil, Russia, India and China do not represent the same interests as developing countries. 
Since 2001, when Goldman Sachs issued the report “Building Better Global Economic 
BRICs”,234 it has been possible to detect certain features in these countries’ international tax 
policies regarding the taxation of passive investment income. Notwithstanding the interest of 
those countries in DTCs is completely different to those of developing or less developed 
countries, those features, or new approaches, are interesting for the purposes of this research 
as they constitute new ways of understanding the forces of international taxation.  
 
From 2001 onwards, Brazil has signed nine235 DTCs, Russia has signed 12236 DTCs, India 
has signed 19237 DTCs, and China has signed 36238 DTCs.  The majority of the DTCs follow 
the OECD MTC regarding the rates of withholding taxes, but, in some cases, there are 
interesting surprises due to the elimination of taxation at source in relation to some passive 
investment income. 
 
BRICS countries are no longer regarded as developing countries. They are industrialized 
countries that fall somewhere between developing and developed countries, with strong 
economies and bargaining positions in the negotiation of DTCs. This economic step above 
developing countries means they have different aims when signing a DTC, since now, in the 
 
234 Goldman Sachs. Building Better Global Economic BRICs. Global Economics Paper 66, 2001. Available at: 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/archive/archive-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf  
235 Chile (2001), Ukraine (2002), Israel (2002), Mexico (2003), South Africa (2003), Russia (2004), Venezuela 
(2005), Peru (2006), and Trinidad y Tobago (2008).  
236 Argentina (2001), Oman (2001), Singapore (2002), Estonia ((2002), Botswana (2002), Venezuela (2003), 
Mexico (2004), Chile (2004), Brazil (2004), Algeria (2006), Saudi Arabia (2007) and Latvia (2010).  
237 Algeria (2001), Malaysia (2001), Slovenia (2003), Sudan (2003), Armenia (2003), Hungary (2003), Uganda 
(2004), Saudi Arabia (2006), Serbia and Montenegro (2006), Kuwait (2006), Botswana (2006), Mexico (2007), 
Iceland (2007), Myanmar (2008), Luxembourg (2008), Syria (2008), Tajikistan (2008), Finland (2010), and 
Norway (2011).  
238 Qatar (2001), Cuba (2001), Venezuela (2001), Nepal (2001), Kazakhstan (2001), Indonesia (2001), Oman 
(2002), Nigeria (2002), Tunisia (2002), Iran (2002), Bahrain (2002), Greece (2002), Kyrgyzstan (2002), 
Morocco (2002), Sri Lanka (2003), Trinidad y Tobago (2003), Macau (2003), Brunei (2004), Albania (2004), 
Azerbaijan (2005), Georgia (2005), Mexico (2005), Saudi Arabia (2006), Hong Kong (2006), Algeria (2006), 
Singapore (2007), Taijikistan (2008), Ethiopia (2009), Czech Republic (2009), Belgium (2009), Turkmenistan 
(2009), Finland (2010), Zambia (2010), Malta (2010), Syria (2010), and United Kingdom (2010).  
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majority of the cases, they act as capital exporter countries instead of as capital importer 
countries, which is usually the case for developing or less developed countries.  
 
In 2013 the International Monetary Fund released an interesting article that can be used as an 
example of the matter. 239  The article stated that of the countries that had until then signed 
DTCs with BRIC countries (since 2001), only Israel, Singapore, Estonia, Slovenia, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Finland, Norway, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic and Belgium could 
be considered as developed countries. Considering the 76 DTCs that were concluded by the 
BRIC countries from 2001 to 2013, only 13 (17%) were signed with developed countries and 
the remaining 63 (83%) were concluded with developing or less developed countries. 
Country by country, the percentages do not change dramatically. For Brazil, out of the nine 
DTCs that have been concluded since 2001, only one was signed with a developed country: 
Brazil-Israel (2002), or 11% of their new treaties. For Russia, out of the 12 DTCs concluded 
since 2001, only two were signed with developed countries: Russia-Singapore (2003) and 
Russia-Estonia (2002), or 16.6% of their new treaties. For India, out of the 19 DTCs that 
have been concluded since 2001, only five were signed with a developed country: India-
Slovenia (2003), India-Iceland (2007), India-Luxembourg (2008), India-Finland (2010) and 
India-Norway (2011), or 26.3% of their new treaties. And lastly, for China, out of the 36 
DTCs that have been concluded since 2001, only five were signed with a developed country: 
China-Singapore (2007), China-Czech Republic (2009), China-Belgium (2009), China-
Finland (2010) and China-United Kingdom (2010), or 13.8% of their new treaties.  
 
This highlights the importance of developing or less developed economies for BRIC 
countries, countries with which they act as capital exporter countries and therefore became 
interested, from a revenue perspective, in reducing taxation at source and increasing taxation 
at residence. They act with the same interests as developed countries when signing a DTC 
with a developing country. As Monica Inés Hernández Gómez concluded in her research 
entitled: “The BRICs: Tax Treaty Policy Regarding Dividends”, from a tax policy 
perspective, what BRIC countries have negotiated in the last decade demonstrates that China 
 
239 International Monetary Fund. World Economic and Financial Survey. World Economic Outlook Database, 
2013. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/pdf/text.pdf 
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is behaving as a capital exporter country – it provides incentives and encourages its residents 
to invest abroad – while Russia and India appear to be somewhere in the middle. In particular, 
India is leaning towards China’s position and the government has expressly stated its interest 
in encouraging Indian companies to invest abroad.240 Brazil still adheres rather closely to the 
UN MTC by applying the highest withholding taxes of the four countries in their DTCs. 
These differences are probably the result of the different stages of development of each of 
the BRIC countries, which are in the process of becoming capital exporting countries. 
 
In all of its treaties – since 2001 – Brazil uses a 10% withholding tax rate on FDI, which is 
higher than the 5% that is proposed by the OECD MTC; Russia uses a 5% or a 10% rate 
depending on the DTC, normally having higher withholding taxes in DTCs with South 
American countries (Argentina and Venezuela). India uses a 5% rate and it is only in the 
DTC with Botswana that it uses a 7.5% rate. China uses a 5% rate in all their DTCs, which 
matches the OECD Proposal. 
 
Thus, contrary to BRIC countries’ policy regarding the treatment of active income, where 
the extent of the definition of permanent establishment or the new and strict source 
approaches regarding transfer pricing rules, the treatment of passive investment income in 
DTCs has a tendency to depart from a strict source approach. The tendency of lowering 
withholding taxes at source by BRIC countries can be seen as a strategic international policy 
move of these countries with the ultimate aim of increasing foreign investment and, 
consequently, to further development. 
 
 
1.3 UN MTC TREATMENT OF ACTIVE AND PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME  
 
 
As has been demonstrated, the distinction between passive investment income and active 
income in the international tax context has its origins in a 1923 report that was prepared by 
 
240 Hernández Gómez, Mónica Inés. The BRICs: Tax Treaty Policy Regarding Dividends. IBFD, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, Vol 66, 2012. 
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the four economists of the League of Nations,241 the 1925 report of Technical Experts242 and 
the 1928 League of Nations Models. The choice by the Technical Experts to opt for the 
classification and assignment method as the most suitable method to determine the design of 
DTCs and to solve the problem of double taxation243 meant that the future of the treatment 
of passive investment income and active income in DTCs was fixed. The four economists 
chose the economic allegiance theory as they believed that this was the only theory that, 
alongside the ability to pay principle, was able to solve the problem of where a person ought 
to be taxed and how the division ought to be made between the treaty partners.244  
 
The classification of active and passive investment income through the classification and 
assignment method that is currently in force in the UN MTC stems from the OECD MTC 
approach, and, therefore, from the LN approach. That approach is founded on the assumption 
that treaty partners are more or less similar regarding their development status, and thus can 
generate similar investments flows. The economic classification and assignment approach 
chosen by the LN and thereafter by the OECD lowered the risk of generating an unfair shift 
of tax revenue from one country to another. It was on this belief that the LN experts produced 
their work and, therefore, the criteria concluded are not suitable in the context of a DTC 
between a developing and a developed country.245  
 
MTCs do not expressly refer to the concepts of active and passive income. The UN MTC, by 
following the OECD MTC, consolidates the idea of granting preferential rights to tax active 
income to source countries through the application of concepts such as: (1) permanent 
establishment; (2) residence; and (3) fixed base, amongst others. On the contrary, it also 
 
241 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir 
Josiah Stamp. Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee, 1923. Available at: 
http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
242 League of Nations, Technical Experts to the Economic and Financial Committee.  Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion. Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee, 1925.  
Available at:  http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/  
243 Ibid, 243.  
244 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir 
Josiah Stamp. Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee. April, 1923. Available at: 
http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
245 Van der Bruggen.  Citing for the OECD quote, OECD Report on Fiscal Incentives for Private Investment in 





consolidates the idea of granting preferential rights to tax passive investments income to 
residence countries. The principles governing the taxation of passive investment income and 
of active income in the DTC context have, however, been developed by the OECD. Probably 
the best example of this is the concept of permanent establishment.  
 
The taxation of passive investment income, not only in the UN MTC but also in the OECD 
MTC, is based on the application of reciprocity: “Reciprocal reduction of withholding tax 
rates by source countries”. This principle could cause unfairness when developing (or 
underdeveloped) countries are involved, as is illustrated in the example given by Charles R. 
Irish in his publication entitled: “International Double Taxation Agreements and Income 
Taxation at source”. In this example, he states that in 1972, interest payments remitted from 
Zambia to private lenders domiciled in United Kingdom, the United States, West Germany 
and Japan were estimated to be in excess of US$ 20 million per year, while interest payments 
from those countries to Zambian lenders were estimated to be less than US$ 10,000 per 
year.246    
 
The UN MTC classification and allocation approach addresses the following incomes: (1) 
income from immovable property (Article 6); (2) business profits (Article 7);  (3) shipping, 
inland waterways transport and air transport (Article 8);  (4) associated enterprises (Article 
9);  (5) dividends (Article 10);  (6) interest (Article 11);  (7) royalties (Article 12); (8) fees 
for technical services (Article 12A); (9) capital gains (Article 13);  (10) independent personal 
services (Article 14);  (11) dependent personal services (Article 15);  (12) director’s fees and 
remuneration of top-level managerial officials (Article 16);  (13) artists and sports persons 
(Article17);  (14) pensions and social security payments (Article 18);  (15) government 
services (Article 19);  (16) students (Article 20); and (17) other income (Article 21). Incomes 
treated in Articles 6, 7, 8 number 1, 9, 15, 16, 17 and 18 are mostly allocated to the source 
country, and incomes from Article 8 number 2, 10, 11, 12, 12 A and 13 are mostly allocated 
to home / resident countries.  
 
 
246 The information was obtained from the 1972 annual reports of Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines Ltd. 




In order to illustrate what has been described above, the following tables summarize the 
income classification and corresponding allocation of taxing rights that is currently used in 




Traditionally known Active Income Allocation of taxing rights Elimination of Double 
Taxation 
 
Art. 7: Business Income 
 
Source country unlimited rights (must fulfil some 
criteria – permanent establishment)  
Residence country only residual rights or unlimited if 
source criteria is not fulfilled.  
 
  
Credit or Exemption 
 
Art. 8 (B): Shipping, Inland Waterways 







1.- Income from the operation of ships:  
  
Source country unlimited rights (must fulfil some 
criteria – “more than casual”). Residence country only 
residual rights or unlimited if source criteria is not 
fulfilled. 
 
 2.- Income from the operation of aircraft: 
 
Residence country unlimited rights (where the effective 
management of the enterprise is situated). 
 
  
Credit or Exemption 
 
Art. 14: Independent personal services  
 
Source country unlimited rights (must fulfil some 
criteria – fixed base or residency). Residence country 




Credit or Exemption 
 
 
Art. 15: Dependent personal services 
 
Source country unlimited rights (previous fulfil some 
criteria – residency, who paid the salary, and 
remuneration is not borne by a permanent establishment 
or a fixed base). Residence country only residual rights 
or unlimited if criteria is not fulfilled. 
 
  
Credit or Exemption 
 
 
Art. 16: Director´s fees and 




Source country unlimited rights (country where the 
company is resident). Residence country only residual 
rights.  
 
Credit or Exemption 
 
Art. 17: Artists and Sportspersons 
 
Source country unlimited rights (country where the 
activities of the entertainer or sportsperson are 
exercised). Residence country only residual rights. 
 
 











Article 8 (B) is preferred by developing countries.  
 
1.- Payments made within framework of a public 
scheme part of the social security system:  
 
Source country unlimited rights (country from where is 
the public scheme – social security system).  Residence 
country only residual rights. 
  
2.- Payments not made within framework of a public 
scheme part of the social security system: 
 
Source country unlimited rights (previous fulfil some 
criteria – the payment is made by a resident or a 
permanent establishment of the country where the 
employment or services was performed). Residence 
country only has residual rights or unlimited if criteria 
are not fulfilled. 
 











Traditionally known Passive 
Investment Income 
Allocation of taxing rights Elimination of 
Double Taxation 
 
Art. 10: Dividends 
 
Source country limited rights (country where the 





Art. 11: Interest 
 
Source country limited rights (country where the 






Art. 12: Royalties 
 
Source country limited rights (must fulfil some criteria – 
beneficial owner residency). Residence country residual 






Art. 12 A: Fees for Technical Services  
 
Source country limited rights (must fulfil some criteria – 
beneficial owner residency). Residence country residual  








Both tables demonstrate the differences in intensity of how active and passive investment 
incomes are treated in the UN MTC. The treatment is definitely more accurate regarding the 
taxation of active income by prioritizing the economic allegiance analysis and legal 
development of principles with the view to allocating taxing rights fairly.  
 
The comparison between the tax treatment of active and passive income in the UN MTC and 
in the OECD MTC has been successfully conducted by Michael Lennard in his publication 
entitled: “The UN Model Tax Convention as Compared with the OECD Model Tax 
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Convention – Current Points of Difference and Recent Developments”. This publication 
states the following:  
 
(1) Article 5 paragraph 3(a) of the UN MTC has a six-month duration test for building sites 
compared to the 12-month duration that is required by the OECD MTC; 
 
 (2) Article 5 paragraph 3(b) of the UN MTC addresses the “services permanent 
establishments”, which differs substantially from the OECD approach of treating services in 
the same way as the provision of goods;  
 
(3) Article 5 paragraph 4(a) and (b) of the UN MTC omitted the concept of “delivery” from 
the list of preparatory and auxiliary activities by stating that “delivery” can constitute a 
sufficient economic nexus to the source. This is a completely different approach from the one 
used by the OECD in its comprehensive and clear comparison of the two models;  
 
(4) Article 5 paragraph 5(b) of the UN MTC states that an agent that holds stock, even though 
that agent does not conclude contracts for the principal, can constitute a sufficient economic 
nexus to the host country and, therefore, a permanent establishment, so as to justify taxation 
by the host country;  
 
(5) Article 5 paragraph 6 of the UN MTC states that where an insurance enterprise collects 
premiums in the territory of the other state or insures risks situated therein through a person 
that cannot conclude contracts and other than an agent of an independent status to whom 
paragraph 7 applies, this can constitute a deemed permanent establishment;  
 
(6) Article 7 paragraph 1 of the UN MTC states the “force of attraction rule”, which allows 
taxation by the source country of certain profits that are not actually attributable under normal 
rules to the permanent establishment: sales of similar goods or merchandise as well as other 




(7) Article 7 paragraph 3 of the UN MTC provides some extra clarification of the treatment 
of deductions in determining permanent establishment profits;  
 
(8) Article 8 of the UN MTC provides an alternative Article (b) regarding the taxation of 
profits from the operation of ships and aircraft in international traffic by granting limited 
instead of no rights to the source country in relation to this income, thereby departing from 
the OECD approach of no taxation at source;  
 
(9) Article 10 paragraph 2 does not specify the maximum dividend withholding tax rate that 
is allowed to the source country and it has left this subject to negotiations between 
prospective treaty partners; 
 
 (10) Article 11 paragraph 2 does not specify the maximum interest withholding tax rate that 
is allowed to the source country and it has left this subject to negotiation between prospective 
treaty partners;  
 
(11) Article 12 provides for source country taxation of royalties by granting limited instead 
of no source country rights in relation to this kind of income, as the OECD MTC does;  
 
(12) Article 12 A provides for source country taxation of fees for technical services by 
granting limited instead of no source country rights in relation to this kind of income (without 
permanent establishment), as the OECD MTC does; 
 
(13) Article 13 paragraph 4 of the UN MTC covers not only source country taxation of sales 
of shares in land-rich companies, but also interests in partnerships, trusts or estates. Also, and 
by extending source country rights, the UN MTC deals with the alienation of the shares of 
non-land-rich companies in a provision that does not appear in the OECD MTC;  
 
(14) The UN MTC retains Article 14 which was deleted from the OECD MTC. However, it 
states an available alternative for those wishing to delete it. Therefore, the UN MTC keeps 
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the “fixed base” test instead of replacing it by the permanent establishment test and business 
profit attribution, as is the case in the OECD MTC;  
 
(15) Article 16 paragraph 2 extends the scope of this Article by including salaries, wages and 
other similar remuneration of “high level managers” as income that is to be taxed by the 
source state, the country where the company is resident; and  
 
(16) Article 18 of the UN MTC provides for two alternatives. The first, following the OECD 
MTC approach, assigns to the country of residence the exclusive right to tax pensions and 
other similar remuneration. However, and as an important difference with the OECD MTC 
approach, it grants to the source country of the pension the exclusive right to tax when the 
payments involved are made within the framework of a public scheme which is part of the 
social security system of that country or a political subdivision or a local authority thereof. 
The second alternative provides for the sharing of taxing rights between the country of 
residence and the country of source of the pension regarding pensions and other similar 
remuneration when the payments involved are not made within the framework of a public 
scheme which is part of the social security system of a country or a political subdivision or a 
local authority thereof. If the payments are made within the framework of such a public 
scheme, the right to tax belongs only to the source country. 
 
This list reinforces the statement regarding the depth of analysis and study of the treatment 
of active income, i.e. permanent establishment, business income, income from operations of 
ships and aircraft in international traffic, independent personal services, residency, fixed base 
test, director’s fees and pensions, especially when compared to the analysis and study that 
has been done regarding passive investments income. From Lennard’s publication, it is 
possible to conclude that the main focus of the UN MTC is related to the idea of reinforcing 
and extending the source country’s taxation rights in DTCs between developing and 
developed countries. Properly determining the benefits that signatory countries should gain 
by concluding a DTC between a developing and a developed country is therefore something 
which has been neglected thus far. The UN MTC approach to royalty income is one clear 




Notwithstanding that it seems that the UN MTC does not achieve the goal of fairly dividing 
the right to tax between source and residence countries, it is possible to observe that the UN 
MTC has developed its approach and, therefore, it has achieved fair and accurate results 
regarding active incomes. What can be said with regard to known active income cannot be 
said with regard to the treatment of passive investment income, where there has been no 
salient development of consistent principles.  
 
The UN MTC, by following the OECD MTC approach regarding the classification of 
income, failed due to the different economic realities of the potential treaty partners. The 
design of the articles governing the taxation of passive investment income assumes that 
dichotomies in allocation will be solved by the existence of reciprocal investment flows. The 
non-reciprocity of investments therefore highlights the problem of that MTC. When 
contracting states are at vastly different levels of economic development, the income flows 
are substantially unilateral: out of the developing country, as the source country, and into the 
developed country, as the residence country.247  
 
This research considers that the classification of the income as active or passive in the UN 
MTC – due to the desired or undesired influence of the OECD MTC in its design – is the 
greatest obstacle for developing countries when analysing the benefits of a DTC with a 
developed country. The decision made by the UN, i.e. a lack of analysis of the benefits carried 
out by the division of taxing rights regarding passive investment income, has forced 
developing countries to restrict their demands only to the ineffective claim of higher 
withholding taxes at source, thereby distorting the real sense behind the decision of 
developing countries as to whether to sign a DTC with a developed country. The development 
of the model has been influenced by these demands, instead of by setting proper rules that 




247 Irish, Charles R. International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation. The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 23, 1974. 
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PART II – HISTORY TO DATE 
 
 
The history, validating all of the foregoing, demonstrates that developing countries have 
focused their efforts on claiming more taxing rights when signing DTCs with developed 
countries. The position of developing countries regarding the allocation of taxing rights248 in 
DTCs with more developed countries only became a discussion point after the Second World 
War,249 250 251 and these claims were expressed in the creation of the MTCs.252  
 
2.1 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES’ CLAIMS OF TAXING RIGHTS – MTC CONTEXT 
 
2.1.1 MEXICO MODEL 
 
 
The first joint action by developing countries was embodied in the Mexico MTC. In June 
1939, the Fiscal Committee of the League of Nations suggested that the 1928 Geneva Models 
dealing with direct taxes should be revised in light of the technical improvements embodied 
in the various bilateral DTCs that were concluded during the 1930s.253 The Fiscal Committee 
met in The Hague in April 1940, but this work was abandoned on 10 May 1940 after the city 
of Rotterdam was bombed during the Second World War. 
 
 
248 Pickering, Ariane. Why Negotiate Tax Treaties?. Papers on Selected Topics in Negotiation of Tax Treaties 
for Developing Countries, United Nations, 2013. Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/uploads/2013/05/20130530_Paper1N_Pickering.pdf. 
249Arnolds, Brian J. An introduction to tax treaties, 2015. Available at:  http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-
content/uploads/2015/10/TT_Introduction_Eng.pdf  
250 Daurer, Veronica; and Krever, Richard. Choosing between the UN and the OECD Tax Policy Models: an 
African Case Study. European University Institute, Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. 
Working Paper RSCAS 2012/60. 
251 Lang, Michael. Introduction to the Law of Double Taxation Conventions, 2nd ed. Linde, 2010. p. 32. 
252 League of Nations, Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Income 
(Mexico Model), 1943; Andean Community, Decision 40 (MTC – Cartagena Agreement), 1971; and United 
Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed 
and Developing Countries, 2017.  
253 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2003. 
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Due to the political conflict that characterized this period of European history, the Director 
of the League of Nations’ Financial Division and the Secretary of the Fiscal Committee left 
Geneva. Both went to Princeton University in the United States of America to continue their 
research.254 Mitchell B. Carroll, who was the Chairman of the Committee, arranged with the 
Mexican member of the Fiscal Committee to hold a Regional Tax Conference with 
representatives of Canada, the United States of America, Mexico and other Latin American 
countries.255  
 
Two conferences were held under the auspices of the League of Nations, the first in June 
1940 and the second in July 1943. During the first conference, the model was prepared 
together with a variety of documents submitted by the Secretariat of the League of Nations.256 
During the second conference, the MTC that was adopted replaced the 1928 Geneva Model.  
 
Regarding passive investment income, the Mexico MTC granted host / source countries 
preferential taxing rights on interest and dividend income – in Article 9 thereof 257 – and 
royalty income – in Article 10 thereof.258 As regards the source of dividends and interest, the 
MTC followed a strict host country approach, i.e. the source of the income was always 
associated with the country where the capital was invested. With respect to the source of 
royalties, the MTC distinguished between the rights on industrial works (patents, secret 
processes or formulas, trademarks and analogous rights) and cultural works, stating that 
royalty income derived from the former must be taxed by the country where such rights were 
 
254 Carrol, Mitchell B. Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad: Part 1. International Tax Law, 
Vol 2, 1968.  
255 The conference was attended by representatives of Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Peru, United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
256 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, 2003. 
257 League of Nations, Model Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of the Double Taxation of Income 
(Mexico Model), 1943, Article 9: “Income from movable capital shall be taxable only in the contracting State 
where such capital is invested.”  
258 Ibid, 258, Article 10. “1. Royalties from immovable property or in respect of the operation of a mine, a 
quarry, or other natural resource shall be taxable only in the contracting State in which such property, mine, 
quarry, or other natural resource is situated. 2. Royalties and amounts received as a consideration for the right 
to use a patent, a secret process or formula, a trade-mark or other analogous right shall be taxable only in the 
State where such right is exploited. 3. Royalties derived from one of the contracting States by an individual, 
corporation or other entity of the other contracting State, in consideration for the right to use a musical, artistic, 
literary, scientific or other cultural work or publication shall not be taxable in the former State.” 
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exploited. The latter, however, were exempted from taxation at the state where they were 
exploited. This way, the MTC recognized some source connection with the country where 
the royalty was most likely developed, i.e. the residence country of the licensee.259  
 
The new MTC represented the position of developing countries at that time regarding the 
allocation of taxing rights in DTCs between developing and developed countries. That 
position, justified at that time as a reaction to the strict residence base approach of the LN 
MTC, was not based on development but rather on the amount of taxing rights / collection of 
taxes.  
 
In the Mexico MTC, the allocation of taxing rights approach was the consequence of the 
application of the “economic classification and assignment approach”. The economic interest 
of the taxpayer was interpreted on the basis of developing countries’ interests, demonstrating 
that the economic link required between the income and the countries could be interpreted in 
more than one way, i.e. the main problem of this method of allocating taxing rights. In this 
Model, developing countries – typically host / source countries in commercial relations with 
developed countries – had the opportunity to jointly express their position.260  
 
At that time, DTCs did not replicate what was provided for in domestic law. The domestic 
laws of developed countries were not as developed as they are today. This means that DTCs, 
by eliminating double taxation, were real drivers for facilitating investment in the host 
country. The elimination of double taxation was only based on the exemption system. As in 
the League of Nations Models, the Mexico MTC allocated taxing rights to one of the two 
contracting countries, departing from what the OECD MTC and the UN MTC currently does 
today. Notwithstanding that the United States of America and the United Kingdom were 
already using a unilateral credit at domestic level to eliminate double taxation, this was not 
yet a reality at DTC level.     
 
259 Ibid, 258, Article 10. “3. Royalties derived from one of the contracting States by an individual, corporation 
or other entity of the other contracting State, in consideration for the right to use a musical, artistic, literary, 
scientific or other cultural work or publication shall not be taxable in the former State.” 
260 That position found doctrinal support in the conferences I, IV, VI and VII of the Latin American Institute of 
Fiscal Law - Instituto Latinoamericano de Derecho Tributario- held in Montevideo (1956), Buenos Aires 




It was therefore an historical circumstance that allowed developing countries to state their 
position regarding the design of a DTC, taking their needs into account while agreeing to 
restrict their sovereignty in relation to taxing income at source. At the Manila Conference on 
the Law of the World in August 1977, the Mexico MTC was considered to be “the first 
attempt by the developing countries to write a model treaty reflecting their particular 
problems”.261   
 
2.1.2 DECISION 40 OF THE ANDEAN COMMUNITY 
 
 
31 years later, in 1971, the Andean Community262 – known as Andean Pact until 1969 –
released two MTCs through “Decision 40”.263 One of these MTCs regulates treaties between 
member states of the Andean Community while the other intends to regulate treaties between 
member countries of the Andean Community and third countries.  
 
This MTC, which is comparable to the Mexico MTC, was also designed by starting from a 
particular and independent interpretation of the location of the economic interest of the 
taxpayer. Regarding the economic classification and assignment approach, this MTC also 
used an approach that left most of the taxing rights to the country where the capital was 
invested, where the borrowed money was used, or where the royalties were exploited. For 
the members of the Andean Community, the connecting factor – the economic link – between 
passive investment income and the country was coincidently always in the host / source 
country and never in the home / residence country.   
 
 
261 Ibid, 261. 
262 Information available at: http://www.comunidadandina.org  
263 Agreement available at: http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/junac/decisiones/Dec040e.asp  
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The Model granted exclusive taxing rights to the source country to tax passive investment 
income in Article 9 on royalties,264 in Article 10 on interest265 and in Article 11 on 
dividends.266 As was stated by Buitrago267 in her book entitled “El concepto de Cánones y/o 
Regalías en los Convenios para Evitar la doble Imposición sobre la Renta”, the MTC, which 
intended to regulate the relations of Andean Member States with third countries, was never 
actually used by the Andean member countries.268 Instead, the majority of the countries’ 
treaty networks were unsatisfactory or non-existent, and this was only rectified a few years 
ago. However, for Community purposes, the criteria are still in force and in 2004 they were 
even sharpened. In 2004 the Andean Community released a new provision, the “Decision 
578”,269 so as to avoid double taxation and prevent fiscal evasion within the Andean 
Community. This decision did not derogate from the MTC with third countries. 
 
According to Decision 578, royalties on intangibles may be taxable only by the country in 
which the intangible is used or in which the right to use is granted.270 However, business 
profits related to the performance of services, technical services, technical assistance and 
consultancy may be taxable only in the member country in whose territory the benefit of such 
services occur. This is, unless demonstrated otherwise, the country in which the benefit is 
charged and registered. Interest and other financial income are taxable only by the member 
country which charges and registers the payment.271 Dividends are taxable only by the 
member country in which the entity distributing the dividends is incorporated / domiciled.272  
 
264 Andean Community, Decision 40 (MTC – Cartagena Agreement), 1971, Article 9: “Royalties earned from 
the use of trademarks, patents, unpatented technical know-how or other intangible goods of a similar nature in 
the territory of one of the Contracting States shall be taxable only in that Contracting State.”  
265 Ibid, 265. Article 10: “Interest earned on loans shall be taxable only in the Contracting State where the loan 
funds were used. Unless proven otherwise, it is assumed that the loan shall be used in the Contracting State 
where the interest is paid.”  
266 Ibid, 265. Article 11: “Dividends and equity investments shall be taxable only by the Contracting State where 
the enterprise distributing them has its legal residence.” 
267 Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. El Concepto de Cánones y/o Regalías en los Convenios para Evitar la Doble 
Imposición sobre la Renta, CISS-Kluwer, Spain, 2007, p. 371. 
268 Ibid, 269.  
269 Decision 578 available at:  http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/JUNAC/junaind.asp  
270 See Article 9: “Las regalías sobre un bien intangible sólo serán gravables en el País Miembro donde se use 
o se tenga el derecho de uso del bien intangible”.  
271 See Article 10: “Los intereses y demás rendimientos financieros sólo serán gravables en el País Miembro 
en cuyo territorio se impute y registre su pago”. 
272 See Article 11: “Los dividendos y participaciones sólo serán gravables por el País Miembro donde estuviere 
domiciliada la empresa que los distribuye. El País Miembro en donde está domiciliada la empresa o persona 




As in the case of the Mexico MTC, the early and brave attempt of the Andean Community 
can be seen as a reaction to the 1963 OECD MTC. It was a conscious decision from the 
Andean Community to promulgate an MTC that took not only the economic development of 
their members into consideration, but also the protectionism of national economies at that 
time. More importantly, the Andean Community seems to have followed the 1953 and 1969 
recommendations of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (“Resolutions 
486-B and 1430 respectively”)273 so as to adopt the source as the criteria underpinning tax 
agreements between developed and developing countries.274 By doing so, the Andean 
countries became somewhat isolated, their treaty networks with third countries did not follow 
the intended approach, and later UN works have not had the strength to support that approach.  
Nowadays the Andean member countries do not exhibit a unified position in this field. 
Venezuela, which has the biggest treaty network, left the community in 2006 and Colombia 
already joined the OECD. However, their respective treaty networks show more adherence 
to the UN approach on the taxation of passive income compared to the OECD approach.  
 
2.1.3 UN MODEL TAX CONVENTION 
 
 
After the publication of the 1963 OECD Draft MTC, and later the 1977 OECD MTC, the 
OECD MTC quickly became the worldwide standard for the purposes of tax treaty 
negotiations.275 Until 1965, only a few treaties were concluded between developed and 
developing countries. The OECD Fiscal Committee acknowledged this in its 1965 Report, 
which was completed in Paris, stating that: “(…) the traditional tax conventions have not 
commended themselves to developing countries”.276 The lack of DTCs in force, the increase 
 
receptora o inversionista, ni tampoco en cabeza de quienes a su vez sean accionistas o socios de la empresa 
receptora o inversionista”. 
273 ECOSOC: Resolution 486-B from the 9th of July of 1953. Ratified by the resolution 1430 from the 6th of 
June of 1969.  
274 Ibid, 269. 
275 Kosters, Bart. The United Nations Model Tax Convention and its Recent Developments. IBFD, Asia-Pacific 
Tax Bulletin, Vol 10, 2004.   
276 OECD, Fiscal Incentives for Private Investment in developing Countries: Report of the OECD Fiscal 
Committee, 1965. para. 164. 
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of international trade and the end of colonialism were key factors that determined the need 
for guidelines for the negotiation and conclusion of DTCs between developing and developed 
countries. As Bart Koster stated in his publication “The United Nations Model Tax 
Convention and its Recent Developments”,277 there was a consensus that the OECD MTC 
was more appropriate for negotiations between developed countries and less suitable for 
capital importing countries or developing countries. The pressure was put on the United 
Nations to reassume the work done by the League of Nations. The United Nations reacted by 
setting up an independent working group (Ad Hoc Group of Experts on Tax Treaties between 
Developed and Developing Countries) of DTC experts that were appointed by their 
governments but who acted in their personal capacity. The UN Secretary General created the 
group in 1968 by complying with Resolution number 1273 of the ECOSOC, which was 
adopted on 4 August 1967.278   
 
The Ad Hoc Expert Group was formed by representatives from countries in Latin America, 
North America, Africa, Asia and Europe, and it also included observers from the 
International Monetary Fund, the International Fiscal Association, the OECD, the 
International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation and other international organizations.279 The 
first step for this group was the formulation, over the course of the seven meetings from 1968 
to 1977, of the guidelines for the negotiation of bilateral DTCs between developed and 
 
277 Bart Kosters. The United Nations Model Tax Convention and its Recent Developments. IBFD Asia-Pacific 
Tax Bulletin, Vol 10, 2004.  
278 United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Resolution 1273, 1967: “set up an ad hoc working group 
consisting of experts and tax administrators nominated by Governments, but acting in their personal capacity, 
both from developed and developing countries and adequately representing different regions and tax systems, 
with the task of exploring, in consultation with interested international agencies, ways and means for 
facilitating the conclusion of tax treaties between developed and developing countries, including the 
formulation, as appropriate, of possible guidelines and techniques for use in such tax treaties which would be 
acceptable to both groups of countries and would fully safeguard their respective revenue interests.” 
279 The seven meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, from 1968 to 1977, were attended by members of: 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, India, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, the Sudan, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America. These meetings were also attended by the 
observers from Austria, Belgium, Finland, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain, Swaziland and 
Venezuela and from the following international organizations: the International Monetary Fund, the 
International Fiscal Association, the OECD, the Organization of American States and the International Chamber 
of Commerce.  
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developing countries, which were contained in the “Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral 
Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries”.280  
 
In the first regular ECOSOC session on the work of the Group of Experts, the Secretary 
General expressed the view that “(…) the completion of a model bilateral convention for 
possible use by developed and developing countries constitutes a logical follow-up to the 
work done by the Group of Experts relating to the formulation of guidelines”. 
 
The UN MTC was published in 1980. This was the third attempt of developing countries to 
set up an MTC that represented their views. The approach regarding the allocation of taxing 
rights was inherited from the 1928 Geneva Models. The UN MTC Model, unlike the Mexico 
MTC and Decision 40 of the Andean Community regarding the relation of its Member States 
with third countries, achieved more worldwide consensus on the demands of developing 
countries in relation to an MTC that was to be designed for the negotiation and conclusion 
of DTCs between developed and developing countries. Regarding passive investment 
income, the 1980 UN MTC took as a starting point the 1963-1977 OECD MTC approach, 
i.e. an approach of sharing taxing rights between host / source and home / residence countries 
by limiting taxation at source. 
 
The UN MTC followed the OECD MTC regarding the methods to eliminate double taxation.  
Paragraph 2 of Article 23 A and Article 23 B of the 1980 UN MTC ratified the credit method 
as the method to avoid double taxation regarding passive investment income. In so doing, the 
UN MTC limited the discussion regarding the fair demands of developing countries (host / 
source states) in DTCs with developed countries to only the question of whether or not to 
increase withholding taxes at source. At that time, the number of OECD / developed countries 
that used a participation exemption was not as high as it is today. Thus, a worldwide system 
of taxation / credit system was still being used in the domestic legislation of most developed 
countries.281     
 
280 2019 version available at: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/manual-bilateral-tax-
treaties-update-2019.pdf 
281 Only 9 of the current 34 OECD countries used territorial systems in 1980. See PWC Report, Evolution of 




The UN MTC granted limited taxing rights to source countries regarding the taxation of 
passive investment income. For dividends, the Model granted taxing rights to the state of 
residence of the recipient of the income.282 However, and in a minor way, the Model allowed 
taxation at source, i.e. in the state in which the company paying the dividends was resident, 
but limited the right to tax of that state up to a percentage on the gross base – to be defined 
through bilateral negotiations – if the recipient was a company and the beneficial owner of 
the interest held at least 10% of the capital of the company paying dividends, stating that in 
all other cases the limit would be extended to another percentage – also to be defined through 
treaty negotiations.283  
 
With respect to the taxation of interest income, the Model also followed a similar approach 
by granting taxing rights to the state of residence of the recipient of the income284 and by 
limiting the source state’s right to tax, the limit of which was to be defined through bilateral 
negotiations on the gross amount of the interest when the recipient is the beneficial owner of 
the interest.285  
 
On the treatment of royalties, the 1980 UN MTC differed from the OECD 1963-1977 Models 
by allowing taxation by the state where the royalties arise and according to the laws of that 
 
http://www.techceocouncil.org/clientuploads/reports/Report%20on%20Territorial%20Tax%20Systems_2013
0402b.pdf   
282 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 1980, Article 10 paragraph 1: “Dividends paid by a company which is a 
resident of a Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.”  
283 Ibid, Article 10 paragraph 2: “However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which 
the company paying the dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that State, but if the recipient is 
the beneficial owner of the dividends the tax so charged shall not exceed: (a)  _____ per cent (the percentage 
is to be established through bilateral negotiations) of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner 
is a company (other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 10 per cent of the capital of the company 
paying the dividends; (b)  _____ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral negotiations) 
of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases. The competent authorities of the Contracting States 
shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of application of these limitations. This paragraph shall not affect 
the taxation of the company in respect of the profits out of which the dividends are paid.”. 
284 Ibid., 283. Article 11 paragraph 1: “Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State.”. 
285 Ibid, 283. Article 11 paragraph 2: “However, such interest may also be taxed in the Contracting State in 
which it arises and according to the laws of that State, but if the recipient is the beneficial owner of the interest 
the tax so charged shall not exceed _____ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) of the gross amount of the interest. The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by 
mutual agreement settle the mode of application of this limitation.”. 
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state,286 thereby upholding the demands of developing countries. The MTC, however, 
follows the general criterion that “Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a 
resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State”. 
 
Neither the Mexico MTC nor Decision 40 succeeded in practice. The UN MTC is the only 
Model that has regard to the demands of developing countries and which has actually been 
applied in practice. This success confirms one fundamental premise of this research: DTCs 
are bilateral contracts that must give rise to mutual benefits. The revenue perceived by 
developing countries according to the share of taxing rights over passive investment income 
in DTCs between developing and developed countries has probably been perceived by 
developing countries as one benefit of agreeing a DTC with a developed country.  
 
To date, practice has demonstrated that the only viable solution to issues related to the 
allocation of taxing rights in DTCs between developing and developed countries is to share 
taxing rights. That is the difference between the Mexico MTC, Decision 40 and the UN MTC. 
The UN MTC seems to grant a minimum balance so as to make the MTC attractive for both 




2.2 EXPERIENCES OF OTHER MTCs REGARDING TREATMENT OF PASSIVE 
INVESTMENT INCOME  
 
 
As previously mentioned, the first MTC only became a reality after the end of the First World 
War in 1919. After a request made by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),287 
 
286 Ibid, 283. Article 12 paragraph 1: “Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the 
other Contracting State may be taxed in that other State”; and paragraph 2: “However, such royalties may also 
be taxed in the Contracting State in which they arise and according to the laws of that State, but if the recipient 
is the beneficial owner of the royalties, the tax so charged shall not exceed _____ per cent (the percentage is 
to be established through bilateral negotiations) of the gross amount of the royalties. The competent authorities 
of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of application of this limitation.”. 
287 International Chamber of Commerce, Resolution N° 11 of the Constituent Congress in 1920 referred to in: 
League of Nations, Technical Experts to the Economic and Financial Committee.  Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion. Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee, February 
1925.  Available at:  http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org   
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supported by the Report on Double Taxation published in March of 1923 by the four 
economists,288 plus the experience and expertise of the members of the Committee of 
Technical Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion289 of the League of Nations, the 
General Meeting of Government Experts on Double Taxation and Tax Evasion, convened by 
the Council of the League of Nations, adopted a Bilateral Convention for the Prevention of 
Double Taxation in the Special Matter of Direct Taxes in October 1928, along with three 
other MTCs dealing with succession duties, administrative assistance in matters of taxation 
and judicial assistance in the collection of taxes respectively.290 All of these are known as the 
1928 Geneva Models.291  
 
The League of Nations was the predecessor to the United Nations and it was the main 
institution working in the field of international double taxation and Model DTCs until shortly 
after World War II.  
 
 
2.2.1 - MODEL TAX CONVENTION LEAGUE OF NATIONS 1928  
 
 
This first MTC was the result of almost a decade of work carried out by the Committee of 
Technical Experts292 in addition to the work that was conducted by the four economists that 
was consolidated in a report that was submitted in 1923 to the Financial Committee of the 
League of Nations. In 1927, a Draft Convention was held, which presupposed an income tax 
structure in the contracting parties consisting of impersonal taxes on specific categories of 
incomes with flat rates and a superimposed personal income tax with progressive rates on 
 
288 Professor Bruins –The Netherlands-, Professor Einaudi –Italy, Professor Seligman – United States -, Sir 
Josiah Stamp –United Kingdom -.  
289 Ibid, 288. 
290 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, New York, 2003.  
291 Bart Kosters. The United Nations Model Tax Convention and its Recent Developments. IBFD Asia-Pacific 
Tax Bulletin, Vol 10, 2004. 
292 League of Nations, Technical Experts to the Economic and Financial Committee.  Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion. Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee, February 
1925.  Available at:  http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
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entire net income.293  However, and due to the fact that the Draft Convention could not fit in 
with the systems that were used in most of the countries represented in the League of Nations, 
two other MTCs were adopted as a response. Thus, the 1928 report contained three Model 
Conventions (MTCs): 1 A), 1 B) and 1 C).  
 
This result was achieved by combining the work done by the four economists, work that 
examined the topic of double taxation from a theoretical and scientific perspective, and the 
work that was carried out by the committee of technical experts, which examined the topic 
from an administrative, technical and practical perspective. Thus, it is clear that the LN MTC 
was not a model based on pure economic theory. The MTCs – mainly the base model – 
resulted in the combination of the economic allegiance theory that was proposed by the report 
of the four economists and the classification and assignment method that was chosen by the 
Committee of Technical Experts.  
 
The nationalities of the members – the four economists294 and technical experts295 – were 
considered as being relevant to the criteria produced that underpinned both reports.296 This 
not only concerned their preference regarding the source or the residence principle on the 
allocation of taxing rights, but it also concerned the structure of the MTC, a structure that 
was definitively influenced by the tax systems of the most powerful countries at that time.  
 
At the time of the four economists’ report297 for the League of Nations in 1923, only the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Germany and the Netherlands (partly) were regarded as 
 
293 Carrol, Mitchell B. Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad: Part 1. International Tax Law, 
Vol 2, 1968. 
294 Professor Bruins –The Netherlands-, Professor Einaudi –Italy, Professor Seligman – United States -, Sir 
Josiah Stamp –United Kingdom -. 
295 League of Nations, Technical Experts to the Economic and Financial Committee.  Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion. Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee, February 
1925.   
296 As Graetz and O’Hear have rightly observed that the principal authors of the Report of the Four Economists 
were from capital exporting creditor nations and their report reflected the interest of those nations. See Graetz, 
Michael J.; and O’Hear, Michael M. The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International Taxation. Duke Law Journal, 
Vol 46, 1997. 
297 League of Nations, Economic and Financial Commission, Professors Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir 
Josiah Stamp. Report on Double Taxation submitted to the Financial Committee, 1923.  
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having personal income taxes.298 The report by the technical experts299 noted that the tax 
systems of most other European and American nations were based on impersonal taxes.300 
301 Nevertheless, the second report of the committee of technical experts – which clearly 
reflected the influence of the United States which joined the Committee in 1926 – produced 
the Draft Model Convention 1 A), which gave rights to the source countries to levy 
impersonal taxes, assigning source rules for each category of income and it also gave rights 
to the residence countries to levy personal tax. The right to levy personal tax was subject to 
the elimination of double taxation by the residence country by granting a foreign tax credit.302 
This approach was opposed in practice, as was evidenced in the treaty between Italy and 
Czechoslovakia,303 which was examined by the Committee of Technical Experts and which 
assigned taxing rights in an exclusive way.304  
 
The influence exerted by developed countries has naturally determined the future of DTCs. 
The League of Nations Model 1928 – Model 1A) – was the basis for the OECD MTC 1963 
and therefore for the UN MTC 1980. The change of vision that was imposed by the 
Committee of Technical Experts, who were influenced by the taxation systems of the United 
Kingdom and the United States, changed how treaties were built, by analysing the nature of 
the income and the assignment of taxing rights, which resulted in an approach that was more 
focused on the tax systems of the treaty partners than on the potential economic effects for 
treaty partners. That approach omitted or simply diminished the importance of the analysis 
of the nature of the income – i.e. active or passive – in order to decide which country should 
have strongest rights to tax. However, the approach fulfilled the expectations of treaty 
partners regarding the division of tax revenue, without the need to differentiate between 
 
298 Taylor, C. John. Twilight of the Neanderthals, or Are Bilateral Double Taxation Treaty Networks 
Sustainable?. Melbourne University Law Review, Vol 34, 2010.   
299 League of Nations, Technical Experts to the Economic and Financial Committee.  Double Taxation and Tax 
Evasion. Report and Resolutions submitted by the Technical Experts to the Financial Committee, 1925.   
300 Impersonal Taxes: taxes on distinct categories of income (such as land, business profits, and so on).  See 
Taylor, C. John. Twilight of the Neanderthals, or Are Bilateral Double Taxation Treaty Networks Sustainable?. 
Melbourne University Law Review, Vol 34, 2010.   
301 Ibid, 301.   
302 Ibid, 301. 
303 Treaty between Italy – Czechoslovakia for the Prevention of Double Taxation and the Settlement of other 
Questions concerning Direct Taxation, 1924. Final Protocol, signed 1 March 1925.   
304 The reduction in the tax base of the personal tax with the consequent effects on the applicable marginal rates 
that it involved would not have been acceptable to countries such as United Kingdom and United States, whose 
income taxes were confined to personal taxes levied on a worldwide basis.  
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active and passive income so as to correctly allocate taxing rights. This, in practice, quelled 
many theoretical discussions and allowed the LN to present an MTC.  
 
A broad qualification of income – leaving behind an accurate analysis of the nature of the 
income – and an assignment method based on the reciprocity of investments flows confined 
the taxation approach in relation to those incomes to what it is currently stated in the UN 
MTC. In addition, the existence of personal and impersonal taxes was considered to be the 
most important factor and, therefore, it granted the right to tax to the source country and to 
the residence country on different levels in relation to all passive investment incomes.  
 
The MTC 1 A) of 1928 report was the “basic model”, whereby the source country’s right to 
tax passive investment income was a predominate feature of this model. As was stated, this 
MTC followed a schedular approach by distinguishing between impersonal taxes (i.e. “taxes 
(…) levied on all kinds of incomes at source, irrespective of the personal circumstances of 
the taxpayer”)305 which must be collected by the state of source,306 and personal taxes (i.e. 
taxes “which rather concern individuals and their aggregate income”)307 which must be 
collected by the state of residence.308 The necessary deductions to avoid double taxation had 
to be applied by the state of residence.309  
 
The MTC preferably granted rights to the source countries regarding the taxation of passive 
investment income in the following articles: interest income in Article 3 and dividend income 
in Article 4. Regarding royalties, there was no specific article dealing with the matter, 
although in the draft on allocation of business income of 1935, the committee defined the 
source of mining royalties as the place where the mine is situated.310 The question about the 
 
305 League of Nations, Model Tax Convention, No. 1 A, 1928, commentary on Article 1.  
306 Wang, Ke Chin. International Double Taxation of Income: Relief Through International Agreement 1921-
1945. Harvard Law Review, Vol 59, 1945.  
307 League of Nations, Model Tax Convention, No. 1 A, 1928, commentary on article 1. 
308 Ibid, 306. 
309 Ibid. 306.   
310 League of Nations, Fiscal Committee. Report to the Council on the fifth session of the Committee, Annex I: 
Revised text of the Draft Convention for the allocation of business income between States for the purpose of 





source of cross-border income derived from patent and copyright royalties was subsequently 
solved by the Fiscal Committee, which held that such items should be taxable at the fiscal 
domicile of the recipient, except when they constitute a part of the commercial income of an 
enterprise, in which case they would be taxable as part of the income of the establishment 
which exploited them.311 
 
Regarding the taxation of dividends, the MTC provided a hybrid source-residence approach 
by stating that the: “(…) income from shares or similar interests shall be taxable in the State 
in which the real centre of management of the undertaking is situated”.312 This is a hybrid 
approach because the real centre of management of an undertaking is, by its very definition, 
a source rule but, in practice, it can end up being the country in which the undertaking is 
resident – the “source approach” – or the country in which the shareholders are resident – the 
“residence approach”.  
 
With respect to the taxation of interest, the Model clearly provides a source country approach 
by stating that: “(…) income from public funds, bonds, including mortgage bonds, loans and 
deposits or current accounts, shall be taxable in the State in which the debtors of such income 
are at the time resident”.313  
 
The second MTC was presented as a “simplified text” and, as Mitchell B. Carroll stated, “the 
second (submitted by us)”314 reflects the influence of the United States of America,315 with 
the result that it was an MTC that aimed to be used for conventions between countries in 
which taxation by reference to domicile was a predominate feature. It provided for taxation 
at source for certain types of income, avoiding double taxation by allowing a credit for tax 
paid at source against the tax to be paid at the recipient’s residence state. Passive investment 
 
311 Carrol, Mitchell B. Allocation of Business Income: The Draft Convention of the League of Nations. Columbia 
Law Review, Vol 34, 1934. 
312 League of Nations, Model Tax Convention, No. 1 A, 1928.  
313 Ibid, 313. Commentary on Article 3. 
314 Carrol, Mitchell B. Benefits for American Investors and Enterprises Abroad: Part 1. International Tax Law, 
Vol 2, 1968. 
315 The United States of America joined the group in 1927.  
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income, such as dividends, interest and royalties, were exempt from tax at source and were 
taxable only in the state in which the recipient had its fiscal domicile.  
 
The third MTC, which aimed to be an MTC for conventions between countries with different 
fiscal systems in particular,316 317 also provided for taxation at source for certain types of 
income, similar to Model 1 B). This was done by allowing taxation for the state of fiscal 
domicile of the recipient on dividends, interest and royalties, with the condition of avoiding 
double taxation by crediting any taxes withheld at source, i.e. allowing source taxation.  
 
At least regarding the taxation of passive investment income, there were no great differences 
between MTC 1 B) and MTC 1 C). Even though MTC 1 A) – the basic Model – clearly 
recognized a recognition of the right of source countries to tax passive investment income, 
that power was limited in practice by the pattern of international flows of private capital in 
the era that preceded the Great Depression.318 The historical circumstances have easily 
distorted the real meaning of those concessions. 
 
2.2.2 - OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION  
 
 
In 1956, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) which subsequently 
became the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), created its 
Fiscal Committee and entrusted it with the task of promulgating a draft model DTC “(…) 
which would effectively resolve the double taxation problems existing between OECD 
member countries and which would be acceptable to all member countries”.319 From 1958 
to 1961, the Fiscal Committee prepared four interim Reports before submitting its final 
Report in 1963 entitled “Draft Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital”,320 with 
 
316 Maisto, Guglielmo. Residence of Individuals under Tax Treaties and EC Law, IBFD, 2010. 
317 League of Nations, Model Tax Convention, No. 1 A, 1 B and 1 C, 1928. 
318 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, New York, 2003.  
319 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. 
320 Ibid, 320. Introduction – Historical background. 
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recommendations to OECD member countries as to how to conform to this convention when 
signing or revising their bilateral conventions with other OECD countries.  
  
The OECD MTC was developed in response to the needs of developed countries and it 
provided a firm and solid model to be followed in treaty negotiations. At the time of the 
publication of the 1963 OECD MTC, the following countries were OECD members: Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States.321 Thus, from the outset, the OECD MTC was 
created to be used by developed countries, which was historically justified by the “increasing 
economic interdependence and co-operation of the member countries of the OEEC in the 
post-war period showed increasingly clearly the importance of measures for preventing 
international double taxation”.322  
 
The Fiscal Committee of the OEEC in its work between 1958 and 1961 left the discussion 
regarding the taxation of passive investment income until the end of the negotiations. The 
taxation of dividends, interest and royalties was finally included only in the fourth report that 
was submitted by the Fiscal Committee. The reason for this was put as follows in the 
introduction of the referred fourth report: “ (…) in its reports to the Council in July 1959 and 
July 1960, the Fiscal Committee submitted a number of Articles which, in addition to those 
it had already submitted in its first report, were intended to form the bases of the future 
Convention. But the most important and most difficult question, that of the taxation of 
dividends, interest and royalties, still remained to be settled. For, although agreement on the 
various questions covered by the first three reports had been reached with relative ease, it 
was found that the drafting of the Articles concerning dividends, interest and royalties, was 
a particularly long and arduous task”. The Fiscal Committee realized that reaching an 
approach regarding the taxation of passive investment income was the most difficult part of 
 
321 Whittaker, Donald R. An examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. model tax treaties: history, provisions and 
application to U.S. foreign policy. North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, 
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their work,323 and it categorized this problem as the chief obstacle that had to be overcome 
before a draft convention acceptable to all member countries of the OEEC could be 
established.324    
 
This fourth report was the basis for the 1963 OECD Draft MTC and therefore formed the 
basis of the approaches of the OECD and UN MTCs regarding the taxation and allocation of 
taxing rights regarding passive investment income. The promotion of a shared system of 
taxation – dividends and interest – between the source and the residence country by limiting 
source taxation to a certain threshold325 is, therefore, and for the purposes of this research, 
one of the key issues that must be explored in the history of the taxation of passive investment 
income.  
 
The reasons used by the Fiscal Committee to justify the difficulty of this task demonstrated 
that the analysis of where the economic activity belongs that in turn gives rise to the income 
was only one of various elements involved in the analysis.326 The solution proposed by the 
Fiscal Committee was based more on practical than economic factors, and this approach was 
supported by the fact that OEEC countries, at that time, were on a level playing field in terms 
of development and were thus able to support the application of the reciprocity principle,327 
 
323 OEEC, Fourth Report by the Fiscal Committee, The Elimination of Double Taxation, Paris, June 19, 1961. 
Introduction: “(…) in the case of dividends, interest and royalties, the divergences between the economic 
interests of the States and also between their legislations are particularly marked and are the chief source of 
difficulty in the negotiation of bilateral Conventions on double taxation”. Available at: 
http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
324 OEEC, Fourth Report by the Fiscal Committee, The Elimination of Double Taxation, 1961.  
325 Only regarding interests and dividends.  
326 OEEC, Fourth Report by the Fiscal Committee, 1961. III Further results of the Committee’s work. A) 
number 16:  “As stated in the Introduction, the establishment of common rules for the avoidance of double 
taxation with respect to taxes on dividends, interest and royalties was a matter of major difficulty because of 
the divergences between the economic interests of Member countries, the very great dissimilarity in their tax 
laws and regulations, the differences in their theoretical concept of the question and also between the solutions 
adopted in practice in the bilateral Conventions on double taxation. These difficulties had already been brought 
out generally at the commencement of the League of a Nations' studies on double taxation after the first World 
War, particularly in the report prepared in 1923 by the group of four economists appointed by the Financial 
Committee of the League of Nations in 1921. These difficulties explain why rather different solutions were 
proposed for this problem in the various Model Conventions established by the League of Nations in 1928, 
1943 and 1946. In fact, the clauses in regard to which the Mexico Model Convention of 1943 and the London 
Model Convention of 1946 differ most are those concerning the taxation of dividends, interest and royalties.”.  
327 Ibid., 327. III Further results of the Committee’s work. A) number 20: “These rules as to the right to tax are 
a balanced arrangement based on reciprocal concessions, which the Fiscal Committee regards as equitable. 
They have the advantage of being simple and easy to apply in practice. Their adoption by the Member countries 
in their bilateral Conventions would be a definite step forward since it would both afford a settlement of 
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which did not require the economic allegiance of the taxpayer with the country through a 
neutral economic classification and assignment approach. The Fiscal Committee worked 
with the aim of reconciling the divergent interests of the member countries in a satisfactory 
manner with respect to the taxation of passive investment income.328 This fact is a crucial 
one, especially when assessing whether the UN MTC is able to achieve fairness regarding 
the taxation of passive income if the system is based on an MTC that aims to solve the 
problem of double taxation between countries with similar economic realities.    
 
The approach proposed in the report regarding royalty income did not achieve consensus 
among the members. Spain, Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal – all capital importer 
countries in those years, informed the Fiscal Committee that they were not in a position to 
relinquish all tax at source, but suggested that they could restrict it to 5% of the gross amount 
of the royalties.329 Due to the above, and which was surprisingly not the approach 
recommended by the OECD in treaties involving countries with different economic realities, 
the other countries330 declared that they were prepared, in bilateral conventions and subject 
to reciprocity, to concede to them the right to levy tax at source at 5% of the gross amount.  
 
2.2.2.1 – FISCAL COMMITTEE APPROACH – DIVIDENDS TAXATION  
 
 
The working party number 12 of the Fiscal Committee, formed by delegates of Germany, 
Italy and Switzerland, was in charge of studying the problems connected with the taxation of 
dividends and was to present a proposal with a view to framing a draft article to be inserted 
into an MTC.      
 
The group based their work on the studies and proposals that were provided by the League 
of Nations and on the various solutions for dividend taxation that were contained in some 
 
particularly difficult questions and make it possible to harmonies these Conventions on points where they show 
the greatest differences.”  
328 Ibid, 327. III Further results of the Committee’s work. A) number 22.  
329 Ibid, 327. III Further results of the Committee’s work. A) number 20. 
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earlier conventions.331 Thus, instead of looking to the nature of the income and then 
attributing the right to tax to the residence or the source country, the Fiscal Committee, 
through working party number 12, addressed the problem from the perspective of the 
different systems of dividend taxation in their member countries.332 The working party 
declared that in certain states, the principle of taxation at the place of residence was the rule 
and in other states the principle of taxation at the place where the income arises prevails333 
and, therefore, in their first report on the taxation of dividends they prepared two draft 
articles. Draft A was based on the principle of taxing dividends in the state of residency but 
granting limited rights to the source state to tax and Draft B allowed each state the right to 
tax dividends in accordance with their own laws but limited any tax charged at source to 15% 
and to 5% in the case of dividends paid to controlling companies. The above was justified in 
order to use Draft A in DTCs between states that were prepared to follow the principle of 
taxation in the state of which the shareholder was a resident and to reduce the rate of tax at 
source considerably, and Draft B was to be used in DTCs where one of the contracting states 
wished to have a more extensive right to tax dividends paid by a resident company.334         
 
The working party justified the application of the residence country approach instead of a 
source country approach with the following arguments: 
 
(1) It would be difficult to apply the principle of territoriality to dividends; the source state 
is not necessarily the state in which the capital has been invested; 
 
(2) Taxing dividends in the residence state of the shareholder also makes it possible to 
observe the dominant principle of taxing according to taxable capacity; and, 
 
(3) The principle of taxation in the residence state of the recipient is contained in several  
conventions for the avoidance of double taxation that have been concluded between the 
member countries of the OEEC.  
 
331 OECD. Working Party No. 12 of the Fiscal Committee (Germany – Italy – Switzerland). Report on the 
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332 Ibid, 332.  
333 Ibid, 332. 




This demonstrated the lack of economic analysis that was present in the adoption of the 
allocation of taxing rights approach, the prevalence of practical reasons, and the fact that the 
work done was never intended to be used in DTCs between countries with important 
developmental differences.  
 
On 19 January 1959, the Italian delegation sent a confidential note to the Fiscal Committee 
regarding the taxation of dividends. At that time, Italy was a capital importer country and its 
taxation system was predominantly based on the principle of taxation at the place where the 
income was produced. This being so, even a partial renunciation by Italy of taxation at the 
place of source represented a real sacrifice without any real compensation.335 At that time, 
Italy more or less faced the same problems that developing countries face today regarding 
the allocation of taxing rights in relation to passive investment income in DTCs signed with 
developed countries under the UN MTC. The sacrifice without compensation for Italy 
stemmed from the design of their taxation system – territorial taxation – which is comparable 
with the situation of developing countries regarding the lack of reciprocal investments.  
 
Italy argued that a reduction in the rate of tax on dividends at source might be justified if the 
recipient resident abroad confines itself to owning shares in Italian companies. But, when in 
addition to drawing dividends, the recipient directly carries on an industrial or commercial 
business in Italy through a permanent establishment, i.e. taking an active and direct part in 
the country’s economic life, then there would be nothing to justify preferential treatment. 
Italy basically claimed that dividends were part of a more active than passive activity due to 
the fact that the recipients participate in an active and direct way in the country’s economic 
life. For the author, there is no doubt that the Italian approach was correct. They were 
analysing dividends on a case-by-case basis and then properly allocating taxing rights. The 
Italian argument was not a purely practical approach influenced by their tax system, because 
Italy agreed to a reduction of source taxation when the recipients were not contributing, in 
an active way, to the country’s economic life – passive income – and granted full taxing 
rights to the source state when the recipients were clearly contributing, in an active way, to 
 
335 Ibid, 332. See note by the Italian delegation.  
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the country’s economic life. The Italian approach is what is now argued by countries that 
have implemented a participation exemption, i.e. to consider exempt from tax dividends that 
derive from foreign direct investments / active participation, as giving preference to tax to 
source countries. 
 
As was stated earlier, the approach proposed by the Fiscal Committee was the basis of the 
1963 OECD Draft MTCs and therefore it also became the basis for the OECD and UN MTCs. 
The committee recognized that, after combining the work done by the LN and by some DTCs 
concluded until then, they would have to choose a text that would be acceptable to the 
majority of OEEC members. The final draft article states that dividends shall be taxable in 
the state where the shareholder has its residence, conferring a limited concurrent right to tax 
on the source state. The rates fixed by the draft article for the tax in the source state were the 
maximum rates.336  
 
2.2.2.2 - FISCAL COMMITTEE APPROACH – INTEREST TAXATION  
 
 
The working party number 11 of the Fiscal Committee, which was formed by delegates of 
France and Belgium, was tasked with studying the problems connected with the taxation of 
interest and presented a proposal with a view to framing a draft article that could be inserted 
into an MTC.      
 
The working party decided not to re-open the doctrinal discussions on the merits of taxing 
interest income in the state of source or in the state of residency of the recipient according to 
whether the tax was personal or impersonal. Nor to consider whether the theoretically ideal 
taxation of income from movable property should be a privilege of the state of the creditor’s 
residency by virtue of the principle that movable property income is intimately associated or 
related to the person of its owner and, therefore, tax on that income should be incurred by the 
owner. Thus, the working party did not consider the work of the LN and started its work on 
the basis of the following observations and considerations:  
 
336 OECD, Working Party No. 12 of the Fiscal Committee (Germany – Italy – Switzerland). Second Report on 




(1) The methods that had thus far been advocated for taxing interest were not uniform. 
Furthermore, they were not, generally speaking, followed by the member countries of the 
OEEC, which had adopted various methods that provided a whole range of solutions, most 
of them differing more or less widely from the recommendations given by the LN;337 
 
(2) The countries that export capital and the countries investing it have different positions 
regarding the taxation of interest. The former are naturally inclined to tax that income in the 
state of the recipient’s residence and the latter wish to tax that income in the state where the 
income has arisen;338   
 
(3) By raising the question: can it be said that the countries where the capital is invested are 
making an unreasonable claim when they will benefit not only from the development of their 
economies and the increase in wealth which will not only result from the investment but also 
by a taxable substance which will bring them new taxation revenue? 339  
 
(4) To answer that question the working group took into consideration the fact that capital 
import countries were not in a good enough financial position to achieve development on 
their own. The working party even referred to the recommendation made by the United 
Nations Organization, which invited capital export countries, as far as possible, to leave the 
benefit of taxation of the revenue from such investment to the country in which the capital 
has been invested, but they considered this to be a recommendation which could not be 
applied since the discussion was premised on the member countries of the OEEC.340  
 
Notwithstanding this last observation, the report stated that there were other considerations 
which justify taxation in the state of source of the income, even when movements of capital 
take place between states with similar levels of development. The working party concluded 
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that the avoidance of double taxation requires some sacrifices which must be equal if the 
measures were to be acceptable to both sides.341  
 
Thus, it seems that both solutions, that which gives an exclusive right to tax to the country of 
source of the interest and that which reserves it to the country of the creditor’s residence, 
were too rigid. Therefore, this made it necessary to find a compromise whereby uniformity 
might be achieved in the OEEC countries’ methods of taxing interest and whereby the 
differing points of view can be reconciled. The report recognized that the proposed approach 
was more pragmatic than theoretical. 342 
 
As in the work done regarding dividend taxation, the working party, instead of looking to the 
nature of the income and then attributing the right to tax to the residence or to the source 
country, simply focused on the different systems of interest taxation of their member 
countries and at the DTCs that had been concluded by those countries until then. Ultimately, 
and as the approach which formed the basis of the 1963 OECD Draft Model and consequently 
the basis for the OECD and UN MTCs, the committee followed the recommendation given 
by the working party which was extracted from the approach that was followed in Article 6 
A of the treaty that was signed on 22 June 1956 between the United States and France.   
 
The working party briefly considered the nature of the income and took as a starting point  
the principle that it is logical to give a priority right to the source state with respect to income 
from immovable property and income from different kinds of business activity. However, in 
the case of investment income, it would be more reasonable for the priority right to be 
reserved to the state of residence. Moreover, they also considered, as working party 12 did 
regarding the study of dividend taxation, the fact that interest attributable to a permanent 
establishment belonging to the recipient resident in the other state – if the interest arises from 
debt-claims forming part of the permanent establishment’s assets or if it pertains to 
transactions made by the permanent establishment or arises from loans which have a clear 
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economic connection with the permanent establishment – should be taxed by the source 
state.343 
 
On 17 March 1959, the Italian delegation once again sent a confidential note to the Fiscal 
Committee regarding the taxation of interest. As was stated regarding dividend taxation, at 
that time Italy was a capital importer country and its taxation was predominantly based on 
the principle of taxation at the place where the income is produced. Due to the above, the 
principle followed by Italy – based on economic and practical reasons – was at risk of being 
completely circumvented by an approach like the one proposed by working party 11.  In the 
note, it was stated that if Italy were to relinquish the right to levy tax on interest flowing from 
Italy to other countries, the result would be an unrequited loss which the Italian economy 
could not afford to sustain. Moreover, as was also stated regarding dividend taxation and the 
Italian reality, at that time Italy more or less was facing the same issues that developing 
countries face today in DTCs that are signed with developed countries under the UN MTC.  
 
In the second, third and fourth reports that were issued by working party number 11, it was 
even more explicit that the main purpose of the working party was to present an approach 
that was amenable to all delegations of the member countries, instead of an approach that 
was based on the nature of the income and the correspondingly fair allocation of taxing rights. 
Ultimately, the committee chose a text that was acceptable to the vast majority of OEEC 
members. The final draft article states that interest shall be taxable in the state of the recipient 
residence, conferring a limited concurrent right to tax on the source state of up to 10%, i.e. 
the maximum rate.   
 
2.2.2.3 - FISCAL COMMITTEE APPROACH – ROYALTIES TAXATION  
 
 
Working party number 8 of the Fiscal Committee, which was formed of delegates from 
Germany and Luxembourg, was in charge of studying the problems connected with the 
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taxation of patent royalties and similar payments, and it was charged with presenting a 
proposal with the view to framing a draft article to be inserted into an MTC.      
 
Working party number 8 based its work on the studies and proposals provided by the LN and 
on the various solutions for royalty taxation that were contained in some earlier 
conventions.344  
 
Regarding dividend and interest taxation, the work done by the Fiscal Committee through 
working party number 8 did not address the problem from an economic point of view. In 
other words, they did not add any value to the work that had already been carried out by the 
LN – particularly the London Model – and by the OEEC countries in treaties that were signed 
by some OEEC members.  
 
As is known, the 1928 LN Models did not contain specific rules regarding royalties and the 
taxation of similar payments. Thus, this income was only taxed by the country where the 
grantor resided, unless the income was derived through a permanent establishment of the 
grantor in the other state.345  The Mexico Model made a distinction between (1) patents, 
secret processes or formulas, a trademark or other analogous rights and (2) musical, artistic, 
literary, scientific or other cultural work. It granted exclusive rights to tax to the source state 
regarding the income derived from the sources listed in (1) and exclusive rights to tax to the 
grantor residence country regarding the income derived from the sources listed in (2). The 
London Model did not make such a distinction, as it granted exclusive taxation rights to the 
grantor residence country regarding both sets of incomes.  
 
In relation to treaties signed between OEEC countries, working party number 8 used the 
treaties between Norway and United Kingdom,346 Austria and Switzerland,347 France and 
 
344 OECD, Working Party No. 8 of the Fiscal Committee (Germany and Luxemburg). Report on the direct 
taxation of Patent Royalties and similar payments, 1958. Available at: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
345 Ibid, 342. 
346 2 May 1951.  
347 12 November 1952. 
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Switzerland,348 Denmark and Sweden349 and Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany350 
for the purposes of its analysis. All of these treaties adopted the principles that were set forth 
in the London Model, which consequently eradicated any chance of discussion, at least in 
those years, of the active or passive elements of the income and, thus, the corresponding fair 
allocation of taxing rights between the source and the residence country.  Ultimately, working 
party number 8 simply focused on preparing a draft article which would conform to the 
conventions that had been previously concluded by the OEEC members.351  
 
The best way to provide an example of the above is to reproduce the argument that was given 
by working party number 8 in its second report.352 This was a response to the 
recommendations given by the Austrian, United Kingdom and Italian delegations on their 
proposals regarding source countries’ rights to tax. The Austrian delegation proposed 
granting rights to tax to the source state in respect of industrial and commercial royalties that 
were paid by subsidiaries to their parent companies; the United Kingdom delegation raised 
the question of whether a right to tax should be given to the source state in cases where the 
state of residence does not tax and the Italian delegation proposal related to the source state’s 
right to tax when the recipient of the royalties had a permanent establishment or a fixed base 
in the state of the payer. Working party number 8, instead of analysing the arguments of those 
proposals, answered all of the proposals by stating that the adoption of one of those 
approaches would constitute a derogation from most DTCs in force between OEEC members, 
and they did so by confirming that the aim of their work was not to analyse the nature of the 
income in order to fairly allocate taxing rights.    
 
Consistent with the above, the supplementary memorandum that was issued by working party 
number 8, on 10 November 1958, only addressed the issue of source state taxation of royalty 
income from a practical perspective. In that memorandum, working party number 8 agreed 
 
348 31 December 1952.  
349 27 October 1953. 
350 4 October 1954. 
351 OECD, Working Party No. 8 of the Fiscal Committee (Germany and Luxemburg). Report on the direct 
taxation of Patent Royalties and similar payments, 1958. Available at: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
352 Ibid, 352.  
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with the fact that, when double taxation is prevented by bilateral conventions,353 the source 
country can have limited rights to tax when special conditions arise. That scenario was the 
result of the understanding that in light of the economic relations between the two contracting 
states, it would not be correct to deprive the source state of all rights to tax royalties.354 
Moreover, the working party agreed that a 5% withholding tax on the gross amount was the 
maximum that it would recommended to be agreed in a DTC, since another rate would result 
in a major derogation from the principle that the state of residence should have the exclusive 
right to tax. This was reflected in the London Model and in the majority of the treaties that 
had been concluded by OEEC members until then.             
 
Only one delegation analysed the problem of the allocation of taxing rights regarding royalty 
income from a more substantial perspective. On 2 December 1958, the secretariat of the 
Fiscal Committee circulated amongst its members the Belgian note regarding the principles 
of tax allocations on royalty income. The Belgian delegation considered that there was no 
justification for giving the exclusive right to tax royalties to the country of residence of the 
recipient – the grantor. They supported the view that it seemed to be correct to allow the 
country in which the right is used to levy a reasonable tax on the net income obtained by the 
foreign grantor by virtue of such use.355   
 
One of the justifications that was put forth by the Belgian delegation for their proposal was 
the possibility of finding compensation on other points – when bilateral conventions are being 
negotiated between Member countries of the OEEC (some of which had very similar 
industrial structures) – for the sacrifice accepted by a country which would have an excessive 
outflow of royalties. The justification addressed the problem of non-reciprocity of royalty 
flows, an issue of immense relevance in treaties between developing and developed countries 
and which form the core of this research. The Belgian delegation proposed an approach of 
 
353 The working party was of the opinion that in a multilateral convention the right to tax royalties should be 
conferred exclusively on the state of which the recipient is a resident.  
354 OECD, Working Party No. 8 of the Fiscal Committee (Germany and Luxemburg). Supplementary 
Memorandum to the Second Report on the direct taxation of Patent Royalties and similar payments, 1958. 
Available at: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/   
355 OECD, Direct taxation of Patent Royalties and similar payments (Note by the Secretariat), 1958. Available 
at: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/   
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limited taxing rights to the source state and unlimited taxing rights to the residence state with 
the obligation to avoid double taxation through the enactment of a credit method. The Belgian 
delegation recognized the difficulties in agreeing a uniform formula for limiting taxation in 
the state of source, regardless of whether the limit is applied to the tax base or to the rate of 
tax.356  
 
With regard to royalty taxation, it was even more explicitly stated in the third357 and in the 
fourth358 reports issued by working party number 8 that the main purpose of the working 
party was to present an approach which could be approved by all the delegations of the 
member countries, instead of an approach based on the nature of the income and 
correspondingly the fair allocation of taxing rights. Ultimately, the committee chose a text 
which was acceptable to the great majority of OEEC members. The final draft article states 
that royalties shall be taxable in the state of residence of the recipient, conferring rights to 
tax on the source country only when the recipient has a permanent establishment to which 
the right giving rise to the royalties actually pertains. The third and fourth reports simply 
deleted any possibility of source taxation on both a gross or net basis.     
 




The result of seven years of work of the Fiscal Committee359 was the “Draft Double Taxation 
Convention on Income and Capital” that was presented and adopted on 30 July 1963, with 
recommendations to OECD member countries to conform to this draft convention when 
signing or revising their bilateral DTCs. 
 
The establishment of common rules for the OECD regarding Articles 10, 11 and 12 – 
dividends, interest and royalties respectively – was the major difficulty of the Fiscal 
 
356 Ibid,356. 
357 OECD, Working Party No. 8 of the Fiscal Committee (Germany and Luxemburg). Revised Third Report on 
the taxation of Royalties, 1961. Available at: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
358 OECD, Working Party No. 8 of the Fiscal Committee (Germany and Luxemburg). Revised Fourth Report 
on the taxation of Royalties, 1961. Available at: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
359 In total were 37 sessions each covering a period of three days. 26 of these sessions were held between May 
1956 and September 1961 in the OEEC, and 11 from November 1961 to June 1963 in the OECD. 
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Committee as a result of the divergences between the economic interests of the member 
countries, the great dissimilarity in their laws, and the differences in their theoretical concept 
of the question and also between the solutions that were adopted in practice in bilateral 
DTCs.360 Ultimately, the rules of attribution that are contained in the 1963 Draft MTC 
represent a balance of reciprocal concessions between the member countries which favuor 
taxation by the state of residence and those which favour taxation by the source state. This 
solution – concessions – was possible, and has worked until now, due to the similarity of 
investment flows between OECD members. 
 
The compromise consisted of granting exclusive rights to tax royalties361 to the state in which 
the recipient was resident and on the share of the right to tax dividends362 and interest363 
between the state in which the recipient was resident and the state in which the income was 
sourced.  In practice, the right to tax of the source state was restricted to levying a tax up to 
a certain rate, a tax that the residence state was forced to take into account in computing its 
own tax so as to avoid juridical double taxation.  
 
Besides the fact that Article 12 stated that royalties were only taxable by the residence 
country, the other articles governing passive investment income were similar and had almost 
identical wording. Each article sets forth the rule of attribution for the right to tax, defines 
the income – the taxation of which it regulates – and then provides an exception to the above 
rules in cases where that income is more actively connected to the source country. Thus, 
when the recipient has a permanent establishment in the other contracting state with which 
the equity on which the dividends were paid, the indebtedness on which the interest was paid, 
or the property or right in respect of which the royalties were paid, were effectively 
connected, then the source state regains its taxing rights.  
 
 
360 OECD, Council, Report of the Fiscal Committee on the Draft Convention for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation with respect to taxes on Income and Capital among the Member Countries of the O.E.C.D, 1963. 
Available at: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/ 
361 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 1963, Article 12.  
362 Ibid, 362. Article 10. 
363 Ibid, 362. Article 11. 
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The 1963 OECD Draft MTC mostly followed the approach of the 1946 LN London MTC 
and it was definitively influenced by the various solutions contained in some pre-existent 
conventions between OECD countries. This has influenced the tax treatment of passive 
investment in DTCs since then.  
 
The solution embodied by this Draft MTC became the basis not only for the models which 
were intended to be followed by treaties between developed countries but also for the UN 
MTC, which, by its very definition, was supposedly created to be followed in treaties between 
developing and developed countries.    
 
The result of the revision to the 1963 Draft MTC by the Fiscal Committee of the OECD from 
1967 onwards was the 1977 MTC on Income and Capital. The most important change of the 
latter MTC regarding passive investment income, was the inclusion of the term “beneficial 
owner”.364 365 366 This addition, which indirectly affects the approach to the allocation of 
taxing rights in relation to passive investment income,367 was inserted with the purpose of 
denying the treaty benefits when an intermediary, such as an agent or nominee, was 
interposed between the beneficiary and the payer.368 Thus, if there was an intermediary, such 
as an agent or nominee, in between the beneficiary and the payer, unless the beneficial owner 
was a resident of the other contracting state, the limitation to tax for the source state was no 
longer enforceable.    
 
 
364 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 1977, Article 10 paragraph 2.  
365 Ibid, 365. Article 11 paragraph 2. 
366 Ibid, 365. Article 12 paragraph 2.  
367 Because the limitation to tax in the state of source was no longer granted.   
368 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 1977, commentary on Article 10 paragraph 2., 
commentary on Article 10 paragraph 2.  
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In addition to the above, in the three articles the MTC extended the application of extra rules 
in order to protect source countries’ rights not only in the case of permanent establishments 
according to Article 7, but also in the case of a fixed base according to Article 14.369 370 371  
 
The revision of the 1977 MTC resulted in the 1992 MTC. This new consolidated version of 
the MTC took into account the experience gained by the member countries in the negotiation 
and practical application of bilateral conventions that has taken place since 1977.372 The 
globalization and liberalization of the OECD economies accelerated rapidly in the 1980s. 
Consequently, after 1977 the Committee on Fiscal Affairs continued to examine various 
issues that were directly or indirectly related to the 1977 MTC. This work resulted in a 
number of reports, some of which recommended amendments to the MTC.373 
 
Unlike the 1963 Draft MTC and the 1977 MTC, the revised 1992 MTC did not represent a 
comprehensive revision. The OECD approach was to view this MTC as the first step in an 
ongoing revision process that was intended to produce periodic updates, thereby ensuring 
that the MTC continues to accurately reflect the views of member countries at any point in 
time and to respond to the needs of taxpayers.374   
 
 
369 Ibid, 369. Article 10 paragraph 4: “The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply if the beneficial 
owner of the dividends, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting 
State of which the company paying the dividends is a resident, through a permanent establishment situated 
therein, or performs in that other State independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein, and 
the holding in respect of which the dividends are paid is effectively connected with such permanent 
establishment or fixed base. In such case the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14, as the case may be, shall 
apply.” 
370 Ibid, 369. Article 11 paragraph 4:“The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply if the beneficial 
owner of the interest, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting State 
in which the interest arises, through a permanent establishment situated therein, or performs in that other State 
independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein, and the debt-claim in respect of which the 
interest is paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment or fixed base. In such case the 
provisions of Article 7 or Article 14, as the case may be, shall apply.” 
371 Ibid., 369 Article 12 paragraph 3: “The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if the beneficial owner of 
the royalties, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting State in 
which the royalties arise, through a permanent establishment situated therein, or performs in that other State 
independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein, and the right or property in respect of which 
the royalties are paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment or fixed base. In such case 
the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14, as the case may be, shall apply.” 
372 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 1992. 
373 Ibid, 373.  
374 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Introduction. 
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The phrase “or for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment” was deleted from Article 12 (2) of the OECD Model following a 
recommendation in paragraph 23 of the OECD Leasing Report. The removal of these 
payments from the definition means that they now fall within the terms of the business profits 
article and, thus, from an allocation of taxing rights perspective, the removal of that phrase 
from the OECD MTC has resulted in an increase of the source country’s rights to tax in DTCs 
between developed countries.375 The above effect will not be achieved if the same change is 
made in the UN MTC, since in the UN MTC source countries have rights to tax royalty 
payments as a percentage of gross revenues with a limited withholding tax. The OECD legal 
analysis arrives at the correct conclusion that income from copyrights, patents, knowhow, 
etc., constitute real royalty income, as opposed to income from leasing, which should not be 
regarded as real or proper royalty income, but should rather be categorized as rent from 
letting. 
 
The Model was updated in the 1994, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2010, 2015 and 
2017. It was only in the 2000 update that a common modification of the articles dealing with 
the taxation of passive investment income was undertaken.  
 
The exclusion of Article 14 from the OECD MTC, due to the unjustified separate treatment 
of independent personal services from business profits according to the OECD, makes the 
term “fixed base”, that is included in the 1977 Model in Articles 10, 11 and 12 thereof, 
somewhat redundant.376 From then on, only the term “permanent establishment” applies to 
protect source countries’ rights to tax dividends, interest and royalties which are effectively 




375 This amendment was deemed necessary because member states of the OECD did not strictly adhere to the 
idea of tax royalties only in the state of residence. See du Toit, C.P. Beneficial Ownership of Royalties in 
Bilateral Tax Treaties. Faculty of Law University of Amsterdam, 1999. Available at: 
http://dare.uva.nl/document/470938 
376 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 1977. Article 10 paragraph 4; Article 11 paragraph 
4; and Article 12 paragraph 3.  
 
 120 




The latest version of the UN MTC from 2017 and the latest version of the OECD MTC, also 
from 2017, do not deviate, at least substantially, in relation to passive investment income 
from that which was already in force in the 1980s. However, due to the undoubted influence 
of the OECD MTC on the UN MTC, it is necessary to examine the differences between both 
approaches in detail.  
 
As explained before, the approach used by the UN MTC (dividends, interest and royalties), 
which was influenced by the OECD MTC (dividends and interest), is a mechanism by which 
the source country levies a withholding tax on gross income and the resident country avoids 
juridical double taxation by granting an ordinary credit to the recipient – up to the 
withholding tax paid in the source country – thereby retaining the right to tax that income at 
the recipient level without any limitations. The OECD MTC grants exclusive taxing rights to 
the residence country regarding the taxation of royalty income.  
 
The residence country taxation approach that is followed by both models regarding the three 
types of income is limited when the beneficial owner of the investment income, being a 
resident of a contracting state, carries on business in the other contracting state through a 
permanent establishment or, in the case of the UN MTC, performs independent personal 
services in that other state from a fixed base that is situated therein and the investment income 
is effectively connected to that permanent establishment – UN MTC and OECD MTC – or 
fixed base – UN MTC. At that point, such income is considered to be business profits and is 
taxed accordingly.  
 
In both models, the country where the recipient of the income – the individual or entity – is 
resident will be responsible for eliminating the juridical double taxation, thereby assuming 
the burden of that responsibility by granting a foreign tax credit.377 One of the principal 
 
377 Whittaker, Donald R. An examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. model tax treaties: history, provisions and 
application to U.S. foreign policy. North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, 
Vol 8, 1982. 
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defects of the foreign tax credit method in the eyes of developing countries is that the benefit 
of low taxes in developing countries or of special tax concessions granted by them may, for 
the large part, favour the treasury of the capital exporting country – developed country – 
rather than the foreign investor for whom the benefits were designed. Thus, and as a direct 
effect, the application of that method in a scenario in which the domestic law of the 
developing country intends to stimulate foreign investment through lower tax rates results in 
the shift of tax revenue from the developing country to the capital-exporting country.378  
 
The shared system of taxation approach adopted by the UN MTC regarding the taxation of 
dividends, interest and royalties directly limits the extent of the source country’s jurisdiction 
to tax this income. The limitation – the rate of the tax – is left open by the UN MTC to be 
agreed upon in the negotiations by treaty partners with the aim of differentiating this 
approach from that which was adopted by the OECD MTC regarding dividends and interest. 
As was verified when the history of the tax treatment of investment passive incomes was 
reviewed, such approach, right from the beginning, was not accepted by developed countries 
as the approach to be used in treaties among themselves. Therefore, in most instances, no 
thought was given to the problems that were faced by capital-importing countries – 
developing countries.379 An approach that does not consider effective incentives for the 
foreign investor to invest in the source country – developing country – conflicts with 
developing countries’ aims when they are concluding a DTC with a developed country.  
 
In practice both approaches are mainly designed with the same logic regarding the taxation 
of passive investment income. A general overview of the treatment of traditionally known 
passive income under both models through a comparative analysis is required in order to set 
ground rules for proposals.  
 
 
378 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Commentary on Article 23, General Considerations. 
379 Whittaker, Donald R. An examination of the O.E.C.D. and U.N. model tax treaties: history, provisions and 
application to U.S. foreign policy. North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation, 
Vol 8, 1982.  
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2.3.1 – TAXATION OF DIVIDENDS   
 
UN MODEL – 2017 
 
1. Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of 
a Contracting State to a resident of the other 
Contracting State may be taxed in that other State. 
 
2. However, such dividends may also be taxed in the 
Contracting State of which the company paying the 
dividends is a resident and according to the laws of 
that State, but if the beneficial owner of the dividends 
is a resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so 
charged shall not exceed: 
 
(a) ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established 
through bilateral negotiations) of the gross amount of 
the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company 
(other than a partnership) which holds directly at 
least 25 per cent of the capital of the company paying 
the dividends throughout a 365 day period that 
includes the day of the payment of the dividend (for 
the purpose of computing that period, no account shall 
be taken of changes of ownership that would directly 
result from a corporate reorganization, such a as a 
merger or divisive reorganization, of the company 
that holds the shares or that pays the dividends); 
 
(b) ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established 
through bilateral negotiations) of the gross amount of 
the dividends in all other cases.  
 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States 
shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of 
application of these limitations.  
 
This paragraph shall not affect the taxation of the 
company in respect of the profits out of which the 
dividends are paid. 
 
3. The term “dividends” as used in this Article means 
income from shares, “jouissance” shares or 
“jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares 
or other rights, not being debt claims, participating in 
profits, as well as income from other corporate rights 
which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as 
income from shares by the laws of the State of which 
the company making the distribution is a resident. 
 
4. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not 
apply if the beneficial owner of the dividends, being a 
resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in 
the other Contracting State of which the company 
paying the dividends is a resident, through a 
permanent establishment situated therein, or performs 
in that other State independent personal services from 
a fixed base situated therein, and the holding in 
respect of which the dividends are paid is effectively 
connected with such permanent establishment or fixed 
base. In such case the provisions of Article 7 or Article 
14, as the case may be, shall apply. 
 
5. Where a company which is a resident of a 
Contracting State derives profits or income from the 
other Contracting State, that other State may not 
impose any tax on the dividends paid by the company, 
except in so far as such dividends are paid to a 
resident of that other State or in so far as the holding 
OECD MODEL - 2017 
 
1. Dividends paid by a company which is a resident of a 
Contracting State to a resident of the other Contracting 
State may be taxed in that other State. 
 
2. However, dividends paid by a company which is a 
resident of a Contracting state may also be taxed 
according to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial 
owner of the dividends is a resident of the other 
Contracting State, the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
 
a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends if the 
beneficial owner is a company  which holds directly at 
least 25 per cent of the capital of the company paying the 
dividends throughout a 365 day period that includes the 
day of the payment of the dividend (for the purpose of 
computing that period, no account shall be taken of 
changes of ownership that would directly result from a 
corporate reorganization, such as a merger or a divisive 
reorganization, of the company that holds the shares or 




b) 15 per cent of the gross amount of the dividends in all 
other cases.  
 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall 
by mutual agreement settle the mode of application of 
these limitations. This paragraph shall not affect the 
taxation of the company in respect of the profits out of 
which the dividends are paid. 
 
 
3. The term “dividends” as used in this Article means 
income from shares, “jouissance” shares or 
“jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or 
other rights, not being debt-claims, participating in 
profits, as well as income from other corporate rights 
which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as 
income from shares by the laws of the State of which the 
company making the distribution is a resident. 
 
 
4. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply 
if the beneficial owner of the dividends, being a resident 
of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other 
Contracting State of which the company paying the 
dividends is a resident through a permanent 
establishment situated therein and the holding in respect 
of which the dividends are paid is effectively connected 
with such permanent establishment. In such case the 






5. Where a company which is a resident of a Contracting 
State derives profits or income from the other 
Contracting State, that other State may not impose any 
tax on the dividends paid by the company, except insofar 
as such dividends are paid to a resident of that other 
State or insofar as the holding in respect of which the 
dividends are paid is effectively connected with a 
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in respect of which the dividends are paid is effectively 
connected with a permanent establishment or a fixed 
base situated in that other State, nor subject the 
company’s undistributed profits to a tax on the 
company’s undistributed profits, even if the dividends 
paid or the undistributed profits consist wholly or 
partly of profits or income arising in such other State. 
 
permanent establishment situated in that other State, nor 
subject the company’s undistributed profits to a tax on 
the company’s undistributed profits, even if the dividends 
paid or the undistributed profits consist wholly or partly 




In both the UN MTC and the OECD MTC, Article 10 states that dividends derived from 
investments in the source country may be taxed by the residence country and also, but with 
some limitations, by the source country. This approach, which we can refer to as a shared 
system of taxation with a restriction at source, was criticized when the UN MTC was first 
considered. Members of the group of experts that represented developing countries felt that, 
as a matter of principle, dividends should only be taxed by the source state or at least taxed 
strongly in the source country.380 
 
The UN MTC does not specify the maximum dividend withholding tax rate that is allowed 
to the source country. It left the threshold subject to the negotiations between prospective 
treaty partners.381 On the other hand, the OECD MTC sets a maximum withholding tax rate 
of 5% for the source country regarding foreign direct investment dividends and a 15% 
maximum for portfolio investments. 
 
Regarding the threshold to determine if a dividend is a foreign direct investment or a portfolio 
investment, the 2017 UN MTC chooses to equate the 25% threshold imposed by the OECD 
MTC. In applying such limitations on taxing dividends, both Models require that the 
beneficial owner of the dividend be resident in the other contracting state.  
 
 
380 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Commentary on Article 10 paragraph 1. 
381 Lennard, Michael. The UN Model Tax Convention as compared with the OECD Model Tax Convention – 
Current points of difference and recent developments. IBFD, Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, Vol 49, 2009. 
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The logic behind this somewhat surprising approach demonstrates that the design of the 
article was no more than the result of non-economic negotiations. On the one hand, 
developing countries – source countries – feel that they benefit from leaving the rates of 
withholding taxes open and that this benefit is fully compensated for developed countries – 
residence countries – by lowering the rate of participation necessary to determine when 
dividends correspond to foreign direct investments instead of portfolio investments.  
 
As is stated in the UN MTC commentaries to this article, the UN MTC reproduces Article 
10 of the OECD MTC, with the exception of paragraph two which contains substantive 
differences and paragraphs four and five which refer to independent personal services.  
 
Regarding Article 10, paragraph two, the difference is that the UN MTC left the threshold of 
withholding tax to be charged at source subject to negotiations between the prospective treaty 
partners, while the OECD MTC states a fixed and maximum rate of 5% for foreign direct 
investment dividends and a 15% maximum for portfolio investment dividends.  
 
In paragraph four, the UN MTC adds to the OECD approach regarding permanent 
establishment restrictions on applying paragraphs one and two and consequently the 
application of Article 7, by stating that if the beneficial owner, by being resident of a 
contracting state, performs independent personal services in the state where the company 
paying the dividends is resident from a fixed base situated therein, and the holding in respect 
of which the dividends are paid is effectively connected with such a fixed base, then Article 
14 will apply.  
 
Lastly, regarding paragraph five, the only difference between the UN MTC and the OECD 
MTC is that in paragraph five there is a reference to the “fixed base” concept as an addition 
to the “permanent establishment” concept. This is related to the prohibition that a contracting 
state has on taxing dividends paid by a company resident in the other state, solely because 





2.3.2 - TAXATION OF INTEREST 
 
UN MODEL - 2017 
 
1. Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to 
a resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed 
in that other State. 
 
2. However, such interest may also be taxed in the 
Contracting State in which it arises and according to 
the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of the 
interest is a resident of the other Contracting State, 
the tax so charged shall not exceed ___ per cent (the 
percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) of the gross amount of the interest.  
 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States 
shall by mutual agreement settle the mode of 
application of this limitation. 
 
3. The term “interest” as used in this Article means 
income from debt claims of every kind, whether or not 
secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a 
right to participate in the debtor’s profits, and in 
particular, income from government securities and 
income from bonds or debentures, including 
premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, 
bonds or debentures. Penalty charges for late 
payment shall not be regarded as interest for the 
purpose of this Article. 
 
4. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not 
apply if the beneficial owner of the interest, being a 
resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in 
the other Contracting State in which the interest 
arises, through a permanent establishment situated 
therein, or performs in that other State independent 
personal services from a fixed base situated therein, 
and the debt claim in respect of which the interest is 
paid is effectively connected with (a) such permanent 
establishment or fixed base, or with (b) business 
activities referred to in (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 
7. In such cases the provisions of Article 7 or Article 
14, as the case may be, shall apply. 
 
5. Interest shall be deemed to arise in a Contracting 
State when the payer is a resident of that State. Where, 
however, the person paying the interest, whether he is 
a resident of a Contracting State or not, has in a 
Contracting State a permanent establishment or a 
fixed base in connection with which the indebtedness 
on which the interest is paid was incurred, and such 
interest is borne by such permanent establishment or 
fixed base, then such interest shall be deemed to arise 
in the State in which the permanent establishment or 
fixed base is situated. 
 
6. Where, by reason of a special relationship between 
the payer and the beneficial owner or between both of 
them and some other person, the amount of the 
interest, having regard to the debt claim for which it 
is paid, exceeds the amount which would have been 
agreed upon by the payer and the beneficial owner in 
the absence of such relationship, the provisions of this 
Article shall apply only to the last-mentioned amount. 
In such case, the excess part of the payments shall 
remain taxable according to the laws of each 
OECD MODEL – 2017 
 
1. Interest arising in a Contracting State and paid to a 
resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in 
that other State. 
 
2. However, interest arising in a Contracting State may 
also be taxed in that State according to the laws of that 
State, but if the beneficial owner of the interest is a 
resident of the other Contracting State, the tax so 
charged shall not exceed 10 per cent of the gross amount 
of the interest.  
 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall 





3. The term “interest” as used in this Article means 
income from debt-claims of every kind, whether or not 
secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right 
to participate in the debtor’s profits, and in particular, 
income from government securities and income from 
bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes 
attaching to such securities, bonds or debentures. 
Penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded 
as interest for the purpose of this Article. 
 
4. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply 
if the beneficial owner of the interest, being a resident of 
a Contracting State, carries on business in the other 
Contracting State in which the interest arises through a 
permanent establishment situated therein and the debt-
claim in respect of which the interest is paid is effectively 
connected with such permanent establishment. In such 







5. Interest shall be deemed to arise in a Contracting State 
when the payer is a resident of that State. Where, 
however, the person paying the interest, whether he is a 
resident of a Contracting State or not, has in a 
Contracting State a permanent establishment in 
connection with which the indebtedness on which the 
interest is paid was incurred, and such interest is borne 
by such permanent establishment, then such interest 
shall be deemed to arise in the State in which the 




6. Where, by reason of a special relationship between the 
payer and the beneficial owner or between both of them 
and some other person, the amount of the interest, having 
regard to the debt-claim for which it is paid, exceeds the 
amount which would have been agreed upon by the payer 
and the beneficial owner in the absence of such 
relationship, the provisions of this Article shall apply 
only to the last-mentioned amount. In such case, the 
excess part of the payments shall remain taxable 
according to the laws of each Contracting State, due 
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Contracting State, due regard being had to the other 
provisions of this Convention. 
 




The taxation of income from interest follows a similar approach to that which is followed by 
the UN and the OECD regarding dividend taxation, notwithstanding the fact that both types 
of income stem from activities that are of a different nature. In both MTCs, Article 11 states 
that interest arising in a contracting state and paid to a resident of the other contracting state 
may be taxed in that other state.382  
 
As in the case of dividends, the UN MTC does not specify the maximum interest withholding 
tax rate that the source country is permitted to apply. It left the threshold subject to 
negotiations between the prospective treaty partners. On the other hand, the OECD MTC 
stipulates a 10% maximum withholding tax rate on interest to the source country. The limit, 
considering the fact that interest is normally deductible at source, has never being clearly 
justified. Furthermore, even the London MTC which was influenced – and maybe more – by 
developed countries, did not establish a limitation on the withholding tax rate for the source 
country in advance. As was stated regarding dividends, in applying such a limitation on 
taxing interest, both MTCs require the beneficial owner of the interest to be resident in the 
other contracting state.  
 
As stated in the UN MTC commentaries to this article, the UN MTC reproduces Article 11 
of the OECD MTC with the exception of paragraphs two and four, both of which contain 
substantive differences, and paragraphs four and five regarding independent personal 
services.  
 
Regarding paragraph two, the difference is that the UN MTC left the threshold of the 
withholding tax to be charged at source and subject to negotiations between prospective 
treaty partners, while the OECD MTC stipulates a fixed rate of 10% in this regard.  
 
 
382 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Article 11. 
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In paragraph four, which provides that paragraphs one and two do not apply to some kinds 
of interest, the UN MTC states two clear differences: firstly, the UN MTC, in paragraph 4 of 
Article 10, adds to the permanent establishment restrictions on applying paragraphs one and 
two and consequently application of Article 7 that if the beneficial owner, by being resident 
of a contracting state in which the interest arises, performs independent personal services in 
that other state from a fixed base situated therein, and the debt claim of which the interest is 
paid is effectively connected with such a fixed place, then the provisions of Article 14 will 
apply. Secondly, and since the UN MTC, unlike the OECD MTC, adopted a limited force of 
attraction rule in Article 7 – defining the income that may be taxed as business profits – 383 
the corresponding change was made in Article 11 by adding that the inapplicability of 
paragraphs 1 and 2 are also extended to the case in which the debt claims are effectively 
connected with business activities in the source country of the same or a similar kind as those 
effected through the permanent establishment.384  
 
Thirdly, regarding paragraph five, the only difference between the UN MTC and the OECD 
MTC is that in the UN MTC there is a reference to the “fixed base” concept as an addition 
to the “permanent establishment” concept. The above is related to the presumption that the 
source of the interest is in the contracting state of which the payer is resident, or, when not a 
resident, the payer has a permanent establishment or a fixed base connected with the 
indebtedness that created the interest payment.  
 
2.3.3 - TAXATION OF ROYALTIES 
 
UN MODEL - 2017 
 
1.  Royalties arising in a Contracting State and paid 
to a resident of the other Contracting State may be 
taxed in that other State. 
 
 
2. However, such royalties may also be taxed in the 
Contracting State in which they arise and according 
to the laws of that State, but if the beneficial owner of 
the royalties is a resident of the other Contracting 
State, the tax so charged shall not exceed ___ per cent 
(the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
OECD MODEL - 2017 
 
1. Royalties arising in a Contracting State and 
beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting 
State shall be taxable only in that other State.  
 
2. The term “royalties” as used in this Article means 
payments of any kind received as a consideration for the 
use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, 
artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, 
any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret 
formula or process, or for information concerning 
industrial, commercial or scientific experience. 
 
383 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Article 7 paragraph 4. 
384 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Commentary on Article 11 paragraph 4. 
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negotiations) of the gross amount of the royalties. The 
competent authorities of the Contracting States shall 
by mutual agreement settle the mode of application of 
this limitation. 
 
3. The term “royalties” as used in this Article means 
payments of any kind received as a consideration for 
the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, 
artistic or scientific work including cinematograph 
films, or films or tapes used for radio or television 
broadcasting, any patent, trademark, design or model, 
plan, secret formula or process, or for the use of, or 
the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment or for information concerning industrial, 
commercial or scientific experience. 
 
4. The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not 
apply if the beneficial owner of the royalties, being a 
resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in 
the other Contracting State in which the royalties 
arise, through a permanent establishment situated 
therein, or performs in that other State independent 
personal services from a fixed base situated therein, 
and the right or property in respect of which the 
royalties are paid is effectively connected with (a) 
such permanent establishment or fixed base, or with 
(b) business activities referred to in (c) of paragraph 
1 of Article 7. In such cases the provisions of Article 7 
or Article 14, as the case may be, shall apply. 
 
5. Royalties shall be deemed to arise in a Contracting 
State when the payer is a resident of that State. Where, 
however, the person paying the royalties, whether he 
is a resident of a Contracting State or not, has in a 
Contracting State a permanent establishment or a 
fixed base in connection with which the liability to pay 
the royalties was incurred, and such royalties are 
borne by such permanent establishment or fixed base, 
then such royalties shall be deemed to arise in the 
State in which the permanent establishment or fixed 
base is situated. 
 
6. Where by reason of a special relationship between 
the payer and the beneficial owner or between both of 
them and some other person, the amount of the 
royalties, having regard to the use, right or 
information for which they are paid, exceeds the 
amount which would have been agreed upon by the 
payer and the beneficial owner in the absence of such 
relationship, the provisions of this Article shall apply 
only to the last-mentioned amount. In such case, the 
excess part of the payments shall remain taxable 
according to the laws of each Contracting State, due 





3. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if the 
beneficial owner of the royalties, being a resident of a 
Contracting State, carries on business in the other 
Contracting State in which the royalties arise through a 
permanent establishment situated therein and the right 
or property in respect of which the royalties are paid is 
effectively connected with such permanent 





4. Where, by reason of a special relationship between the 
payer and the beneficial owner or between both of them 
and some other person, the amount of the royalties, 
having regard to the use, right or information for which 
they are paid, exceeds the amount which would have 
been agreed upon by the payer and the beneficial owner 
in the absence of such relationship, the provisions of this 
Article shall apply only to the last-mentioned amount. In 
such case, the excess part of the payments shall remain 
taxable according to the laws of each Contracting State, 




From an “allocation of taxing rights” perspective, Article 12 of the UN MTC is the only 
provision that addresses passive investment income that definitely departs from the OECD 
MTC approach. By providing a shared system of taxation between the source and the 
residence country, the UN MTC leaves behind the principle of the residence state’s exclusive 
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right to tax that is provided in the OECD MTC.385 Even though the OECD MTC does not 
follow this approach, it is important to consider Michael Lennard’s 386 statement: “This is an 
approach not provided for in Art. 12 of the OECD Model Convention itself, but which is 
followed by about half of the OECD Member countries and is therefore addressed in the 
Commentary to the OECD Model Convention on this Article”. 
 
Despite the foregoing, and as is stated in the UN MTC commentaries to this article, it 
reproduces Article 12 of the OECD MTC except for paragraphs one and three which contain 
substantive differences. Paragraphs two and five do not appear in the OECD MTC and 
paragraph four is drafted somewhat differently. The main differences between the models 
were stated in the UN MTC in 2014.387 Some of the most relevant points are reproduced 
below.   
(1) In paragraph one, the difference is that the UN MTC provides a sharing system of 
taxation between the source and the residence country by dropping the word “only” 
from the corresponding provision contained in the OECD MTC.388  
(2) Paragraph three reproduces paragraph two of the OECD MTC but includes the 
reference to equipment rental389 and includes, within the scope of royalty payments, 
tapes and films used for radio or television broadcasting which are not included in the 
corresponding OECD provision. The real relevance of the definition of royalties has 
more to do with competition between capital-importing countries (developing 
countries) and capital-exporting countries (developed countries) than with 
substantive implications.390 This simply demonstrates that the definition of royalties 
is conditioned on whether the countries concerned are considered to be technology-
importing or technology-exporting countries, instead of looking at the real nature of 
 
385 Ibid., 385. Commentary on article 12 paragraphs 1 and 2. 
386 Lennard, Michael. The UN Model Tax Convention as compared with the OECD Model Tax Convention – 
Current points of difference and recent developments. IBFD, Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin, Vol 49, 2009. 
387 ECOSOC. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Twelfth Session, Discussion 
of substantive issues related to international cooperation in tax matters: article 12: general consideration, 
including equipment-related issues, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=E/C.18/2014/3&Lang=E 
388 Ibid, 388. 
389 Amendment done to the OECD MTC in 1992.  
390 García Heredia, Alejandro. The definition of Royalties in International Tax Law: The copyright, industrial 




the income. Thus, capital-importing countries defend a narrower concept of royalties 
so that the country of use of the intellectual (including industrial) property has a right 
to tax more profits than the country where the intellectual property owner is 
resident,391 and the capital-exporting countries (the country where the intellectual 
property owner is resident) are interested in a broad conception of royalties so that 
they can levy more tax.  
(3) Paragraph two is a consequence of the approach followed in paragraph one, which is 
that royalties may be taxable in the source country as well as in the residence country. 
Thus, this paragraph limits the withholding tax to be imposed by the source country 
on the gross amount of the royalties up to a certain threshold that is to be negotiated 
between the prospective treaty partners, which in turn is underpinned by the fact that 
the beneficial owner of the royalties is a resident of the other contracting state.  
(4) Paragraph five, which is also a consequence of the approach followed in paragraph 
one, includes a presumption that the source of the royalty income is in the contracting 
state of which the payer is resident, or, when not a resident, where the payer has a 
permanent establishment or a fixed base connected with which the liability to pay the 
royalties is incurred. 
(5) In paragraph four of the UN MTC and paragraph three of the OECD MTC, the only 
difference between the UN MTC and the OECD MTC is that in the UN MTC there 
is a reference to the “fixed base” concept as an addition to the “permanent 
establishment” concept. This is related to the restrictions on applying paragraphs one 
and two – in the OECD Model only paragraph one – and consequently the application 
of Articles 7 and 14 respectively – in the OECD Model only Article 7 – if the 
beneficial owner of the royalties, as a resident of a contracting state, carries on 
business in the state where the royalties arise through a permanent establishment 
situated therein or performs, in that other state, independent personal services from a 
fixed base situated therein. 
 
 
391 Lennard, Michael. The UN Model Tax Convention as compared with the OECD Model Tax Convention – 




According to several UN Member States, the inequitable distribution of income between 
“source” and “residence” countries needs to be rebalanced in favour of “source” countries. 
As a consequence, in the UN works, one of the main issues is how to increase “source” 
country taxation. The committee referred to a number of alternatives to do so, including a 
services permanent establishment provision and a broader scope to the royalty definition than 
that which is included in the OECD MTC. The current trend seems to be the inclusion of all 
forms of tangible assets instead of the odd classification of industrial, commercial or 
scientific equipment,392 which goes far beyond the proposals made with respect to the royalty 



















392 ECOSOC. Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Twelfth Session, Possible 
Amendments to the Commentary on Article 12 (Royalties), Note by the  
Coordinator, Ms. Pragya Saksena, 2014. Available at:  
https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP8_Royalties.pdf 
393 Ibid., 390. 
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PART III. UPDATING THE DEBATE  
 
3.1 CONTEXTUALIZATION OF THE MATTER   
 
 
For more than a century, governments and tax specialists have relied on DTCs. The 
expectations that come with these types of treaties are of the most varied character. Initially, 
the intention was to avoid double taxation. However, a number of other functions have come 
into the equation since then. For instance, DTCs are considered to be indispensable 
instruments for the exchange of information with the aim of controlling international tax 
fraud. In this regard, organizations such as the OECD consider the existence of a DTC as a 
determinative factor when defining whether a jurisdiction is cooperative, non-cooperative or 
a tax haven.394 It is also claimed that DTCs help to attract foreign investment395 and that they 
grant legal and investment protection to foreign investors. Lastly, and one role that becomes 
more important each and every day, is the ability of DTCs to resolve conflicts which arise 
when two jurisdictions disagree on the interpretation or application of a provision in a DTC. 
The mutual agreement procedure (MAP) was extensively revised in the BEPS Project.396  
Developing countries believe that DTCs help to increase economic growth and foster 
economic development. They have been signing such treaties for more than 30 years. 
Although DTCs alone cannot determine the success of economic growth and development, 
they can nevertheless aid in this process.  
 
 
394 Lang, Michael; Pistone, Pasquale; Schuch, Josef; Staringer, Claus; Storck, Alfred; and Zagler, Martin. Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics. IBFD, 2010. As quoted in that book, this kind of 
pressure is being put by the Global Forum on Fiscal Transparency.  
395 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and 
Development Management, Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and 
Developing Countries, New York, 2019. Preface. 
396 OECD, Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms More Effective, 2015. Available at:  
http://www.oecd.org/tax/making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-2015-final-report-
9789264241633-en.htm; The Action 14 of the BEPS Project focused on making dispute resolution mechanisms 
more effective by developing solutions to address obstacles that prevent countries from solving treaty disputes 
under MAP. This was due to the absence of arbitration provisions in most treaties and the fact that access to 
MAP and arbitration may be denied in certain cases.  The proposals for change were included in the draft for 
the 2017 OECD MTC, Available at: http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps/oecd-releases-draft-contents-2017-update-
model-tax-convention.htm. The focus is centred on allowing taxpayers to submit a case for MAP to the 
competent authority of either Contracting State, as opposed to the previous wording which only permitted that 




As is revisited in this work, the weak connection between the increase in foreign investment 
and DTCs is clear.397 This was not evident during the second half of 20th century, however. 
As was stated, the positive evolution of unilateral measures to eliminate juridical double 
taxation changed the role of DTCs in this respect. Thus, and regarding the incomes analysed 
in this work, developing countries end up waiving revenue in their DTCs with developed 
countries without necessarily receiving any reciprocal economic benefits.  DTCs are used, 
and imposed on developing countries, as tools to enhance the international image of 
developed countries.398  
 
The principle of non-discrimination according to nationality or other precise circumstances, 
as is stipulated in Article 24 of the MTC, is part of the scope of legal and investment 
protection for foreign investors.399 This principle implies that countries cannot subject a 
national of a treaty partner country to more burdensome taxation than its own nationals who 
face the same circumstances and have the same residential status for tax purposes. There are 
other forms of tax discrimination that are also dealt with in DTCs, for example: (1) permanent 
establishments of a treaty partner enterprise may not be subjected to more burdensome 
taxation than a local enterprise carrying on the same activities; (2) stateless persons must be 
provided equality of treatment with the nationals of a country and (3) the payment of interest, 
royalties or other disbursements by a resident enterprise to a resident of a treaty partner 
country must be deductible under the same conditions as if they had been paid to a local 
resident.400 All of these measures are designed to prevent discrimination, which is also an 
important effect of DTCs.  
 
The granting of legal certainty and investment protection to foreign investors and the 
elimination of double taxation are, in the majority of the cases, already covered by a 
 
397 Davies, Ronald B. Tax Treaties, Renegotiations, and Foreign Direct Investment. Economic Analysis and 
Policy, Vol 33, 2003. Available at:  
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.519.7883&rep=rep1&type=pdf  
398 OECD, Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes, 2009. Information 
available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/transparency/  
399 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Commentary on Article 24 paragraph 1. 




combination of domestic legislation and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs).401 Reuven 
Avi-Yonah, in his work entitled “Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction”, states that DTCs 
are generally unnecessary for preventing double taxation, since most countries unilaterally 
prevent double taxation by either exempting foreign income or by granting a foreign income 
tax credit.402  
    
Developing countries claims regarding their taxing rights on dividends, interest and royalty 
income have been related neither to the increase of foreign investment nor to incentives to 
have access to useful foreign equity, debt capital and necessary technology from developed 
to developing countries. The UN approach has been focused on: (1) increasing the rights 
compared to those granted to the source country in the OECD MTC, i.e. royalty income; and 
(2) the expectation that treaty negotiations between developing and developed countries will 
result in granting higher withholding tax rates to the source country than those that are 
normally applied in DTCs between two developed countries.403  
 
In the work published in 2014 by professors Lang and Owens,404 they insist in relation to 
DTCs that withholding taxes, and therefore revenue, are key instruments for facilitating 
development. However, and as those authors  correctly conclude, the negotiation of DTCs 
only creates a more stable and certain climate in which FDI can take place. Moreover, that 
work reaffirmed that the main objectives that developing countries can expect to achieve 
when signing a DTC with a developed country are: the elimination of double taxation, 
certainty and predictability, non-discrimination, mechanisms to minimize and resolve tax 
disputes and the division of the tax base according to the rules drafted in the DTC.  
 
 
401 UNCTAD. The role of International Investment agreements in attracting foreign direct investment to 
developing countries, New York and Geneva, 2009. Available at:     
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/diaeia20095_en.pdf  
402 Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction. University of Michigan Law School, 2007. 
Available at:  
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1048441.  
403 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Articles 10, 11 and 12.  
404 Lang, Michael; and Owens, Jeffrey. The role of tax treaties in facilitating development and protecting the 
tax base. WU International Taxation Research, Paper Series No. 2014-03 
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The premise of developed countries regarding their preliminary rights to tax passive 
investment income when acting as home/resident countries is not correct. Both the OECD 
MTC and the UN MTC allocate passive investment income to the country of residence. 
Stating that the country of residence is giving up taxing rights whilst signing a DTC with a 
developing country is not accurate.  All countries are, in most cases, bound by their own 
domestic legislation, namely to avoid double taxation. Therefore, if we compare the rights to 
tax of a developed country in their commercial relations with developing countries before 
signing a DTC to the situation once the DTC is actually signed, the conclusion will be, in the 
majority of cases, that the developed country has increased its taxing rights as a consequence 
of the DTC. 
 
Following the same line of reasoning, it could be argued that developing countries have not 
realized that they need a superior goal before they can give up their taxing rights. Effects 
such as the elimination of double taxation, certainty and predictability, non-discrimination, 
mechanisms to minimize and resolve tax disputes and the division of the tax base according 
to the rules drafted in the DTC, can be granted domestically, and therefore, the economic 
sacrifice that those countries are currently making is not justified.  
 
The ongoing discussions disregard the fact that DTCs must bring benefits to both signatory 
countries. The granting of reciprocal benefits is the only argument that could validate 
subscription to a DTC. The relationship between DTCs, tax incentives for foreign investors 
and the short-term budgetary damage of the host / source country – developing country – is 
therefore direct.  
 
The international flow of investments from developed to developing countries has increased 
over the last 50 years and, consequently, taxing rights have shifted from developing to 
developed countries due to the increase of DTCs that have been signed between them. There 
is no scientific proof that the order of the factors has been first, the signing of DTCs, and 
second, the increase of foreign investment in the host / source developing country. This 
parallel evolution is mostly caused by the worldwide tendency of countries to open their 
markets to foreign investors. DTCs are not the reason for the increase in cross-border 
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investments. The causal relationship between DTCs and the increase of foreign investment 
is therefore inconsistent.405  
 
Professor Klaus Vogel, in his publication “Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation”,406 
opined that unilateral measures alone are insufficient to avoid double taxation because they 
generally do not cover all of the situations that give rise to double taxation and they may 
apply inconsistently to double taxation situations depending on which states’ measures are 
applied. From that starting point, he justified why countries have entered into bilateral 
agreements since the 1920s. Nowadays the situation is rather different. The main 
consequence of modern DTCs is to shift taxing rights away from capital-importing countries 
to capital-exporting countries.407 
 
In the report issued by David A. Ward for the Advisory Panel on Canada’s System of 
International Taxation in 2008, it was stated that “the purpose of avoiding double taxation is 
therefore probably no longer the dominant purpose of many tax treaties”.408 Ward even 
stated that in 1992, and due to the above, the OECD changed the title of the MTC: dropping 
the reference to “Double Taxation Convention” and replacing it with “Tax Convention”. 
 
In the same line of reasoning, Katrin McGauran, in her publication “Should the Netherlands 
sign tax treaties with developing countries?”, which was published by the Center for 
Research on Multinational Corporations as part of a series of publications analysing the 
impact of Dutch foreign and economic policy on sustainable development and public 
interest,409 explicitly addressed the changing role of DTCs in this respect. This research began 
 
405 McGauran, Katrin. Should the Netherlands Sign Tax Treaties with Developing Countries? Amsterdam, 2013 
available at: https://www.somo.nl/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/Should-the-Netherlands-sign-tax-treaties-with-
developing-countries.pdf  
406 Vogel, Klaus, Double Tax Treaties and Their Interpretation. International Tax & Business Lawyer, Vol 4, 
1986. 
407 Lang, Michael; Pistone, Pasquale; Schuch, Josef; Staringer, Claus; Storck, Alfred; and Zagler, Martin. Tax 
Treaties: Building Bridges between Law and Economics. IBFD, 2010. 
408 Ward, David. Access to Treaty Benefits. Research Report Prepared for the Advisory Panel on Canada’s 
System of International Taxation, 2008. Available at:  https://www.fin.gc.ca/access/tt-it/apcsit-
gcrcfi/pdf/RR12%20-%20Ward%20-%20en%20-%20final%20-%20090618.pdf   





from the assumption that, although exceptions might still exist and some states might still 
want to agree on mechanisms to eliminate double taxation in a DTC rather than introducing 
domestic laws, these individual cases do not justify the existence of a DTC network which 
consists of more than 3,000 treaties.  
 
Victor Thuronyi’s work entitled “Tax Treaties and Developing Countries”,410 which 
constituted Part VI of the research project of the Institute for Austrian and International Tax 
Law from the Vienna University of Economics and Business, named “Tax Treaties: Building 
Bridges between Law and Economics”, goes even further. He stated that most of the results 
of DTCs can be similarly accomplished by adopting unilateral measures, and he concluded 
that, notwithstanding that DTCs provide some degree of legal protection, if we consider what 
can be accomplished by unilateral measures, the additional value from the legal protection 
afforded by a DTC in many cases will not be worth the cost of negotiating that DTC in the 
first place.   
 
The work conducted by Tsilly Dagan, “The Tax Treaties Myth”,411 started by asking: “What 
is the objective of DTCs?” The answer, and the starting point of that research, was “one might 
say that the point is to prevent, or at least relieve double taxation. But this objective is a 
myth”.  
 
For David A. Ward, the only effect is that DTCs should now be regarded as agreements that: 
(1) allocate, between the state of source and the state of residence, the right to tax specific 
types of income; (2) assist tax authorities by reducing tax evasion, providing information to 
assess taxes, assist in collecting taxes across borders and deal with tax avoidance schemes; 
and (3) assist taxpayers by removing obstacles to the development of economic relations 
between countries for taxpayers engaged in commercial, industrial, financial or other 
activities, including settling, on a uniform basis, the most common problems that arise in the 
field of international taxation.  
 
410 Thuronyi, Victor. Tax Treaties and Developing Countries in Tax Treaties: Building Bridges between Law 
and Economics. IBFD, 2010 
411 Dagam, Tsilly. The tax treaties myth. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, Vol 





Katrin McGauran concluded that, due to the failure of the UN MTC, developing countries 
were confronted with already existing internationally accepted tax treaty standards which 
reflected the interests of OECD countries. Therefore, and with the understanding that the 
OECD tax treaty network provides advantages for members of that network, developing 
countries signed DTCs within the OECD parameters. The advantages of doing so were the 
minimization of communication and the enforcement costs or reputational advantages for 
FDI over competitors who are not members of that tax treaty network.    
 
Victor Thuronyi proposed, as a solution, that if there is a particular investment project, e.g. a 
mining project, where tax stability and other aspects of the legal regime are important as a 
matter of encouraging investment, this can often be accomplished more effectively by a 
concluding a specific agreement with the taxpayer concerned.  Thuronyi specifically stated 
that legal certainty surrounding taxation can be provided by written rulings, thus clarifying 
how tax law is to be interpreted and applied in specific cases. Regarding the lack of 
administrative capacity to issue a substantial number of such rulings, he proposed charging 
a fee for rulings, thereby providing the resources to hire the necessary staff, while also 
providing an incentive to keep the number of rulings down.    
 
And lastly, Tsilly Dagan proved that, due to the incentives that countries have, if each country 
were to implement a unilateral policy for the purposes of preventing double taxation, the 
interaction between the unilateral policies of the residence and the host country would result 
in a stable equilibrium in which juridical double taxation would, as a matter of fact, be 
alleviated.   
 
Of these research projects, only that of David A. Ward and of Victor Thuronyi actually 
considered the increase of foreign investments in the host country as an important element.  
As professors Ault and Arnolds stated in their work on the protection of the tax base of 
developing countries,412 it is not possible to predict the effects of the BEPS Report on tax 
 
412 Ault, Hugh J; and Arnolds, Brian J. Protecting the Tax Base of developing countries. Chapter I of the United 
Nations Handbook on Selected Issues Edited by Alexander Trepelkov, Harry Tonino and Dominika Halka, New 
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incentives. However, if the project succeeds, the tax incentives offered by developing 
countries and, in the case of this work, by DTCs concluded between developing and 
developed countries may become more attractive for foreign investors. The above is 
understood in the context that foreign multinational enterprises will face more difficulties in 
stripping profits out of developing countries.413 Moreover, it should not be disregarded that 
corporate taxation on inbound investments plays a larger role in the total revenue of 
developing countries.414  The taxation of passive investment income should therefore be 
regulated in order to grant the right to impose tax incentives, and they should not interfere in 
the taxation of business income for enterprises that are incorporated in developing countries 
but which are owned by foreign investors.   
 
3.1.1 EUROPEAN UNION EXPERIENCE  
 
 
Although at DTC level it is not a recognized policy, with the exception of the treatment of 
income from royalties in the OECD MTC, a good example of measures designed to eliminate 
tax obstacles in a specific market are those promulgated by the EU. Although such measures 
are specifically designed for a regional economy, it is nevertheless worth considering them 
here. 
 
The EU implemented an approach that grants the total elimination of withholding taxes at 
source, and therefore of juridical and economic double taxation, as a valid measure regarding 
dividend income and it has done so since the adoption of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive in 
July 1990.415 416 Following the same reasoning, but regarding the elimination of juridical 
 
York, 2017. Available at: https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/handbook-tax-base-second-
edition.pdf  
413  Ibid, 413. 
414  Ibid, 413. 
415 Council Directive (EU), 1990/435/EEC, July 23, 1990, on the common system of taxation applicable in the 
case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States. 
416 Council Directive (EU), 2003/123/EC, December 22, 2003, amending Directive 90/435/EEC on the common 
system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States.   
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double taxation regarding interest and royalties, was the issuance of the Interest and Royalty 
Directive in June 2003.417  
 
The Parent-Subsidiary Directive was designed to eliminate tax obstacles in the area of profit 
distributions between groups of companies in the EU. This was to be done by abolishing 
withholding taxes on the payment of dividends between associated companies of different 
EU Member States and by preventing the economic double taxation of parent companies on 
the profits of their subsidiaries. This applies to dividends distributed by subsidiaries to their 
controlling parent companies. As of 1 January 2009, the holding percentage to qualify as a 
controlled subsidiary is at least 10% of the capital of that subsidiary. The Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive, in its preamble, states that the Directive was justified since, at that time, tax 
provisions which governed the relations between parent companies and subsidiaries of 
different Member States varied greatly from one Member State to another. It was also the 
case that those provisions were generally less advantageous than those applicable to parent 
companies and subsidiaries of the same Member State, which naturally constituted a 
disadvantage to cooperation between the companies of different Member States compared to 
the cooperation between companies of one Member State. The measures introduced by the 
Directive resulted in exempting dividend distributions from withholding taxes in the host / 
source country and eliminating both international juridical and economic double taxation in 
the state home/residence country of the parent company, either by exempting the dividends 
received from taxation or by granting a tax credit (indirect tax credit) in respect of any foreign 
taxation incurred on the relevant profits. Article 5 of the Directive states that: “Profits which 
a subsidiary distributes to its parent company shall be exempt from withholding tax.” and 
Article 4(1) of the Directive states that: 
 
Where a parent company or its permanent establishment, by virtue of the association 
of the parent company with its subsidiary, receives distributed profits, the Member 
State of the parent company and the Member State of its permanent establishment 
shall, except when the subsidiary is liquidated, either: 
 
417 Council Directive (EU), 2003/49/EC, June 3, 2003, on a common system of taxation applicable to interest 
and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States. Article 3 letter b). 
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                        (a) refrain from taxing such profits; or 
(b) tax such profits while authorizing the parent company and the permanent 
establishment to deduct from the amount of tax due that fraction of the 
corporation tax related to those profits and paid by the subsidiary and any 
lower-tier subsidiary, subject to the condition that at each tier a company and 
its lower-tier subsidiary fall within the definitions laid down in Article 2 and 
meet the requirements provided for in Article 3, up to the limit of the amount 
of the corresponding tax due.”.  
 
This Directive was implemented by the 28 EU Member States and most of them follow the 
participation exemption option as the most suitable method for the elimination of double 
taxation. In some specific cases, e.g., in Austria, if there is an abuse of law, the method 
switches from the exemption to the indirect credit method. The Netherlands also provides for 
a switchover in the case of low-taxed or non-active participations. The abuse of law can also 
lead to the non-application in the Parent Subsidiary Directive regime, e.g. in the case of 
France. Thus, also considering the prohibition on taxing dividends on a second tier at source, 
the outcome is a market that taxes dividends on a second tier neither at source nor at 
residence, i.e. double juridical non-taxation. On 27 January 2015, the European Council 
formally adopted a binding general anti-abuse rule, i.e. through a main purpose test, to be 
included in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 418 
 
The Interest and Royalty Directive was designed to eliminate tax obstacles in the area of 
cross-border interest and royalty payments within a group of companies in the EU by 
 
418 Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Directive was replaced by the following paragraphs: 
“2.Member States shall not grant the benefits of this Directive to an arrangement or a series of arrangements 
which, having been put into place for the main purpose or one of the main purposes of obtaining a tax advantage 
that defeats the object or purpose of this Directive, are not genuine having regard to all relevant facts and 
circumstances. 
 An arrangement may comprise more than one step or part. 
 3. For the purposes of paragraph 2, an arrangement or a series of arrangements shall be regarded as not 
genuine to the extent that they are not put into place for valid commercial reasons which reflect economic 
reality. 
4. This Directive shall not preclude the application of domestic or agreement-based provisions required for the 




abolishing withholding taxes on interest and royalty payments arising in a Member State. 
These interest and royalty payments are exempt from any tax at source provided that the 
beneficial owner of the payment is a company or a permanent establishment that is resident 
in another Member State. Similar to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the preamble to the 
Interest Royalty Directive states that in a single market having the characteristics of a 
domestic market, transactions between companies of different Member States should not be 
subject to less favourable tax conditions than those applicable to the same transactions carried 
out between companies of the same Member State. This requirement was not met in relation 
to interest and royalty payments; national tax laws coupled, where applicable, with bilateral 
or multilateral agreements may not always ensure that double taxation is eliminated, and their 
application often entails burdensome administrative formalities and cashflow problems for 
the companies concerned. With an equivalent aim as that of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, 
but in this case regarding interest and royalties, and aiming to put cross-border interest and 
royalty payments on an equal footing with domestic payments, by eliminating juridical 
double taxation and cashflow disadvantages, the Interest and Royalties Directive exempts 
interest and royalty payments from withholding tax by the host / source country and allows 
the home/residence country of the recipient to tax that income. Article 1 of the Directive 
states that: “Interest or royalty payments arising in a Member State shall be exempt from any 
taxes imposed on those payments in that State, whether by deduction at source or by 
assessment, provided that the beneficial owner of the interest or royalties is a company of 
another Member State or a Permanent Establishment situated in another Member State of a 
company of a Member State”. Article 7 of the Directive states that this Directive “(…)shall 
apply only if the company which is the payer, or the company whose permanent establishment 
is treated as the payer, of interest or royalties is an associated company of the company 
which is the beneficial owner, or whose permanent establishment is treated as the beneficial 
owner, of that interest or those royalties”. The shareholding requirement to establish that 
companies are associated is defined as a 25% direct holding.419  
 
 
419 Council Directive (EU), 2003/49/EC, June 3, 2003, on a common system of taxation applicable to interest 
and royalty payments made between associated companies of different Member States. Article 3 letter b). 
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As in the case of dividend income, regarding interest and royalties, the EU began from the 
premise that interest and royalty payments should be subject to tax, economically speaking, 
only once. The formal difference in the tax treatment (dividends, exempted from tax at a 
second tier at host / source and indirect credit or exemption at home / residence versus interest 
and royalty payments exempted at host / source and taxed at home/residence) is the result of 
the traditional domestic treatment of those types of income. Although dividends are not taxed 
at a second tier at source, they are economically taxed in the form of business profits at first 
tier at source, i.e. corporate level – business profits. The Directive aims to avoid economic 
double non-taxation. Thus, in the case of dividends, despite there being juridical double non-
taxation, the income is still only taxed once. The same is intended regarding interest and 
royalties. Since both interest and royalties are deductible expenses for the payer at source, 
there is eventually only one tier of taxation at source (withholding tax) and one tier of taxation 
at residence. The Interest and Royalty Directive opted for the elimination of taxation at source 
(no withholding tax) and only leaves taxation at residence, complying with the rule of being 
economically taxed once, which in turn neither affects nor discriminates against the flow of 
taxes in the EU market.   
 
Although not comparable, the situation of two countries within the same market, with one of 
a developing and one of a developed country that do not form part of the same common 
market, the approach is absolutely valid for the purposes of this research. The Parent-
Subsidiary Directive conceives of the non-taxation at source neither at residence “double 
juridical non-taxation” as a benefit nor as a problem. Those criteria are commensurate with 
the idea of solving the lack of incentives for home / resident countries’ investors to invest in 
host / source developing countries when applying the UN MTC. Thus, according to this line 
of reasoning, the premise “harmful effect of economic double non-taxation” should be 
carefully respected.   
 
One demonstration of the premise mentioned above, as an international tax principle, came 
in December 2012 when the European Commission published an action plan on tax fraud 
and evasion, which included proposals to address the perceived loopholes in the EU Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. The aim of the European Commission was to incorporate an anti-
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avoidance rule in the Directive by excluding payments on cross-border hybrid loans from a 
tax exemption. By doing so, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive avoided the existence of 
economic double non-taxation, i.e. business profits must be subject to tax only once. Thus, 
the aim is to prevent the Directive from facilitating economic double non-taxation arising 
from hybrid loan structures, e.g. where a loan is treated as debt at source and as equity at 
residence, whereby payments on the loan are deductible in the former and exempt in the 
latter. The same objective – measures to avoid the harmful effect of economic double non-
taxation – can be found in the BEPS project, in which the EU, the OECD and the UN have 
been either directly or indirectly involved.  
 
3.1.2 TAX SPARING CLAUSES / MATCHING CREDITS  
 
Tax sparing provisions are the mechanism used by DTCs – based on the UN MTC – to 
preserve the tax incentives granted by one jurisdiction, which are normally developing or less 
developed countries. They require the other jurisdiction, which is normally the developed 
country, to grant a tax credit for the taxes that would have been paid if the incentive had not 
been granted.420 In practice, this operates as a tax exemption for the parent company in the 
home / resident country and it is based on the statutory tax rate that is in force in the host / 
source country.421 The commentaries to Article 23 of the UN MTC define tax sparing as a 
credit granted in respect of a tax that is not only actually paid but which has actually been 
forgone under the incentive legislation. Most of the DTCs concluded by developed countries, 
with the exception of the United States, with many but not all developing countries contain 
tax sparing provisions.422  
 
 
420 Brooks, Kim. Using the Tax System to Promote Investment in Low-Income Countries: An illustration of good 
intentions, bad results in Globalization and the Impact of Tax on International Investments: A Symposium in 
Honour of the Memory of the Late Alex Easson, Queen’s University, 2008.  
421 Lejour, Arjan. The foreign investment effects of tax treaties. CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy 
Analysis, 2014. 
422 Hines, James R. Jr. Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries in International Taxation 




Tax sparing provisions play their most important role in cases in which the foreign investor 
is taxed in its state of residence on the income that is earned in the source country – 
developing country – in the year that the profits were earned.423 Thus, the effectiveness of 
tax sparing rules do not solely depend on the relevant provisions, as is normally believed to 
be the case. There are certain cases in which the provisions lose their meaning, however. One 
case is when the investor carries on the business through a separately incorporated entity that 
is resident in the source country. In such a case, the investor will not be taxed in relation to 
that income by his residence country. Using the same example, but regarding dividend 
distributions, if the residence country of the investor adopts an exemption approach that does 
not tax income earned in the source country at all, then it follows that tax-sparing provisions 
will also lose their meaning.  
 
Matching credit clauses are mechanisms that look to the same objectives as tax sparing, 
which is regarded as the main type of tax sparing clauses.424 The difference between them 
depends on the level of influence of the unilateral measures that have been taken by the source 
state to be effective. On the one hand, tax sparing clauses are mechanisms that aim to increase 
foreign investment by leaving such a decision in the hands of the source country. Thereby, if 
the source country were to tax up to a determined level, the resident country, under the treaty 
or through unilateral measures, would grant a foreign tax credit for the tax. However, where 
the source state decides not to tax its non-resident up to the limit that was granted to it by the 
treaty, the residence state must respect such a decision and grant a credit equivalent to the 
maximum amount that the source state could have taxed. Therefore, these clauses only 
benefit investors if the source state unilaterally decides to reduce its taxes, which implies 
taxation below the level permitted by the treaty.425  
 
On the other hand, matching credits are mechanisms that aim to increase foreign investment 
through bilateral consensus. Thereby, if the source state decides not to tax non-residents at 
 
423 Brooks, Kim. Using the Tax System to Promote Investment in Low-Income Countries: An illustration of good 
intentions, bad results in Globalization and the Impact of Tax on International Investments: A Symposium in 
Honour of the Memory of the Late Alex Easson, Queen’s University, 2008. 
424 Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997. 
425 Schoueri, Luis Eduardo. Tax sparing: a reconsideration of the reconsideration in Tax. Law and 
Development, edited by Brauner, Yariv; and by Stewart, Miranda. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013. p. 111. 
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more than the level that is fixed between the two contracting states, the residence country 
agrees to grant a foreign tax credit that will correspond to a fixed amount, usually higher than 
the maximum taxation in the source state. Such a benefit is stated in the treaty and it will 
therefore take effect independent of the unilateral measures or decisions of the source 
country.426  
 
The UN’s recognition of tax sparing clauses as effective methods to avoid the nullification 
of developing countries incentives was not the general consensus from the outset. The UN’s 
Guidelines for Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries issued by the UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 1974 stated that the problem of tax sparing 
was one of the important issues before that group. The group abided by the recommendation 
of the Secretariat, recognizing that alternatives should be considered because not all 
developed countries considered it appropriate to grant a tax sparing credit.427  
 
The UN MTC was released in 1980 and, although it was designed to be more favourable for 
low-income countries entering into tax treaties with high-income countries, the MTC did not 
go so far as to include a provision supporting tax sparing provisions.428 It was only in the 
observations to Article 23 where it was stated that “(…) the most effective method of 
preserving the effects of the tax incentives and concessions extended by developing countries 
would be the application of a tax sparing credit”. Nowadays the UN refers to tax sparing in 
the commentaries to Article 23, describing it as the wish of states that adopted incentive 
programs.429 The statement – an effective method to avoid the nullification of developing 
countries incentives – has been examined elsewhere.430 However, there is no empirical 
 
426 Ibid, 426. 
427 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Guidelines for Tax Treaties Between 
Developed and Developing Countries, New York, 1974. 2016 version available at: 
https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/manual_btt.pdf 
428 Brooks, Kim. Using the Tax System to Promote Investment in Low-Income Countries: An illustration of good 
intentions, bad results in Globalization and the Impact of Tax on International Investments: A Symposium in 
Honour of the Memory of the Late Alex Easson, Queen’s University, 2008. 
429 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 1980. United Nations, commentary on article 23. 
430 Hines, James R. Jr. Tax Sparing and Direct Investment in Developing Countries in International Taxation 
and Multinational Activity, University of Chicago Press, 2000. P. 64. “Japanese firms are significantly more 
likely than U.S. firms to concentrate their outbound FDI, and its equity component, in countries with whom 
Japan has tax sparing agreements”. Available at: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10719.pdf  
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evidence as to whether the increased level of foreign investment created by tax incentives 
and tax sparing provides any development benefit for the host country.431  
 
The discussion of the influence of these rules on foreign investment and therefore on the 
development of developing or less developed countries has lost its strength. An interesting 
conclusion was written by professor Luis Eduardo Schoueri in his work entitled “Tax 
sparing: a reconsideration of the reconsideration”, part of the book “Tax, Law and 
Development” that was edited in 2013 by professors Yariv Brauner and Miranda Stewart. 
That article introduced the idea that these types of clauses are more related to sovereignty 
than to development, concluding that they must be seen as an element of treaty negotiations 
which aim to respect each contracting state’s tax policies and it is on this basis that their 
adoption should be encouraged. Moreover, the article also gives arguments for applying these 
mechanisms in all tax treaties, not only in treaties between developing and developed 
countries but also in treaties between developed countries. Thus, it can be understood as an 
incentive to foreign investors but with non-direct effect in the development of the source 
developing country.  
 
The rationale behind tax incentives is that they are good measures for developing countries, 
though this is only the case if the sacrifice of tax revenue is justified by the increase of foreign 
investment that would not occur without the incentive.432 The OECD stated that, regarding 
FDI, the main benefit for developing countries lies in its long-term contribution to integrating 
the host economy more closely with the world economy.433 The OECD has also recognized 
that FDI triggers technology spillovers, assists human capital formation, contributes to 
international trade integration, helps create a more competitive business environment and 
enhances enterprise development.434 
 
431 Barker, William B.  An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax Sparing, and Development: 
It Is All about Source. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol 29, 2007. Available at:                                                        
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1163&context=jil. 
432 Haugland, Kristian R. The Concept of Tax Sparing A General Analysis, and an Analysis and Assessment of 
the Various Features of Tax Sparing Provisions, Master’s Thesis headed by Professor Frederik Zimmer, 
University of Oslo, 2013. Available at: http://www.jus.uio.no/ior/english/research/projects/global-tax-
tranparency/publications/the-concept-of-tax-sparing.pdf  
433 OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development. Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs. Overview 
 2002. Available at http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf  




Therefore, even though it is difficult to argue against these clauses as effective mechanisms 
that can assist in attracting foreign development, the position of this research is that they are 
not constructed in such a way so as to achieve the real goal. These clauses ensure that tax 
incentives offered by the host country accrue to the foreign investor and not to the 
development of the host country.  
 
The fear of developing countries that have not been addressed until now is the idea that tax 
sparing or matching credits can be counterproductive and they may encourage the foreign 
investor to engage in short-term investment projects. This statement can certainly be used as 
a strong argument in favour of the theory that such an increase in foreign investment does 
not necessarily aid in the development of developing or less developed countries. Even the 
commentaries on Articles 23 A and 23 B of the OECD MTC recognize that experience has 
shown that tax sparing is susceptible to taxpayer abuse. Taxpayer abuse is a type of abuse 
that is difficult to detect, and even when it is detected it is difficult for the state of residence 
to react quickly to remedy that tax abuse.435  
 
Advocates of these clauses, as mechanisms that not only increase foreign investment but that 
also achieve an increase of development for developing or less developed countries, normally 
argue against deferral. The position of defending deferral as a better approach than tax 
sparing or matching credits, regarding their effect on development, has been traditionally 
criticized by stating that for some businesses, the fast repatriation of profits is a prerequisite 
and therefore deferral runs contrary to such a requirement. Both approaches are weak, since 
although the direct effect of deferral can be seen as re-investment and therefore, development, 









3.1.3 BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES AND DOUBLE TAX CONVENTIONS 
  
According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),436 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are: “Agreements between two countries for the 
reciprocal encouragement, promotion and protection of investments in each other's 
territories by companies based in either country”.  BITs are agreements between two 
sovereign states. From the point of view of the capital-importing country, the basic purpose 
BITs is to attract foreign investment, and, from the point of view of the capital-exporting 
country, the basic purpose of BITs is to guarantee protection to their investors.437 
 
Regarding the effects of BITs on foreign investment, there is varied, but ultimately, 
consistent literature regarding the positive effect of BITs on foreign investment. Jeswald 
Salacuse and Nicholas Sullivan, in their work entitled “Do BIT´s Really work? An Evaluation 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain”, from 2005, analyse the topic by 
evaluating the impact of BITs in relation to their intended goals: (1) foreign investment 
protection; (2) investment and market liberalization; and (3) promotion of investment. They 
conclude that BITs do have a positive effect on foreign investment inflows and that the effect 
is greater when developing countries conclude these agreements with countries that are more 
economically developed.  
 
Tim Buthe and Helen Milner achieved similar results in their work entitled “The Politics of 
Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International 
Trade Agreements?”. Their study was conducted in 2008 and it analyses the topic by focusing 
on the mechanisms that are provided in BITs and how they make commitments to foreign 
investors about the treatment of their assets, thus reassuring investors and increasing 
investment. They conclude that these international commitments are more credible than 
domestic policy choices, because reneging on them is more costly. Statistical analyses for 
 
436 Definition of UNCTAD: “Body responsible for dealing with development issues, particularly international 
trade – the main driver of development”. Available at: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/AboutUs.aspx. 
437 Sachs, Lisa E; and Sauvant, Karl P. BITs, DTTs, and FDI flows: An Overview in The Effect of Treaties on 
Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties and Investment Flows, 





122 developing countries from 1970 to 2000 support this argument. Thus, in their opinion, 
developing countries that belong to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and participate in 
more BITs experience greater foreign investment inflows than they otherwise would. By 
becoming party to international trade agreements, developing countries are able to attract 
more foreign investment and thus to increase economic growth. 
 
With that said, the UNCTAD study on the topic was less conclusive than the studies above. 
In the 2009 work entitled “The Role of International Investment Agreements in Attracting 
Foreign Direct Investment to Developing Countries”, as part of the UNCTAD Series on 
International Investment Policies for Development, UNCTAD concluded that BITs are part 
of the policy framework for foreign investment and are thus only one of many factors that 
impact on a company’s decision on where to make an investment. As a consequence, BITs 
alone can never be a sufficient policy instrument to attract FDI. Other host country 
determinants, particularly economic determinants, play a much more powerful role in this 
regard.  
 
Following the same line of reasoning, Mary Hallward-Driemeier in her work entitled “Do 
Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI?  Only a bit…and they could bite” concluded that 
BITs had an insignificant effect on FDI flows in general. However, she found that they have 
positive effects in countries which possess an already stable business environment and 
reasonably strong domestic institutions. Thus, the negative effect pertains mainly to 
investments in riskier environments.  
 
Despite some differences in the results of those studies, in all of the studies, but to different 
extents, the premise that BITs do have a positive effect on foreign investments inflows was 
confirmed.   
 
As in DTCs between developing and developed countries, BITs between developing and 
developed countries completely depart from the logic of BITs that is relied upon between 
two developed countries. DTCs between two developed countries rely on the reciprocity 
principle, i.e. reciprocal reduction of withholding tax rates by source countries, as the best 
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approach regarding the taxation of passive investment income whereas the BITs between two 
developed countries are based on the notion of reciprocity and mutual protection.438 When a 
BIT between two developed countries is in force, nationals from both countries expect to 
invest reciprocally in the territory of the other, and when a DTC between two developed 
countries is in force, residents from both countries expect to remove the obstacles that double 
taxation presents to the development of economic relations between the countries.439 In both 
types of agreements – DTCs and BITs – the above premises are not applicable to agreements 
that are concluded between developing and developed countries. Concluding and 
maintaining DTCs and BITs requires a bargain from which both parties must derive benefits. 
Thus, if those premises are not applicable – (1) nationals from both countries expect to invest 
reciprocally in the territory of the other and (2) both countries expect to remove the obstacles 
that double taxation presents to the development of economic relations between countries – 
then why would developing countries enter into such agreements?  
 
Regarding BITs, their stated purpose is to protect and promote foreign investment. Similarly, 
DTCs are intended to reduce the administrative complexities of foreign investments as well 
as to eliminate double taxation.  In the author’s understanding, in both DTCs and BITs the 
answer must be the same: the promotion of foreign investment.  The theory that is supported 
by this research, namely that the increase of valuable foreign investment is the only way to 
counterbalance the limitation of developing countries’ sovereignty when taxing passive 
investment income in a DTC between developing and developed countries, can be applied 
analogously to BITs.  In the case of BITs, the limitation of sovereignty that justifies the goal 
of the promotion of foreign investment sought by developing countries is related to how BITs 
limit the ability of these countries to take the necessary legislative and administrative actions 
to advance and protect their national interests.440    
 
The author’s intention to combine DTCs and BITs or, more accurately, to include DTC aims 
within BITs, is not an isolated and novel idea. Eric Neumayer, in his work entitled “Do 
 
438 Salacuse, Jeswald W; and Sullivan, Nicholas P. Do Bits Really Work?: An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and Their Grand Bargain. Harvard International Law Journal, Vol 46, 2005. 
439 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Introduction. 
440 Ibid, 438.  
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double taxation treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?”, 
described the joint goal of BITs and DTCs as follows:  
 
“In their aim to increase FDI inflows, developing countries have resorted to bilateral 
treaties to signal their commitment to stable, correct and often favourable treatment 
of foreign investors. By signing DTCs, developing countries provide foreign investors 
with security and stability as regards the issue of taxation in addition to the relief 
from double taxation. By signing BITs, developing countries commit to grant certain 
relative standards such as national treatment (foreign investors may not be treated 
any worse than national investors, but may be treated better and, in fact, often are) 
and most-favoured nation treatment (privileges granted to one foreign investor must 
be granted to all foreign investors). They also agree to guarantee certain absolute 
standards of treatment such as fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors in 
accordance with international standards after the investment has taken place. BITs 
typically ban discriminatory treatment against foreign investors and include 
guarantees of compensation for expropriated”.  
 
In accordance with international standards, BITs also guarantee fair and equitable treatment 
for foreign investors after the investment has been made. They typically also proscribe 
discriminatory treatment against foreign investors and include guarantees of 
compensation.441  
 
The first DTC was concluded in 1899 between Austria-Hungary and Prussia and the first 
BIT between Germany and Pakistan was only signed in 1959. This makes it difficult to 
justify the theory that DTCs are complementary agreements to BITs. However, what matters 
for the purposes of this research is that DTCs between developing and developed countries 
only started to be signed in the 1960s as a consequence of the same historic reasons that 
justified the proliferation of BITs. After the end of World War II, the lack of agreements in 
force, the increase in international trade, and the end of colonialism were key factors that 
 




determined the need for guidelines for the negotiation and conclusion of DTCs and BITs 
between developing and developed countries. Thus, considering the causes and the historic 
context of both types of agreements, the author is of the opinion that it is necessary to unveil 
the complementary role of DTCs and BITs by including the aims of BITs in DTCs between 
developing and developed countries, i.e. the UN MTC.  
 
The rationale behind the proposal is the fact that, although the development of domestic 
legislation of developed countries has taken over the main role of DTCs, that is the 
elimination of double taxation, for developing countries there has always been an underlying 
and main aim when signing a DTC with a developed country, which is to increase foreign 
investment. Thus, although that aim is not explicitly recognized in the literature, the UN 
MTC – being a Model that aims to govern DTCs between developing and developed 
countries – must be able to achieve that goal.  
 
In practice, DTCs and BITs are normally part of broader economic reform packages in 
developing countries. Although they are included in packages alongside free trade 
agreements or reforms in domestic legislation, it is clear that, at least regarding DTCs, their 
rules neither reduce the administrative complexities of foreign investments nor confront 
double taxation in a more efficient manner than that provided for in domestic legislation.  
 
3.1.4 LATEST DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The 2017 update to the OECD MTC is a consequence of the measures approved by the final 
BEPS Reports.442 On 11 July 2017, the OECD released the draft content. Working Party Nº1 
of the Committee on Fiscal Affairs constantly reviewed and updated the MTC to address new 
issues in relation to DTCs. The last update to the MTC came in 2014. The changes address 
the recommendations that were contained in the final report in Action 2 “Neutralising the 
Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements”, Action 6 “Preventing the Granting of Treaty 
Benefits in Inappropriate Circumstances”, Action 7 “Preventing the Artificial Avoidance of 
 




Permanent Establishment Status”, and Action 14 “Making Dispute Resolution Procedures 
More Effective”. 
 
On 7 June 2017, the “Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to 
Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (MLI) was signed.443 That instrument, as well as 
the BEPS Project, demonstrated the OECD’s lack of intention to change the criteria used in 
its MTC for the purposes of allocating taxing rights. The erosion of the tax base of developing 
countries will continue, and certainly not because of taxpayer abuse but as a direct 
consequence of the status quo of the UN regarding the way in which DTCs between 
developing and developed allocate taxing rights.  
 
In the context of this research, it is worth mentioning the proposal stated in the final report 
of Action 6 444 regarding dividend income taxation at source and the requirement to benefit 
from the reduced withholding tax. That proposal, regulated by Article 8 of the MLI,445 instead 
of allocating taxing rights to whomever it corresponds, insisted on reinforcing source 
countries’ taxing rights by protecting them through a minimum holding period rule. The rule 
recommended by Action 6 to be included in subparagraph a) of Article 10(2) of the OECD 
MTC reads as follows: 
 
“a) 5 per cent of the gross amount of dividends if the beneficial owner is a company 
(other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 25 per cent of the capital of 
the company paying the dividends throughout a 365 day period that includes the day 
of the payment of the dividends (for the purpose of computing that period, no account 
shall be taken of changes of ownership that would directly result from a corporate 
reorganisation, such a merger or divisive reorganisation, of the company that holds 
the shares or that pays the dividends”.  
 
443 OECD BEPS Project: Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent BEPS, 
2016. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-
measures-to-prevent-beps.htm  
444 OECD BEPS Project: Final Report Action 6:  Preventing the Granting of Treaty Benefits in Inappropriate 






The MLI provision states that:  
 
“Provisions of a Covered Tax Agreement that exempt dividends paid by a company 
which is a resident of a Contracting Jurisdiction from tax or that limit the rate at 
which such dividends may be taxed, provided that the beneficial owner or the 
recipient is a company which is a resident of the other Contracting Jurisdiction and 
which owns, holds or controls more than a certain amount of the capital, shares, 
stock, voting power, voting rights or similar ownership interests of the company 
paying the dividends, shall apply only if the ownership conditions described in those 
provisions are met throughout a 365 day period that includes the day of the payment 
of the dividends (for the purpose of computing that period, no account shall be taken 
of changes of ownership that would directly result from a corporate reorganisation, 
such as a merger or divisive reorganisation, of the company that holds the shares or 
that pays the dividends)”. 
 
The UN followed the OECD approach in this respect. As was stated in the report on proposed 
BEPS-related changes to the UN MTC that was issued by Carmel Peters,446 the Committee 
of Fiscal Affairs considered that in order to prevent abuse of the lower withholding rate for 
direct investment dividends, a 365-day holding period should be inserted into subparagraph 
(a) of Article 10 of the UN MTC. This 365-day holding requirement may be met either at the 
time of the payment of the dividend or after the dividend is paid.447 Furthermore, and by 
increasing the right of the source country to tax, it was agreed to increase the threshold for 
the reduced dividend withholding tax from 10% to 25%.448  The proposed amendment to 
paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the UN MTC reads as follows:  
 
 
446 United Nations BEPS Project: Proposed BEPS-related Changes to the United Nations Model Double 
Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries. Report by Coordinator Carmel Peters. 
Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Twelfth Session, 2016. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP10_-beps.pdf  
447 Ibid, 447.  
448 Ibid, 447. 
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“2. However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which the 
company paying the dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that State, 
but if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the other Contracting State, 
the tax so charged shall not exceed:  
 
(a) ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a 
company (other than a partnership) which holds directly at least 25 per cent 
of the capital of the company paying the dividends throughout a 365 day 
period that includes the day of the  payment of the dividend (for the purpose 
of computing that period, no account shall be taken of changes of ownership 
that would directly result from a corporate reorganisation, such as a merger 
or divisive reorganisation, of the company that holds the shares or that pays 
the dividend);  
(b) ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral 
negotiations) of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.  
 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle 
the mode of application of these limitations.  
This paragraph shall not affect the taxation of the company in respect of the profits 
out of which the dividends are paid”. 
 
The statement above confirms something that is already known, that is, that the BEPS project 
is a mere continuation of historic tax policies regarding the allocation of taxing rights in 
DTCs. The 2014 Report on “Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax 
Treaties”, 449 had the only purpose of eliminating potential opportunities for double non-
taxation or less than single taxation, and for profit shifting by multinational enterprises, that 
could arise or even be facilitated by the current tax treaty system.450 
 
449 OECD BEPS Project: Final Report Action 15: Developing a Multilateral Instrument to Modify Bilateral Tax 
Treaties, 2015. Available at: https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/taxation/developing-a-multilateral-instrument-to-
modify-bilateral-tax-treaties-action-15-2015-final-report_9789264241688-en#page1  
450 Silberztein, Caroline; and Tristram, Jean-Baptiste. OECD: Multilateral Instrument to Implement BEPS. 




Finally, and probably one the most bespoke changes to the UN MTC by developing countries 
was the inclusion of a specific article dealing with the taxation of services. By extracting fees 
from technical services from Article 7 (combined with Article 5) and in some cases, from 
Article 12, the UN MTC managed to solve some practical problems in relation to the matter. 
Notwithstanding the fact that income from technical services is without doubt active income, 
it is unavoidable to refer to this relevant modification in the UN MTC. The inclusion of the 
new Article 12A of the UN MTC is clearly related to the topics that have been criticized by 
this research, i.e., the effort of source countries on increasing their taxing rights instead of 
focusing on the elimination of barriers to facilitate cross-border trade and investment.  
 
Before the introduction of Article 12A of the UN MTC, the rules governing the allocation of 
taxing rights gave limited scope to source countries to tax the income generated from those 
services in particular without a fixed base or permanent establishment in the country of 
source.451 The problem was partially solved, in practice, by some countries by endowing a 
broad interpretation of the expression “information concerning industrial, commercial or 
scientific experience” that is contained in Article 12 of the UN MTC and by including certain 
technical services within its scope.  
 
What is expected in practice is to solve the problems that are generated by mixed contracts 
whereby an enterprise may provide services and the right to use property or know-how to a 
customer. Until now, and in accordance with paragraph 12 of the Commentary on Article 12 
of the UN MTC (quoting paragraph 11.6 of the Commentary on Article 12 of the OECD 
MTC), the payments under the contract must be disaggregated into separate elements of 
payments for services and royalties, unless one element is merely ancillary and largely 





451 United Nations BEPS Project: Taxation of Services. Report by Coordinator Liselott Kana. Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Seventh Session, 2016. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP1_Services.pdf  
452 Ibid, 452.   
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under the new Article 12A of the UN MTC and for royalties in Article 12, may help to 
alleviate difficulties in this regard, and it may be useful for developing countries that possess 
scarce administrative resources and allow them to reduce potential conflicts as a result of the 
application of the article.453   
 
The ultimate development was the Principal Purpose Test, hereinafter: PPT, which is 
contained in the commentaries to paragraph 9 of Article 29 of the UN MTC. The PPT will 
be overridden by the proposals that are contained in this research. The aforementioned test 
requires the following two elements to be present for certain transactions or arrangements in 
order for them to constitute an abuse of the provisions of a DTC: (1) the main purpose for 
entering into these transactions or arrangements was to secure a more favourable tax 
position and (2) obtaining that more favourable treatment would be contrary to the object 
and purpose of the relevant provisions. 
 
As known, this test is focused on the intention of the investor in a context where the objective 
and purpose of the provisions of the UN MTC are mainly restricted to the elimination of 
juridical double taxation. The drastic change regarding the objectives and purposes of the 
UN MTC proposed by this research requires a change in how anti-abuse rules in DTCs are 
constructed. As the real benefit of these proposals is the granting of only one tier of taxation 
in only one of the two contracting states for income that is derived from equity, debt financing 
and the licensing of goods, rights, or property (GRP) that generate royalty income, the focus 
of DTC anti-abuse rules should not be centred on the intention to obtain a tax benefit, but 
instead should focus on the conditions that are needed to grant those benefits at source. As 
will be proposed, the main condition for the treatment of equity, debt financing and the 
licensing of GRP that generate royalty income must be economically beneficial for 
developing countries. The emphasis is on the impact of the investments or transactions on 
the source/developing country. The aim is to make the UN MTC a cross-border agreement 
capable of aiding developing countries in their development journey. Thus, and due to the 
necessity of granting legal certainty to investors who reside in developed countries, the author 
defends that it is necessary to apply the substantive tests that are found in the proposals, 
 
453 Ibid, 452.  
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instead of relying on a PPT, i.e. a substantive-economic test regarding the impact of all those 
investments or transactions, as well as an alternative temporary test in the case of equity, an 
arm’s length test and an agreement nature test in the case of debts financing, and finally, an 
arm’s length test in the case of GRP that generate royalty income.  
 
Leaving the granting of benefits of a DTC between developing and developed countries to a 
PPT would be incompatible with the author’s approach. The purpose of the PPT rule is to 
tackle DTC abuse by preventing taxpayers from claiming treaty benefits in abusive 
circumstances. The purpose of the author’s proposal is to provide treaty benefits to beneficial 
investments or to those beneficial transactions that are made from developed to developing 
countries. What then can be considered as “DTC abuse” under the author’s proposal? If the 
main objective is to help developing countries on their road to development by eliminating 
cross-border tax barriers, it seems whether the investor is entering into the transaction or 
arrangement in order to secure a more favourable tax position is not relevant. That is exactly 
what these proposals grant to investor residents in developed countries, i.e. if they invest in 
developing countries and those investments or transactions are considered by the source 
country to be economically beneficial to them, those investors will benefit from preferential 
tax treatments. Thus, it is absolutely right and compatible with the purposes of the new 
provisions to be proposed if foreign investors, lenders, and owners of GRP that generate 
royalty income enter into these investments or transactions in order to secure a more 
favourable tax position.  
 
In the context of the author’s proposals, and assuming that the conditions for benefitting from 
the DTC between the developing and the developed country are fulfilled, the source 
developing country’s treatment of dividends, interest and royalty income will be similar, i.e. 
exemption at source plus taxation of business income that derives from those investments or 
transactions. Royalties and interest will be considered as legitimate tax expenses that are 
deductible as business expenses in the source developing country. By way of contrast, the 
tax treatment of dividends, interest and royalty income in the country of residence will differ. 
In the case of royalties and interest, both incomes will be fully taxed by that country. 
Dividends will be exempt not only at the corporate level but also at the personal income tax 
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level. By so doing, passive investment income, i.e. income derived from equity, debt 
financing and the licensing of GRP that generate royalty income, will only be effectively 
taxed once.  
 
Even though it could be argued, according to the same logic, that it is also not relevant for 
the source developing country whether the investor in the case of equity, the lender in case 
of debt financing and the owner of the GRPs that generate royalty income, effectively resides 
in the other contracting state; the author instead stresses the importance of respecting the 
principle that the benefits of the DTC will be only granted to the beneficial owner’s residence 
in one of the two contracting states. This is essential in order to protect the tax base of the 
residence country. The country of residence will have exclusive taxing rights to tax royalties 
and interest under the scope of this proposal. However, it is undeniable the effort that 
residence countries will undertake by renouncing their right to tax all types of dividends not 
only at the corporate income tax level but also at the personal income tax level. Under that 
scenario, the risk of treaty shopping by residents of countries that do not have a DTC with 
the targeted developing countries is high.  
 
According to this proposal, the tax treatment of foreign investor residents in developed 
countries with which the developing country has a DTC in force would be much more 
beneficial than the tax treatment of foreign investors that are resident in developed countries 
with which the developing country does not have a DTC in force. Although it seems to be an 
obvious result of the conclusion of a DTC, it is not. As an example, this would not be the 
case under the current treatment of income that is derived from passive investment income 
under the UN MTC. Hence, the concept of the beneficial owner will continue to remain of 
great importance for countries of residence. The sacrifice in revenue made by developed 
countries must not cover investments or transactions made by non-residents.  Lastly, it is also 
essential to respect the sovereignty of developed countries that have decided not to conclude 




Treaty shopping refers to the use of a DTC, by persons who might not ordinarily come within 
its scope, in order to avoid paying taxes.454 The objective has always been linked to the 
reduction of source taxation regarding passive investment income or business income that is 
not connected to a permanent establishment. According to this proposal, that benefit will only 
be granted if the equity, debt financing and licensing of GRP that generate royalty income 
are economically beneficial to that developing country. Residence countries can deny the 
exemption of dividends if the beneficial owners do not effectively reside in their countries. 
However, the problem arises in the case of interest income that is derived from beneficial 
debt financing provided by lenders, and royalty income derived from beneficial GRP owned 
by licensors, when it does not fulfil the criteria of the country of residence to be considered 
as a resident of that country. In these two cases, those incomes will be exempted at source 
and taxed by the country of residency. Neither the host / source developing country nor the 
residence / developed country will have an interest in denying the benefits to these types of 
investments / transactions. 
 
The beneficial owner concept is a common law trust concept that has no equivalent in civil 
law countries.455 Neither the UN MTC nor the OECD MTC actually define what is meant by 
the concept. There is only an attempt to describe its characteristics. In the commentaries to 
both MTCs,456 457 it is recognized that source countries, i.e. countries that waive the taxation 
of passive investment income, are not obliged to give up taxing rights merely because that 
income is immediately received by a resident of a country with which the source country has 
concluded a DTC. Moreover, both commentaries expressly state that the term beneficial 
owner is not used in the MTCs in a narrow technical sense and therefore it must be understood 
in the context and in the light of the object and purpose of the DTC, that is, amongst other 
things, the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion and 
 
454 Krishna, Vern. Treaty Shopping and the Concept of Beneficial Ownership in Double Tax Treaties. Canadian 
Current Tax, Vol 19, 2009. 
455 Ibid, 455.  
456 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Article 12 paragraphs 1 and 2.  




avoidance.458 459 Thus, notwithstanding that the UN and the OECD have not advocated treaty 
shopping, they never assumed to express that principle in the models by defining and 
determining the scope of the term “beneficial owner”. 
 
The decision adopted in the Prevost case is very important in this regard.460 The issue was 
whether a Dutch holding B.V (Prevost Holding B.V.) was the beneficial owner of dividends 
that were paid for by the Canadian company Prévost Car. The shareholders of Prevost 
Holding B.V. were the Swedish company Volvo Bussar A.B and the British company Henlys 
Group PLC. The Canadian Minister of National Revenue issued assessments under Part XIII 
of the Canadian Income Tax Act on the basis that the beneficial owners of the dividends were 
the corporate shareholders of the Prevost Holding B.V., instead of Prevost Holding B.V. 
itself.  
 
The court held that Prevost Holding B.V. was the beneficial owner of the dividends from 
Prévost. In the court’s view the “beneficial owner” of dividends is:  
 
“The person who receives the dividends for his or her own use and enjoyment and 
assumes the risk and control of the dividend he or she received. The person who is 
beneficial owner of the dividend is the person who enjoys and assumes all the 
attributes of ownership. In short the dividend is for the owner’s own benefit and this 
person is not accountable to anyone for how he or she deals with the dividend 
income”.461   
 




458 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Article 12 paragraphs 1 and 2.  
459 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Commentary on Article 12 paragraphs 1 and 
2. 
460 Baas, Nicolas. Prevost Car Inc. v. The Queen, Moodys Gartner Tax Law LLP, 2009. Available at: 
https://www.moodysgartner.com/prevost-car-inc-v-the-queen/ 
461 Ibid, 461. 
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The main argument of the court was that a holding company would not necessarily be treated 
as the beneficial owner of the income received by another company unless the company is a 
conduit with absolutely no discretion as to the use or application of that income. Therefore, 
and since in the case described  the dividends received by Prevost Holding B.V. were from 
that company and it could do what it wanted with that income until the director’s decision as 
to the distribution of dividends, the company was not regarded as a mere conduit company.  
 
An interesting evolution of the principles governing the concept has arisen in Germany. On 
4 April 2018 the German Ministry of Finance (MOF) issued an official guidance regarding 
the German anti-treaty shopping rule. The guidance was a response to the European Court of 
Justice decision in the joint cases of Deister Holding C-507/16 and Juhler Holding C-613/16. 
Although the decision concerns a former version of section 50d(3) of the German Income 
Tax Act which was applicable until 2011, significant conclusions were drawn for the current 
version of the law.462 
 
According to the MOF guidance, holding companies engaged in mere asset managing 
activities can claim dividend withholding tax relief under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. 
Until that guidance, withholding tax levied on dividends distributed by a German subsidiary 
to an intermediary parent company were not refunded by the German tax authorities since 
the governing law only allows treaty and parent subsidiary benefits for a foreign intermediary 
if the foreign intermediary derives income from performing its own economic activities, or 
if there are substantive economic reasons for interposing the entity mentioned above, i.e. the 
business purpose test; or the entity engages in business activity having sufficient resources, 
i.e. substance test.  
 
Until this latest discussion, all anti-treaty shopping rules use a strict concept of beneficial 
owner for the purposes of given or denied treaty benefits.  This new German approach has 
 
462EY Global Tax Alert, German Federal Ministry of Finance reacts to CJEU decision regarding German 







incorporated the discussion of the concept of  “Ultimately genuine self-business activities”. 
According to the guidance, mere passive asset management activities, i.e. holding company 
activities, should qualify as genuine business activities provided that the company exercises 
its shareholder rights.463 The relief could be claimed even in cases where no management 
functions are exercised. Thus, the German MOF states that in the case of passive asset 
management activities, Germany will consider the holding company as the beneficial owner 
for treaty purposes even though that company does not employ management and other 
personnel at all times in its country of residence.  
 
This proposal considers that the concept “beneficial owner” should be present in the UN 
MTC regarding dividend income in order to test if the benefits must be granted. In the case 
of interest and of royalties, where it is less likely there will be any interest from the two 
countries in tackling the transactions, the recommendation is to also include the concept in 
order to respect the sovereignty of the countries from where the investors are effectively 


















PART IV. DIVIDENDS: TESTS, NEW PROPOSAL, DIVIDEND TAXATION and the UN 
MODEL  
 
4.1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND 
FOREIGN PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT  
 
 
DTCs differentiate between FDI464 and FPI.465 The argument behind this tax policy is that 
when the foreign shareholder is a parent corporation that owns a significant portion of the 
stock of the dividend-paying subsidiary corporation, the combination of the corporation tax 
on the subsidiary and the dividend source withholding tax may exceed the tax payable by the 
parent corporation on the same amount of income from operations within the country of its 
residence. Thus, in order to avoid any obstacles to the international flow of capital, DTCs 
distinguish between FDI and FPI. Although it cannot be considered as discrimination since  
a full credit will be granted in any case regarding FPI, both types of dividends are in fact 
taxed differently.  
 
 
464 UNCTAD: Comprehensive Study of the Interrelationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), 1998. Available at: 
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/pogdsdfsbd5.pdf According to the document, FDI is “the category of international 
investment in which a resident entity in one country obtains a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another 
country. A lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the management of the enterprise. The criteria 
used to distinguish direct investment from other types of investment is that ‘a direct investment is established 
when a resident in one economy owns 10 percent or more of the ordinary shares or voting power, for an 
incorporated enterprise, or the equivalent, for an unincorporated enterprise’. All subsequent transactions 
between affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated, are also classified as direct investment 
transactions. Direct investment is divided into equity capital, reinvested earnings, and other capital.”  
465 Ibid, 462. According to the document, FPI “includes investments by a resident entity in one country in the 
equity and debt securities of an enterprise resident in another country which seek primarily capital gains and 
do not necessarily reflect a significant and lasting interest in the enterprise. The category includes investments 
in bonds, notes, money market instruments and financial derivatives other than those included under direct 
investment, or in other words, investments which are both below the ten per cent rule and do not involve 
affiliated enterprises. In addition to securities issued by enterprises, foreigners can also purchase sovereign 
bonds issued by governments. According to the IMF’s 1996 Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey Guide 




When re-thinking the taxation of dividend income within the context of the UN MTC, it is 
necessary to analyse if the ongoing principles governing the taxation of that income in the 
UN MTC are appropriate. Thus, under the line of research of this work, the analysis of 
taxation of FDI and FPI must be carried out by taking the impact of both types of equity 
investments in host/source/developing countries into consideration. There is consistent 
economic and financial literature that supports the theory that both FDI and FPI can promote 
sustainable growth in developing economies. FDI and FPI provide economic benefits and 
together they can enhance those benefits.  
 
FDI is primarily motivated by the long-term realization of returns from a company in a 
foreign country. It involves the establishment of an entity – a subsidiary –  by the parent 
company. The foreign investor can usually influence the management of the business and 
take part in the strategic decision-making process of the business.466 FPI, on the other hand, 
is essentially focused on the creation of short-term benefits in the host country.467   
 
Kimberly Evans, in her work entitled “Foreign Portfolio and Direct Investment, 
Complementary, Differences, and Integration”,468 a contribution to the discussion in the 
OECD Global Forum on International Investment held in Shanghai in December 2002, 
concluded that characterizing FPI as “bad” and FDI as “good” essentially oversimplifies a 
much more complex situation. Both bring risks and both require their own separate 
approaches to policy. If one takes the word “foreign” out of foreign portfolio or direct 
investment, most policymakers would acknowledge that domestic portfolio and direct 
investment are both necessary for promoting healthy economic growth and development. 
Thus, put “foreign” back in and one effectively increases the quantity and diversity of 
investments to an even greater effect. Both FPI and FDI can bring powerful benefits to the 
economy, and together the benefits are increased.  
 
 
466 Chaudhuri, Sarbajit and Mukhopadhyay, Ujjaini. Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries. A 
Theoretical Evaluation, India, Springer 2014. p. 301. 
467 Ibid, 467.  
468 OECD, Global Forum on International Investment. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment for Development, 
2002. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/2764407.pdf  
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Masaya Sakuragawa and Yoshitsugu Watanabe, in their research entitled “Foreign Direct 
and Portfolio Investments in the World”469 concluded that, by considering the importance of 
both types of investments, emerging economies need FDI or FPI depending on the 
development of their financial markets.470 Thus, they indicated that, as the financial market 
develops beyond a certain threshold, countries are able to attract FDI inflows. If financial 
market development exceeds a certain threshold, equity portfolio investment then begins to 
flow in. They suggest that financial development contributes to economic growth by 
attracting capital flows in different ways, according to the degree of development, and 
accordingly they advise that domestic financial market development be prudent in relation to 
lifting capital control and promoting the consolidation of the various financial infrastructures 
in order to attract FDI and spur economic growth. After the degree of financial market 
development exceeds a certain threshold, a country with a sophisticated domestic financial 
market development should lift capital control in a positive manner in order to attract FPI 
and therefore continue to bring about economic growth. 
 
FPI increases liquidity471 and it also helps the efficiency of markets, resulting in a deeper and 
broader market. It also brings discipline, know-how into host markets472 and the promotion 
of the development of equity markets and it thus enables the shareholders’ voices to be heard 
in corporate governance mechanisms.473 474 Thus, FPI is a determining factor in assessing the 
strength of domestic capital markets and it improves their functionality, which leads to a 
proper allocation of capital and resources and thus to a healthier economy.475   
 
 
469 Sakuragawa, Masaya; and Watanabe, Yoshitsugu. Foreign Direct Investment and Portfolio Investments in 
the World, Keio University, 2009. Available at: https://www1.gsec.keio.ac.jp/upload/freepage/file/S-1-10.pdf 
470 Reisen, Helmut; and Soto, Marcelo. Which Types of capital Inflows Foster Developing-Country Growth?. 
International Finance, Vol 4, 2001. 
471 Levine, Ross; and Zervos, Sara. Stock Markets, Banks, and Economy Growth. The American Economic 
Review, Vol 88, 1998. 
472 Evans, Kimberly. Foreign Portfolio and Direct Investment. Complementary, Differences, and Integration. 
OECD, Global Forum on International Investment. Attracting Foreign Direct Investment for Development, 
Shanghai, 2002. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/2764407.pdf.    
473 Feldman, Robert A.; and Kumar, Manmohan S. Emerging Equity Markets: Growth, Benefits, and Policy 
Concerns. The World Bank Research Observer, Vol 10, 1995.   
474 Ibid, 473.    
475 Ibid, 473.   
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FDI helps to strengthen economic potential,476 e.g. by adding new and different economic 
activities and consequently by diversifying the economy. It also promotes competition by 
spurring other competitors to increase their own efficiency and productivity.477 Another 
direct effect is the development of human capital. Foreign investors bring their management 
skills and technology to their enterprises.478  
 
The secretariat of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
issued a report in 1999 entitled “Comprehensive Study of the Interrelationship between 
Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment”,479 which acknowledged the 
positive effects of both types of investments in host economies. The UNCTAD stated that 
FDI and FPI, as components of capital flows, may contribute to financial growth. The Report 
stated that the contribution of FDI in the context of development is directly due to the fact 
that transnational corporations establish subsidiaries that can directly increase the level of 
investment in host countries and as a consequence, augment their productive capacity and 
employment. Although this is not always the case, the UNCTAD has also concluded that FDI 
brings ancillary services by transferring technology, management expertise and marketing 
skills. Regarding FPI, the Report concluded that it aids in the development process by 
providing liquidity in domestic capital markets. Increased corporate governance as well as 
increased transparency and disclosure will be required from companies with foreign investors 
and an increase of the amount of risk capital available for new enterprises.    
 
The potential relevance of both types of investments for developing countries is undeniable. 
Thus, there should not be any differences regarding their tax treatment. For this research, FDI 
and FPI can be differentiated not only between them but also within them, as beneficial or 
non-beneficial foreign investments for host / developing countries. Consequently, and only 
according to that segmentation, this research proposes a different tax treatment in this respect.  
 
 
476 OECD, Foreign Direct Investment for Development. Maximising Benefits, Minimising Costs. Overview, 
2002. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/investment/investmentfordevelopment/1959815.pdf 
477 Ibid, 473. 
478 Ibid, 473.  
479 UNCTAD: Comprehensive Study of the Interrelationship between Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 
Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI), 1998. Available at: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/pogdsdfsbd5.pdf 
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Besides what has been mentioned above, the justification already mentioned for the 
differentiation between FDI and FPI made by the UN MTC and by the OECD MTC, i.e. that 
the actual differentiation can be justified by arguing that the two tiers of taxation at source 
may exceed the tax payable by the parent corporation on the same amount of income from 
operations within the country of its residence, loses all of its substance under the rules that 
will be proposed in this research. Briefly stated, the proposal regarding the taxation of 
dividend income consists of, once certain conditions have been fulfilled, the elimination of 
withholding taxes at the host / source country for both types of equity investments, alongside  
the elimination of economic double taxation by exempting dividends from tax, not only at 
the corporate income tax level, when the shareholder that receives the dividends is a legal 
entity, but also at the personal income tax level of the individual and ultimate beneficial 
owner. The exemption will be granted not only for individuals who invest directly, but also 
for individuals’ final shareholders of the legal entity that received the exempted dividends. 
 
Thus, if a parent company faces a higher tax burden when receiving dividends from the host 
subsidiary due to the fact that the corporate income tax at the subsidiary level is higher than 
that of the country of its residence, it should not be problematic since it is evident that FDI 
that is only made because of low tax conditions is risky for developing countries. In other 
words, it should not be considered as a loss of beneficial foreign investment of the country 
that doesn’t succeed because the corporate income tax of the source country is considered to 
be high. Notwithstanding the aforementioned remarks, it will always be a sovereign option 
of the developing country to limit the rate of corporate income tax to a worldwide accepted 
rate, in order for it to incentivize foreign investment. 
 
Also, no double taxation arises, either juridical or economic, by granting only one tier of 
taxation at source – business profits / corporate income tax – for the taxation of dividend 
income in DTCs between developing and developed countries, and no taxation at the 
residence country level. 
 
If there is a different tax treatment that aims to incentivize foreign equity investment in 
developing countries, it does not have to be done by treating FDI and FPI differently; it has 
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to be done, according to this research, by differentiating between beneficial and non-
beneficial foreign investment. 
 
4.2 PRIMARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GENERATING DIVIDENDS  
 
The first task that must be undertaken before designing the proposal for dividend taxation in 
a DTC between developing and developed countries is to ascertain where the economic 
activity that generates this income is located. By doing this, this research aims to state the 
rights that will be renounced by developing and by developed countries when subscribing to 
a DTC that considers the parameters that are laid down in this proposal. 
 
To determine where the economic activity that generates dividends takes place, it is necessary 
to look into the origin of dividends. The origin of the dividends is where the profits have been 
produced from which the dividends derive.480 As Eric Kemmeren stated, if the company 
carries on its enterprise in its state of residence, the state of origin and the state of residence 
of the company will coincide.481 In the analysis of the problem, this research will use the 
basic case of dividend income, i.e. the situation in which the foreign shareholder is an 
individual and the situation in which the foreign shareholder is a legal entity. In both cases, 
the ultimate individual beneficial owner and the shareholder reside in the other contracting 
state. Following the same line of reasoning, in both situations it is assumed that the country 
of residence of the payer company is the country in which the profits of that company have 
been produced. Further complexities can exist, as is the case when the ultimate individual 
beneficial owner resides in a third country or when the profits of the company have not been 
produced in the country in which the payer company is incorporated. Those cases will not be 
considered any further in this research since the aim of this research is to propose a new core 
principle regarding the taxation of dividend income in DTCs between developing and 
developed countries, and for that it is better to focus on that main rule. Those cases will be 
left for further research work on this topic. 
 
480 Kemmeren, Eric C.C.M. Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models, The Netherlands, 
Pijnenburg, 2001.  




Eric Kemmeren argues that the origin of the dividends is exclusively in the host / source / 
origin country.482 This research, which deviates from Kemmeren’s conclusion in this regard, 
states that it is also possible to find an economic nexus or link between the dividends and the 
country where the shareholder (the individual or legal entity) resides.   
 
Although it was already explained why this research will not treat FDI and FPI in DTCs 
between developing and developed countries in different ways, it is undeniable that both 
incomes can differ in relation to their origin. The analysis of the place where the economic 
activity that generates dividends takes place differs by analysing dividends according to that 
differentiation.  
 
Dividends that derive from business investments – FDI – are understood as dividends that 
are derived from cross-border equity finance initiatives where the investor –  an individual 
or a legal entity –  maintains a certain degree of control over the company that is being equity 
financed. Dividends derived from capital investments – FPI – are understood as dividends 
derived from cross-border equity finance initiatives where the investor –  an individual or a 
legal entity –  has no degree of control over the company that is being equity financed.   
 
For the purposes of this research, the factor of control or involvement is a key determinant 
for evaluating the degree of influence of the investor over the financed company, and 
consequently, for determining the link between the country from which the investor is 
performing its activity and the income generated as a result of that activity. In this line of 
reasoning, the investor’s decision to participate, in an influential way, in the economic life of 
the host country consequently creates a strong link between the dividends and the country 
where the investor resides, making it difficult to define those dividends as purely passive 
income. It is important to clarify that the influence referred to does not mean influence over 
the ownership structure on the board’s functions and strategic decision-making; it simply 
refers to the influence of the investor in the future of the company by deciding to invest in 
that company and, of course, by being allowed to appoint a substantial portion of the board 
 
482 Ibid, 481.  
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of that company. The resources to be invested and the decision to invest those resources in a 
controlled company are performed in the country where the investor resides. Thus, even 
though the country in which the profits of the dividend payer company have been produced 
– in this research it is assumed to be the host / source / origin country – corresponds to the 
country where the act of the payment of the dividends and the decision of the board of the 
host company to distribute the dividends is carried out, it is also possible to find, in this case, 
substantive activities related to the origin of the dividends in the home / residence country. 
In conclusion, regarding dividends derived from business investments – FDI – not only is 
there an economic link to the host / source country but also a link to the home / residence 
country. The influence of the investor in the process that leads to the generation of profits is 
an important activity and therefore it is regarded as a determining factor in this analysis.     
 
This link is difficult to locate when it concerns dividends derived from capital investments – 
FPI – especially where there is no substantial activity executed by the investor. It is possible 
to conclude that dividends derived from cross-border equity finance – where the investor, 
whether an individual or a company, does not maintain any degree of control over the 
financed company – are purely passive dividends. Although they are purely passive 
dividends, and thus according to the current international consensus they represent income 
that should be taxed by the country where the investor resides, the fact that there is no clear 
primary economic activity in that country which can influence the income-generating process 
makes the current rule an uncaused rule. If the economic activity which generates the income 
is not carried out in the country where the investor resides, then it has to be, in the cases 
analysed in this research, in the host country. This conclusion is consistent with Kemmeren’s 
thesis – what is known as the ‘origin theory’.  
 
Although dividends are an exclusive and independent type of income, it is necessary to stress 
the inevitable link between dividends and business profits. Ignoring this link would lead us 
to lose the context when thinking about a fair distribution of benefits in a DTC between a 
developing and a developed country. The UN MTC has defined dividends as “income from 
shares, ‘jouissance’ shares or ‘jouissance’ rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or other 
rights, not being debt claims, participating in profits, as well as income from other corporate 
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rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from shares by the laws 
of the State of which the company making the distribution is a resident”. The definition of 
dividends concerns the distributions of business profits by any corporate body or any entity 
that is treated as a corporate body483 for tax purposes.  
 
Regarding the origin of the income, it is possible to identify differences between business 
profits and dividends. The activity that gives rise to business profits is, without doubt, located 
in the country where the business is operative, and the activity that gives rise to dividends 
can be correlated to the activity that generates business profits, or not as the case may be. 
 
According to the logic of this research, dividends for which their origin exclusively belongs 
to the host / source country (FPI), the preliminary rights in relation to the taxation of those 
dividends should correspond to the host / source country. In this context, it is advisable to 
analyse this idea by taking the fact that business profits are already taxed by the host / source 
/ developing country at the corporate level into consideration.  In order to do so, an MTC 
between developed and developing countries must ensure that the income will not be taxed 
again, i.e. it should provide for the elimination of economic double taxation.  
 
According to the same logic, dividends whose origin can be attributed to both contracting 
states (FDI), the preliminary rights to tax should correspond not only to the host / source 
country but also to the home / resident country. As in the case of dividends derived from FPI, 
it is advisable to analyse these rights within a more extensive context. Firstly, considering 
that business profits are already taxed by the host / source / developing country at the 
corporate level and, secondly, by considering that in practice most home / resident / 
developed countries, by applying a CIN approach, exempt dividends derived from FDI at the 
corporate level. The country where the legal entity that received the exempted dividends, and 
where their final beneficial owners –  individual shareholders –  reside, normally maintain 
taxation rights at the individual shareholder level.  
 
 
483 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Article 3 paragraph 1 subparagraph b).  
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4.3 DEPARTURE FROM THE UN MODEL APPROACH 
 
The different treatment of FDI and FPI has been applied in different ways by the UN MTC, 
in the article that governs the taxation of dividends. Paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the UN MTC 
states that:  
“2.  However, such dividends may also be taxed in the Contracting State of which the 
company paying the dividends is a resident and according to the laws of that State, 
but if the beneficial owner of the dividends is a resident of the other Contracting State, 
the tax so charged shall not exceed: 
 
(a) ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral negotiations) 
of the gross amount of the dividends if the beneficial owner is a company (other than 
a partnership) which holds directly at least 25 per cent of the capital of the company 
paying the dividends throughout a 365 day period that includes the day of the payment 
of the dividend (for the purpose of computing that period, no account shall be taken 
of changes of ownership that would directly result from a corporate reorganization, 
such a as a merger or divisive reorganization, of the company that holds the shares 
or that pays the dividends).  
 
(b) ___ per cent (the percentage is to be established through bilateral negotiations) 
of the gross amount of the dividends in all other cases.  
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle 
the mode of application of these limitations.  
This paragraph shall not affect the taxation of the company in respect of the profits 
out of which the dividends are paid”. 
 
 
This paragraph restricts the host / source taxation of dividend income to a percentage that is 
to be agreed in bilateral negotiations regarding FDI in letter a), and FPI in letter b). In line 
with the rationale underpinning this research, the UN MTC approach, as the OECD does, is 
considered to be strong with regard to the rights of the host / source country vis-a-vis FPI. 
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While in the OECD MTC, the direct and portfolio investment rates are 5% and 15%, 
respectively, developed / developing country treaties rates have traditionally ranged between 
5% and 15% for direct investment dividends and between 15% and 25% for portfolio 
dividends.484  
 
4.4 RENUNCIATION OF PRELIMINARY RIGHTS 
 
 
As has been stated, most home / residence developed countries have made clear in their 
domestic legislation their view regarding the taxation of dividends derived from FDI. 
Notwithstanding the view of the UN MTC and of the OECD MTC (CEN), most developed 
countries apply the CIN theory. By applying the Participation Exemption Regime, those 
countries almost achieve tax neutrality.  
 
The analysis of the evolution of developed countries’ domestic legislation can help to 
understand developed countries’ tax policy aims in this regard. The Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Austria adopted the participation exemption in 1971,485 1968486 and 
1972,487 respectively, in order to fully avoid economic double taxation.488 The United 
Kingdom adopted an indirect credit system in 1950 and switched to the exemption method 
in 2009;489 Japan adopted an indirect credit system in 1962 and also switched to the 
exemption method in 2009;490 Germany adopted an indirect credit system in 1972 and 
switched to the exemption method in 2001;491 and Australia adopted a dividend rebate system 
from 1963 until 1987 and then switched to an indirect credit system before moving to 
 
484  United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017. Paragraph 10 of the commentary on Article 10.  
485 Kofler, Georg. Indirect Credit versus Exemption: Double Taxation Relief for Intercompany Dividends. 
IBFD, Bulletin for International Taxation, Vol 66, N°2, 2012. 
486 Ibid, 486. 
487 Ibid, 486. 
488 Ibid, 486. 
489 Ibid, 486.  
490 Masui, Yoshihiro. Taxation of Foreign Subsidiaries: Japan’s Tax Reform 2009/2010. IBFD, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, Vol 64, N° 4, 2010. 
491 Ibid, 486. 
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exemption in 1991.492  Furthermore, of the 35 OECD Members, 27 apply a territorial tax 
system, i.e. exemption, and only eight apply a worldwide tax system, with a credit. The group 
of eight493 countries that apply a worldwide tax system includes some of the least developed 
OECD countries – Chile, Greece, Korea (Rep.), Mexico and Poland.494  
 
The literature interprets the above tendency as being the result of the choice of residence 
countries between CIN and CEN neutrality policies.495 However, and in addition to the 
neutrality discussion,496 there is a repatriation policy lurking behind those shifts. It is an 
undeniable truth, recognized for example in Japan’s tax reform of 2009/2010,497 that the 
indirect foreign tax credit system, combined with relatively high tax rates in the investor 
residence country and relatively low tax rates in host jurisdictions, creates a distinct bias 
against the repatriation of foreign profits.498 In November 2007, the Tax Commission of the 
Japanese government issued a report named “Basic Idea for Fundamental Reform of Tax 
Systems” in which the underlying reasons regarding the shift in approach were unveiled, as 
follows:  
“For instance, as for the foreign tax credit system, a well-balanced system should be 
developed,  in accordance with the principle that corporations should be allowed no 
deduction in excess of  the tax burden they owe to Japan, while giving due 
consideration to the business realities of  Japan’s corporate groups, such as increases 




492 Ibid, 486.  
493 Chile, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Korea (Rep.), Mexico, Poland, and United States. 
494 Ibid, 486. 
495 See: Holmes, Kevin. International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction to Principles and 
Application. IBFD, 2007; Schön, Wolfgan. Tax Competition in Europe. General Report. Max Planck Institute, 
Munich. IBFD, 2003; and Neil, Stephens. A Progressive Analysis of the Efficiencies of Capital Import 
Neutrality. Law and Policy in International Business, 1998.  
496 Desai, Mihir A.; and Hines, James R. Jr. Evaluating International Tax Reform, National Tax Journal, Vol 
56, 2003.Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=425943 
497 Japanese Tax Commission. Basic Idea for Fundamental Reform of Tax System, November, 2007. Available 
at: http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tax_policy/tax_commission/e0711a.pdf.  
498 Masui, Yoshihiro. Taxation of Foreign Subsidiaries: Japan’s Tax Reform 2009/2010. IBFD, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, Vol 64, N° 4, 2010. 
499 Ibid, 498.   
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This is also confirmed by the recent discussion in the United States regarding the shift from 
the worldwide income taxation system to a territorial tax system.500 501 The President of the 
United States Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform issued a proposal to change the system 
of taxation in the United States in November 2005.502 Those who are in favour of this shift 
argue that a switch to a territorial tax system would increase the repatriation of foreign 
earnings by United States multinational companies, generate economic growth and jobs in 
the United States, enhance the international competitiveness of many United States 
companies, and increase corporate tax revenues.503 Those against the change argue that the 
barrier to bringing foreign income back to United States is not the worldwide income taxation 
but the deferral, that is, the fact that the tax is elective.504 
 
Hence, in a scenario between a developing and a developed country, once the analysis of 
where the primary economic activity of dividends takes place has already taken place and it 
is clear which country (host / source or home / residence) has preliminary rights to tax 
according to the origin of the income, then it is possible to determine the dimension of the 
effective renunciations that each country will undertake if it subscribes to a DTC which 
adheres to the parameters that are proposed in this research. The principles must be the 
increase of foreign investment in the host / source / developing country granting neutral tax 
treatment, legal security, certainty for the international activities of taxpayers, alongside the 
positive repatriation of benefits policy for investors in their home / residence country.  
 
500 United States of America, Public Law 115-97 known as “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act 2017”. New Code section 
245A.  
501 Kane, Mitchell. Considering ‘Reconsidering the Taxation of Foreign Income’. Tax Law Review, Vol 62, 
2009. 
502 President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform. Simple, Fair & Pro-Growth: Proposal to Fix America’s 
Tax System, United States of America, 2005. Available at: https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/documents/report-fix-tax-system-2005.pdf. For an early critique of the Panel’s proposal see Shaviro, 
Daniel. A Blueprint for Future Tax Reform?: Evaluating the Reform Panel’s Report, Tax Analysts, 2005. 
Available at: at: 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265669277_A_Blueprint_for_Future_Tax_Reform_Evaluating_Ref
orm_Panel's_Report 
503 Drabkin, Erik; Serwin, Kenneth; and Tyson, Laura D. Implications of a Switch to a Territorial Tax System 




504 Fleming, J. Clifton Jr; and Peroni, Robert J. Exploring the Contours of a Proposed U.S. Exemption 
(Territorial) Tax System. Tax Notes, Vol 109, 2005.  
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The proposal includes renouncing preliminary taxing rights over dividend income, not only 
by the developing country but also the developed country. The host / source country must 
refrain from taxing dividends at the second tier at source, i.e. withholding tax, and the home 
/ resident country must grant the elimination of cross-border economic double taxation.  
As already stated, this will be done by exempting dividends from tax not only at the corporate 
income tax level when the shareholder receiving the dividends is a legal entity, but also at 
the personal income tax level of the ultimate individual beneficial owner. The exemption will 
be granted not only for individuals who invest directly, but also for individuals’ final 
shareholders of the legal entity that received the exempted dividends. 
 
The exemption system fully secures the elimination of cross-border economic double 
taxation,505 which is a benefit that is not addressed by the UN MTC and, according to the 
analysis conducted in this research, is an essential measure, and probably the only one, that 
has the potential to effectively eliminate barriers and to increase trade and investment 
between countries. By doing so, the UN MTC could achieve the creation of a real incentive 
to promote the increase of foreign investment in the host / developing country while granting 
neutral tax treatment, legal security, certainty and a beneficial repatriation of benefits policy 
for investments made by investors of home / resident / developed countries. In accordance 
with the position of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, and unlike the position of OECD 
Members,506 this research concludes the necessity of including measures in a DTC between 
developing and developed countries to confront the problem of economic double taxation. 
The elimination of cross-border economic double taxation will be the in the hands of the 
home / residence country. It will be not only for dividends derived from business investments 
– FDI – but also for dividends derived from capital investments – FPI. The exemption will 
 
505 OECD Glossary of Tax Terms. Available at:  http://www.oecd.org/ctp/glossaryoftaxterms.htm  
506 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Paragraph 51 of the commentary on Articles 
23 A and 23 B: “The Committee on Fiscal Affairs has considered whether it would be appropriate to modify 
Article 23 of the Convention in order to settle this question. Although many States favoured the insertion of 
such a provision in the Model Convention this met with many difficulties, resulting from the diverse opinions 
of States and the variety of possible solutions. Some States, fearing tax evasion, preferred to maintain their 
freedom of action and to settle the question only in their domestic laws.” 
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not only be at the corporate level – as is usually the case for a participation exemption – but 
also at the individual personal tax level.  
 
According to the analysis previously carried out in this study regarding the location of the 
economic activity that generates the income, the rules mentioned above mean that by 
subscribing to a DTC that includes that rule, countries will renounce the following: (1) the 
source / developing country will renounce preliminary taxation rights over dividends derived 
from FDI and from dividends derived from FPI; (2) the residence / developed country will 
only renounce preliminary taxation rights over FDI. However, and considering that 
nowadays most developed countries through the domestic participation exemption actually 
exempt dividends derived from FDI, when the exemption is at the corporate level (when the 
shareholder receiving the dividends derived from FDI is a legal entity), this should not 
radically alter the position of residence / developed countries compared to the position that 
they currently have according to the contemporary UN approach. The same can be said 
regarding the taxation of dividend income derived from FDI or from FPI when the 
shareholder is an individual. This proposal moves away from the actual credit system granted 
by the UN MTC to exemption. Both eliminate economic double taxation and therefore the 
same objectives can be achieved. The real difference imposed by these proposals for 
residence / developed countries is their obligation to grant an exemption at the individual tax 
level of the ultimate beneficial owner of the legal entity that receives the exempted dividends. 
This is, according to the logic of this research, the only real means to achieve neutrality and 
to ensure that the income will be taxed only once.  
 
The idea of limiting these preliminary rights to tax in DTCs between developing and 
developed countries is to encourage investors from developed countries to invest in 
developing countries. Tax barriers for investors are not only present in the host / source 
country; the repatriation of the benefits and, therefore, taxation at home, is equivalent to the 
aforementioned tax event regarding the disincentives to investing in the developing country. 
Repatriation policies must be commensurate with the main objective of promoting effective 
foreign investment in the developing country, i.e. investment beneficial to the country’s 
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development process. The quality of the investments in the host economy, therefore, becomes 
an essential element in this regard. 
 
Lastly, and with the aim of ensuring that this approach will achieve the attraction of foreign 
investment that effectively helps in the development process of the host / source / developing 
country, the proposed rules will allow the source / host country to tax at a secondary level 
(withholding tax over dividends) when the foreign investment is not from those that could, 
according to certain tests, be considered as investments that assist in the development 
process. If that is the case, the residence country could also elect to change the tax treatment 
at the recipient level by moving away from the exemption system granted by this proposal to 
the credit system at the first level of recipients (individual investor or corporate investor), 
and by eliminating the exemption benefit at the individual tax level of the ultimate beneficial 
owner of the legal entity that receives the exempted / taxed dividends. The above will be 
measured by the application, by the host / source country, of an economic substantive test, 
i.e. on the impact of the foreign equity in the economy of the host country, or by the 
application of a temporal test, i.e. the determination of the permanence of the equity in the 
host / source country. 
 
In conclusion, the benefits granted to the foreign investor by this proposal will not be 
available for investments that are not able to effectively assist in the development process. If 
that is the case, the outcome is simply what is implemented today. That is to say, taxing rights 
will be shared, and juridical double taxation will be eliminated through the exemption or 
credit system (residence country option). Economic double taxation as a barrier to increased 
trade and investment between countries will remain in existence.  
 
4.5 ECONOMIC-SUBSTANTIVE TEST  
 
As it is impossible to analytically separate the concepts of dividend and business profits, it is 
also impossible to separate the equity of the host company from the underlying business 
activities of the host company. The UN MTC must include a test that is able to determine the 
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real impact of the foreign investment – the equity provided by the foreign investor into the 
host company – in the economy of the host country.  
 
The aim of this economic substantive test is to differentiate between beneficial and less or 
non-beneficial investments for countries that are in the process of development, i.e. 
productive and counterproductive foreign investments for developing countries. That test can 
only be properly designed by economists and naturally depends on the economic 
characteristics of each host / developing country. It is impossible to define a concept of 
beneficial or non-beneficial investments that is applicable to all developing countries’ 
economies.  
 
By way of example, although the UNCTAD 2011 World Investment Report showed a slump 
in FDI flows into South Africa in 2010 compared to 2009, the South African economy grew 
relatively faster in 2010 than it did in 2009. The real output in the economy increased by 
2.8% in 2010, by way of contrast to a decrease of 1.7% in 2009.507 As was concluded by 
Jonas Mosia in his publication entitled “When is Foreign Direct Investment Beneficial to a 
Country and When Is It Not? The Case of South Africa”, it was important for South African 
policymakers to focus their energies on drafting and implementing policy measures that have 
the effect of promoting “industrialization”.  
 
Laura Alfaro, in her publication “Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does the Sector 
Matter?”,508 concluded that, although there may be a positive correlation between economic 
growth and FDI in the manufacturing sector, the same cannot be said about the primary and 
services sectors. Jonas Mosia exemplified this situation with reference to Walmart in South 
Africa, which concerned the discussion about the positive and negative aspects of FDI in the 
retail sector for developing countries. He stated that the advantages of FDI in the retail sector 
are said to be lower prices for the consumers; however, the reality is that such investments 
have devastating effects on the economy. Manufacturers are displaced due to massive imports 
 
507  Mosia, Jonas. When is Foreign Direct Investment Beneficial to a Country and When Is It Not? The Case of 
South Africa, SAIIA Policy Briefing Vol 44, 2012. Available at: https://saiia.org.za/research/when-is-foreign-
direct-investment-beneficial-to-a-country-and-when-is-it-not-the-case-of-south-africa/ 
508 Alfaro, Laura. Foreign Direct Investment and Growth: Does Sector Matter?, Boston, Harvard Business 
School, 2003. Available at: http://www.people.hbs.edu/lalfaro/fdisectorial.pdf  
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and big retailers, such as Walmart, and they have the effect of displacing small economic 
players through various predatory pricing strategies. 
 
Hence, since it is impossible for the author to design a test that is suitable for all host / 
developing countries, the definition of beneficial and non-beneficial investments in the 
proposal provided by this research will be left aside in order to be decided by each country 
according to their respective characteristics and economies. The idea of this test – definition 
– is to promote foreign investment that can have positive effects on the source country 
economy and, consequently positively enables, either directly or indirectly, the development 
of the host country. 
 
In order to achieve this, it will be essential to ascertain the underlying business activities of 
the host company in the host country in order to distinguish between foreign equity 
investment that is being used in the generation of productive activities within the host country 
borders and, therefore, assists the host / developing country’s development.  
 
This is not a new approach in the context of MTCs. Although it was stated with a different 
purpose, and regarding different income, the Mexican MTC contained an economic 
substantive test in the article governing the taxation of income from any industrial, 
commercial or agricultural business. Paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the Mexican MTC, in 
addition to the fixed place requirement for permanent establishments, permitted source 
country taxation when significant sales took place within the source country, despite the 
absence of a fixed place of business,509 as follows: “If an enterprise or an individual in one 
of the contracting States extends its or his activities to the other State, through isolated or 
occasional transactions, without possessing in that State a permanent establishment, the 
income derived from such activities shall be taxable only in the first State”. Although the 
approach was unsuccessful, the author considers it important to take this relevant historical 
source into consideration.  
 
 
509 Cockfield, Arthur J. Reforming the Permanent Establishment Principle through a Quantitative Economic 
Presence Test, Canadian Business Law Journal, Vol 38, 2003. 
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By differentiating between beneficial and non-beneficial investments, the test will allow a 
DTC to determine for which investments the MTC will grant better repatriating conditions. 
Thus, if the foreign equity is considered by the host country to be a beneficial investment 
within the borders of the host / source country, the elimination of juridical and economic 
double taxation by the home / resident and the source / host countries will be done by taxing 
those dividends only once (as business profits at the source / host country). On the other hand, 
both countries will recover their preliminary taxing rights. The source / host country will 
recover these rights by being permitted to tax at the second level with a withholding tax, and 
the home / resident country will be able to shift away from the exemption system to the credit 
system at the first recipient level (individual or legal entity investor) and additionally, by 
eliminating the beneficial treatment of exempting income at the level of the final individual 
beneficial owner of the legal entity that received the dividends.  
 
In the case of beneficial investments, the foreign investor will be allowed to compete in the 
host / source country under the same, or under even better, conditions than domestic 
investors. This will depend on the domestic tax treatment of dividend income by local 
investors. They will most likely face better tax conditions than those granted for dividend 
income that is derived from investments made within their own country. Developed countries 
will manage to broaden their own markets by including those of developing countries as part 
of their own markets, i.e. without tax barriers for trade and investments. 
 
In the case of non-beneficial investments, foreign investors will face the treatment that they 
face today. They will not be allowed to compete in the host / source country under the same 
conditions as the domestic investors of source / host countries. The conditions will be those 
imposed in their country of residence. Final tax rates of the income generated by the 
investment abroad will be the rates of the individual taxation in their home / residence 
countries.  
 
The incorporation of a test is designed to go one step further than that which DTCs usually 
do. The relevance of the impact of the investment in the host / source / developing country is 




4.6 TEMPORARY TEST 
 
 
One alternative to the economic substantive test could be the use of a temporary test to 
differentiate between beneficial and less or non-beneficial investments for host / developing 
countries. Although a substantive approach is more suitable than a formal approach, the 
complexities that a substantive test can bring to developing countries with low tax 
administration capacities renders this temporary approach a viable alternative.     
 
A temporal test would focus on differentiating between those dividends earned as a 
consequence of short-term equity investments and those dividends earned as a consequence 
of long-term equity investments. This does not mean differentiating between FDI and FPI, 
because, as already stated, this research considers the positive effect that both types of 
investments can bring to the economies of developing countries. The challenge requires 
determining different temporary thresholds for each type of investment. 
 
The fact that long-term equity investments tend to obviate volatile market periods, leaving 
the expectation of dividends to the underlying company growth, and that the expectations of 
investors of short-term investment in relation to dividends are associated with trading the 
stock to take advantage of short-term market volatility that produces quick profits, makes the 
author realize that, if it is not possible to carry out a substantive test, it is therefore necessary 
to evaluate the time-presence of the investments by avoiding discriminating against FPI per 
se. Thus, and as an alternative to the economic substantive test, the author proposes that a 
minimum duration of time-presence for the investment in the host country for FDI and 
another a minimum time-presence in relation to the investment for FPI should be required.    
 
The presence of a time factor in DTCs has been historically associated with the taxation of 
active income, and particularly with the concept of a permanent establishment. The role of 
this time factor in articles governing the taxation of active income is related to the role of 
DTCs in the allocation of taxation rights in some specific cases, namely construction of the 
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permanent establishment, thus preventing source country taxation if a required fixed period 
of time has not passed.  
 
In a comparable approach, but regarding dividends, this research proposes to use this element 
in order to guarantee effective tax incentives for beneficial equity investments in DTCs 
between developing and developed countries. Thus, if it is possible to determine the time 
threshold at which active income is considered to be more source country linked, the author 
believes that it is not a great challenge for economists to determine the time threshold that 
will guarantee the minimum average time that equity investments need to be present in order 
to be truly effective in the economy of the host / developing country. As in the economic 
substantive test, the author leaves the determination of the most effective threshold to 
economic specialists.   
 
The differentiation between beneficial and non-beneficial investments will determine the 
taxing conditions. If the foreign equity is considered by the host country to fulfil the period 
of time required, it will be considered as a beneficial investment, and therefore the beneficial 
taxation rules that have already been described will be granted to the investor. If the opposite 
is true, and if foreign equity is not considered by the host country as fulfilling the period of 
time required, it will be considered as a non-beneficial investment, and therefore traditional 
taxing rules, as have already been described, will apply.  
 




This work has justified, throughout the whole research, the position regarding the inadequate 
UN MTC approach in relation to the taxation of dividends. The inefficient approach of 
restringing the role of DTCs in allocating taxing rights when domestic legislation already 
does so is aggravated by the outcome of granting more taxing rights to the home / residence 
country and therefore restricting host / source countries rights, an approach that is in 




Those who advocate improving the situation by increasing the source / host taxation of 
dividend income rely on what is referred to as the benefit theory, that is, by considering the 
fact that host / source countries facilitate investor access to the market and therefore deserve 
a portion of taxing rights. However, they forget that source countries have already taxed that 
income in the form of business profits without restrictions.  
 
Furthermore, considering the fact that host / source taxation would be the rule where there is 
no DTC in force, the limitation of sovereignty regarding dividend taxation that host / 
developing countries face by concluding a DTC with a developed country must be 
counterbalanced by an increase in foreign investment that will effectively aid in the host 
country’s development process.  
 
Thus, it can be affirmed that it is necessary to reform the system of dividend taxation that is 
prescribed by the UN MTC. The fact that DTCs that follow the UN MTC approach have no 
effect on the increase of foreign investment from developed to less developed countries – the 
contrary has not yet been proven – reinforces this proposal. The UN MTC must include, 
amongst its aims, the elimination of tax barriers such as economic double taxation as an 
incentive for cross-border investment that can effectively help in generating development in 
the host / developing country.  
 
This work proposes a new article regarding the taxation of dividend income for the UN MTC, 
respecting a general framework according to the following guidelines: 
 
(1) in order to provide an incentive for the use of the UN MTC as the MTC to be followed 
in DTCs between developing and developed countries, the treatment of dividend 
income must be beneficial to all actors, namely the investor / residence country, the 
host / developing country, and the investor; 
(2) both signatory countries must sacrifice taxing rights in order to achieve the benefits; 
(3) the income must be economically taxed only once; 
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(4) taxing rights regarding dividends should be allocated in a coherent manner, 
irrespective of whether they arise in a developing or in a developed country; and  
(5) activities carried out by the host company in the host country and the permanence of 
the equity in the host country’s economy are the elements that will be considered as 
those which can determine the real impact of the equity in the economy of the host 
country.  
 
As a consequence, this work proposes a modification to Article 10 of the UN MTC so as to 
properly regulate the taxation of income from dividends in conventions between developed 





1. Dividends derived from beneficial investments and paid by a company which is a 
resident of a Contracting State, to a resident of the other Contracting State cannot be 
taxed either by the first state due to the fact that those dividends were already taxed 
in the form of business profits, or by that other Contracting State. That exemption 
will be granted not only at the corporate income tax level in that other state but also 
at the personal income tax level. The exemption at the personal income tax level will 
be granted not only for individual investors receiving foreign dividends income, but 
also for the individual’s ultimate beneficial owners of the legal entities receiving 
foreign dividends income when that income is further distributed to them. The above 
under the condition that those individual’s ultimate beneficial owners are also 
residents of that other Contracting State. When the ultimate beneficial owner (or 
owners) are resident of a third country, the exemption benefit could be extended to 
them i.e. the other Contracting State will exempt that dividend distribution to them if 
the country of residence of those beneficial owners exempt that income from tax once 




2. However, dividends derived by non-beneficial investments may taxed in both 
Contracting States, this is, in the Contracting State of which the company paying the 
dividends is a resident, and in the other Contracting State. 
 
The competent authorities of the Contracting States shall by mutual agreement settle 
the mode of application of these limitations.  
 
This paragraph shall not affect the taxation of the company in respect of the profits 
out of which the dividends are paid. 
 
a. The term “dividends”, as used in this Article, means income from shares, 
“jouissance” shares or “jouissance” rights, mining shares, founders’ shares or other 
rights, not being debt claims, participating in profits, as well as income from other 
corporate rights which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as income from 
shares by the laws of the state of which the company making the distribution is a 
resident. 
 
b. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the dividends, 
being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting 
State of which the company paying the dividends is a resident, through a permanent 
establishment situated therein, or performs in that other state independent personal 
services from a fixed base situated therein, and the holding in respect of which the 
dividends are paid is effectively connected with such permanent establishment or 
fixed base. In such case the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14, as the case may be, 
shall apply.  
 
c. The terms “beneficial” or “non- beneficial investments” used in this Article can be 
defined as follows: (a) Beneficial Investments: [the definition will be defined, 
according to their economic reality, by each developing country that subscribes to 
this Model]; (b) Non-beneficial Investments: [the definition will be defined, 
according to their economic reality, by each developing country that subscribes to 
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this Model]. The definitions may be based on an economic-substantive test or on a 
temporary test.  
 
 
4.8 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSAL 
  
The main objective of this proposal is to grant, through the UN MTC, more beneficial tax 
treatment to investors that are resident in developed countries by way of contrast to those that 
are normally granted to them by domestic legislation. The proposal is based on the 
assumption that developing countries will be willing to relinquish taxation rights over 
dividends if the outcome of that decision results in a positive increase of beneficial foreign 
investment, i.e. that helps in the development process of developing countries.     
 
The current UN MTC approach requires developing countries to partially limit their rights 
without necessarily obtaining positive results in the sense of an increase in foreign 
investment. That outcome is also usually achieved by domestic legislation without requiring 
a limitation of taxing rights over dividend income by the host / developing country.  
 
This proposal modifies one of the traditional principles of MTCs. The allocation of taxing 
rights is no longer the direct result of the analysis of the primary economic activity. The 
primary economic activity analysis serves as a tool for developing countries to know what 
they have and what they will lose by signing a DTC that is based on this new UN MTC 
approach.  
 
Regarding dividends, the result of the primary economic activity analysis was that, 
notwithstanding the strong logic underpinning the position that the origin of the dividends is 
always in the host / source country because that is the country where the profits of the payer 
company have been produced, it is also possible to find substantive activities that are related 




Instead of sharing taxing rights, this proposal calls for a limitation of those preliminary taxing 
rights by both signatory countries, with the aim of achieving the following benefits for all 
actors:  
 
(1) an increase in beneficial foreign investment for the host/source/developing country; 
and  
 
(2) legal security, certainty, beneficial repatriation of benefit conditions and equal 
conditions for foreign investors, when competing in the host / source / developing 
country, for home / resident investors and the home / residence country. 
 
 
Host / source domestic legislation usually eliminates economic double taxation over 
domestic dividends regarding corporate shareholders that hold a relevant portion of the equity 
of the host company. However, for portfolio investors, and for all individual investors, 
irrespective of their participation, economic double taxation is not usually eliminated.  
 
This proposal achieves elimination of: 
 
(1) host country domestic economic double taxation over cross-border dividends 
regarding corporate or individual shareholders without prejudice to either the portion 
of participation in the equity of the host company or the characteristics of the 
investment. This outcome is the result of this research’s view in the sense that, 
regarding incomes derived from cross-border transactions, if the source country has 
the right to tax, then that right to tax should be exercised only once. The risk of triple 
taxation by taxing twice at source is high; and  
 
(2) cross-border economic double taxation over dividends regarding corporate 






Thus, this proposal expects the UN MTC to achieve its stated aims by limiting the 
preliminary rights to tax according to the primary economic activity analysis, thus ensuring 
the elimination of juridical and economic double taxation, avoiding tax discrimination 
between domestic and foreign investors, improving the tax treatment of cross-border 
dividends compared to the current UN MTC approach, and encouraging the investment of 

























PART V. INTEREST: TESTS, NEW PROPOSAL, INTEREST TAXATION and the UN 
MODEL  
 
5.1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: DEDUCTIBLE EXPENSE FOR THE BORROWER, 




The historical tax treatment of domestic and cross-border interest has been to consider it as 
a tax-deductible expense for the borrower and income that is to be taxed in the hands of the 
lender.510 The underlying principle is that if a company pays for the use of a resource that 
does not belong to it, and it uses it for the purposes of its business, then the remuneration 
paid for the use of that resource is regarded as a tax deductible expense.511 On the contrary, 
the remuneration that a company pays to its shareholders on its own capital – dividends –  is 
not considered to be a tax deductible expense. The underlying concept of this principle is 
that, by definition, a company’s equity is part of the company’s own resources and 
accordingly the dividends paid to shareholders are not comparable to the remuneration that 
is paid for other factors of production.512  
 
Action 4 of the BEPS Project,513 at least for multinational groups, has changed this historical 
approach. The proposal considers the “interest stripping rules”514 as the new way of 
determining the amount of interest that is deductible at source. As was stated by the OECD: 
“the recommended approach ensures that an entity’s net interest deductions are directly 
 
510 OECD BEPS Project: Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 4, Interest deductions and other financial 
payments. December 2014 - February 2015. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/discussion-
draft-action-4-interest-deductions.pdf  
511 Finnerty, Chris J; and Merks, Paulus. Fundamentals of International Tax Planning. IBFD, 2007. p.107.  
512 Ibid, 512.  
513 OECD BEPS Project: Final Report Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments, 2015. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/limiting-base-erosion-involving-interest-
deductions-and-other-financial-payments-action-4-2015-final-report-9789264241176-en.htm  
514 OECD Glossary of Tax Terms. Earning Stripping Rules: Anti avoidance rules applied to excessive extraction 
of corporate profits by way of tax-deductible payments (typically interest) generally to related third parties who 
may be tax exempt with respect to the interest or subject to a lower rate of tax. Unlike thin capitalization 
measures, which compare debt with equity, these rules may, in addition, compare taxable income before interest 
with income after interest and deny a deduction to the extent the latter falls short of a certain percentage, e.g. 
50%, of the former. However, since they only apply to companies with a particular (excessive) debt to equity 
ratio they may be seen as supplementary to thin capitalization rules. 
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linked to its level of economic activity, based on taxable earnings before deducting net 
interest expense, depreciation and amortisation (EBITDA)”. By doing so, the interest, known 
as the amount paid by a company for the use of a resource that does not belong to it and 
which it uses for the purposes of its business, will no longer be considered a fully granted tax 
deductible expense. The BEPS proposal not only refers to interest that is derived from related 
debt but also to non-related debt. 
 
Since, in the context of cross-border loan agreements, the tax deduction for the borrower will 
not be offset against domestic taxation because the foreign lender paid taxes in his residence 
country, the source / borrower country normally adds a first tier of taxation for interest by 
withholding tax on the foreign lender. Taxation at source through a withholding tax is still 
considered by some authors as a means of avoiding the erosion of the source country tax 
base.515  In order to avoid the juridical double taxation that arises for the lender, considering 
the taxation at the source / borrower country (withholding tax) plus taxation in its residence 
country, the lender’s country of residence normally grants a credit for the withholding tax 
that is paid at source. 
 
The analysis of cross-border interest taxation has always been analysed in a comparative 
manner and the tax treatment of cross-border equity investments are typically assessed 
according to the achievement (or not) of neutrality. This traditional analysis proceeds from 
the assumption that the tax deductibility of interest payments present under most corporate 
income tax systems, when compared to the non-deductibility of equity, can create a distortion 
in the financing decision of companies.516 For this research, to consider that difference as a 
potentially distorting element is not therefore correct. Dividends and interest are different 
types of income per se, since they derive from different types of financing instruments, 517 
 
515 Arnold, Brian; and Barnes, Peter. Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries against Base-eroding 
Payments: Interest and Other Financing Expenses. United Nations, 2017. p. 104.  
516 See: Fatica, Serena; Hemmelgarn, Thomas; and Nicodème, Gaëtan. The Debt-Equity Tax Bias: consequences 
and solutions, Taxation Papers, Working paper Nº 33, European Commission, 2012; Huizinga, Harry; Laeven, 
Luc; and Nicodème, Gaëtan. Capital Structure and International Debt Shifting, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol 88, 2007; and de Mooij, Ruud A. Tax Biases to Debt Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions, 
IMF Staff Discussion Note, 2011.  
517 Piltz, Detlev J. General Report in International Aspects of Thin Capitalization, Cahiers de droit fiscal 
international, Vol 81b, International Fiscal Association, 1996.  
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518 i.e. equity and debt,519 520 which means that both have different legal, economic and 
financial repercussions for the financed company. 
 
Equity financing is a means of company financing that is usually engendered through the 
issuance of shares to investors. Equity financing does not entail an assurance that the 
investment will bring a return; conversely, there are no limitations to the possible return. The 
investor (as an owner of the company) bears the risk of the business. Amongst several other 
characteristics, it is possible to also mention: (1) return linked to profits; (2) non-stated (long 
or indefinite) term for repayment / return; and (3) poor credit quality (i.e. high subordination 
in the payment chain).      
  
Debt financing means that the company is financed by a loan. It typically involves raising 
money by issuing instruments such as notes and bonds to investors, who are then entitled to 
receive the principal of the amount that was lent as well as any accrued interest. The pricing 
of the interest is usually composed of: (1) return on the risk of default, plus (2) return on the 
opportunity cost, plus (3) compensation on inflation, plus (4) customary margin (spread). 
After a specified period of time, there may be the possibility to raise judicial proceedings or 
to force bankruptcy if no repayment is carried out. The OECD discussion draft on financial 
transactions521 related with the implementation of BEPS Actions 8 – 10 has included in the 
discussion of pricing of financial transactions between associate parties elements such as 
contractual terms, functional analysis, characteristics of financial products or services, 
economic circumstances, and business strategies. Amongst several other characteristics, it is 
 
518 Brealey, Richard; Myers, Stewart; and Allen, Franklin. Principles of Corporate Finance, 11th ed., United 
States, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, 2013. p. 385; and Tirole, Jean. The Theory of Corporate Finance, United Kingdom, 
Princeton University Press, 2006. p. 75. 
519 Ernst, Markus. Toward a Level Playing Field for Thin Capitalization: German and US Approaches, Tax 
Notes International, Vol 43, 2006. p. 657. Definitions: Equity: “An unlimited claim to the residual benefits of 
ownership and an equally unlimited subjection of the burdens thereof.’’; Debt: “An unqualified obligation to 
pay a sum certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in interest payable 
regardless of the debtor’s income or the lack thereof”. 
520 Schön, Wolfgan; Beuchert, Tobias A; Roesener, Astrid; Gerten, Andreas; Haag, Maximilian, Heidenbauer, 
Sabine; Hohmann, Carsten; Kornack, Daniel; Lagdali, Nadia; Mueller, Lukas; Osterloh-Konrad, Christine; 
Pohlhausen, Carlo; Redeker, Philipp; and Röder, Erik. Debt and Equity: What’s the Difference? A Comparative 
View, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law, Research Paper No. 09-09, 2009.  
 





also possible to mention: (1) return that is not linked to profits; (2) market term for repayment 
/ return (arm’s length); and (3) good credit quality (low level of subordination). 
   
Regarding the taxation of cross-border interest, probably the most distinguishing feature of 
the outcome, after combining the legislation of the lender’s country and that of the borrower’s 
country, is that unlike dividends, interest payments do not suffer economic double taxation; 
interest payments are not taxed in the hands of both, the borrower and the lender.522 The 
borrower deducts the interest payments in its country of residence as expenses; the 
borrower’s country taxes the interest income of the non-resident lender on a gross basis with 
a withholding tax and the lender’s country taxes the interest income of the lender on a net 
basis, i.e. worldwide income taxation. As a consequence, only juridical double taxation 
occurs in this scenario.  
 
As a part of a loan agreement, it is common to see that signatories agree that the payment and 
economic cost of the tax on interest at source is assumed by the payer. This does not alter the 
situation outlined above. The fact that the borrower pays the tax does not lead to, however, 
the generation of economic double taxation. If it is the case that the borrower undertakes to 
bear the tax chargeable at source, this is as though the borrower had agreed to pay additional 
interest to its lender that corresponds with the amount of such a tax.523 The most complex 
issue in relation to cross-border debt financing for developing countries is the increase in 
costs when interest rates are grossed up in loan agreements. This is the main reason why 
withholding taxes are probably the highest barrier to international debt capital financing 
insofar as it increases the private cost of international borrowing.524  The latest work that was 
carried out by Bryan Arnold and Peter Barnes525 recognizes that the result of the grossing up 
of interest payments by residents to non-residents lenders is that withholding tax is effectively 
 
522 See: Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997. p. 711; and Van de Vijver, 
Anne. The New US-Belgium Double Tax Treaty: A Belgian and EU Perspective, Belgium, Larcier, 2009.  
523 Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997. p. 712. 
524 Huizinga, Harry. International Interest Withholding Taxation: Prospects for a Common European Policy, 
International Tax and Public Finance, Vol 1, 1994. 
525 Arnold, Brian; and Barnes, Peter. Protecting the Tax Base of Developing Countries against Base-eroding 
Payments: Interest and Other Financing Expenses. United Nations, 2017. p. 47.  
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borne by residents and thereby this increases the cost of borrowing by residents from non-
residents.  
 
In regard to economic double taxation, the outcome of a limitation on the deductibility of 
interest at source, e.g. thin capitalization rules,526 interest stripping rules,527 or earnings 
stripping rules,528 is probably the closest situation to it. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
application of those rules is similar to a situation of economic double taxation, strictly 
speaking, it is not. It leads to a broadening of the tax base at source, but this does not mean 
that the same income would be taxed twice by comparable taxes by two different 
jurisdictions. The author’s opinion on this matter is that interest income will never suffer 
economic double taxation. The arguments to sustain this opinion is that in the case of the 
limitation on the deductibility of interest at source, the base out of which the interest might 
not be deductible is not the base out of which the payments are made. That is to say that 
interest payments do not depend on the profits of the financed company, but rather they 
depend on the stipulations included in the loan agreement. By way of an example, if there is 
no tax base out of which the interest payments can be deducted, the interest will still be paid 
out to the lender and it will be taxed accordingly by the lender’s country. It is impossible to 
ascertain that the effect of a limitation on the deductibility of interest is that the ‘same income’ 
will be taxed twice. Notwithstanding the foregoing, i.e. that limitations on the deductibility 
of interest at source does not create economic double taxation, it is undeniable that those 
kinds of measures can have negative effects in the context of cross-border financing from 
 
526 Michielse, Geerten M.M. Treaty Aspects of Thin Capitalization, IBFD, Bulletin 57, No. 11, 1997. “Excessive 
debt funding from abroad is viewed by some countries as leading to an unacceptable erosion of their tax revenue 
base i.e. deductibility of interest against the non-deductibility of equity. Generally, under such rules, the interest 
on the amount of debt paid to a related party which exceeds the permitted level is non-deductible. The non-
deductibility is the result of the application of the ‘arm’s length principle’ or a ‘fixed debt to equity’ ratio”. 
527 Ibid, 527: “To a further extent than thin capitalization rules i.e. by also applying it to unrelated parties; 
interest stripping rules aim to prevent tax base erosion provoked by excessive debt financing. In addition to the 
debt-equity analysis normally required by thin capitalization rules, this kind of anti-abuse rule addresses the 
difference between the taxable income before the payment of the interest and the taxable income after the 
payment of the income, rather than at a specific debt to equity ratio or the arm’s length amount.”  
528 Harris, Peter; and Oliver, David. International Commercial Tax, 1st ed., United Kingdom, Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. “It is similar but not entirely identical to the concept of interest stripping. It also aims 
to prevent tax base erosion provoked by excessive debt financing. However, the non-deductibility of the interest 
payment is the result of the application of a debt to equity ratio plus the analysis of the percentage that the 
interest to be deducted corresponds to the company’s adjusted income. This only applies to payments between 
related parties.”  
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developed to developing countries. If those rules are not accompanied with a limitation of 
taxation of those interests in the residence country (those not allowed to be deducted), they 
could constitute a disincentive for foreign debt financing.  
 
For the purposes of this research, the main problem is not the differences in the tax treatment 
of debt and equity capital, but rather the loopholes that any different treatment could create, 
and therefore, the potential for abuse.529 There is no necessity to equate treatments, it is 
however necessary to sanction abuse. The fiscal losses and inequities that are created by these 
loopholes are particularly problematic in the case of international borrowing between related 
parties as they offer an easy substitution at no cost for equity investments.530 In particular,  it 
is extremely harmful for countries to set aside hybrid instruments, i.e. payments that are 
deductible at source as debt capital and not taxed at residence as equity capital.531 The EU 
has worked to impose sanctions on the above. In 2014 and 2015 the European Council 
adopted two amendments to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive532 on the common system of 
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member 
States. The 2014 amendment stated that the Member State of the parent company will be 
allowed to not tax profit distributions from the subsidiary only to the extent that such 
distributions cannot be regarded as tax deductible expenses for the subsidiary, the “anti-
hybrid rule”.533 Subsequently, the 2015 amendment incorporated a binding general anti-
abuse rule.  
 
 
529 OECD BEPS Project: Final Report Action 4: Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments, 2015. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/tax/limiting-base-erosion-involving-interest-
deductions-and-other-financial-payments-action-4-2015-final-report-9789264241176-en.htm  
530 Benshalom, Ilan. The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of International Taxation, 
Virginia Tax Review, Vol 27, 2008.  
531OECD BEPS Project:  Final Report Action 2: Neutralizing the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, 
2015. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/ctp/neutralising-the-effects-of-hybrid-mismatch-arrangements-
action-2-2015-final-report-9789264241138-en.htm  
532 Council Directive (EU) 2014/86, of 8 July 2014, amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of 
taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States. Available at: 
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0086; and Council Directive (EU) 
2015/121, of 27 January 2015, amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of taxation applicable 
in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States. Available at: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32015L0121 
533 Council Directive (EU) 2014/86, of 8 July 2014, amending Directive 2011/96/EU on the common system of 




The risk of equating the treatments, at least for developing countries, is the loss of the 
opportunity to grant a convenient tax treatment to beneficial debt. Furthermore, what is worse 
is a sanctioning of interest that is derived from beneficial debt by not allowing any deduction 
to be granted. This, as was already announced, will start changing after the implementation 
of the BEPS proposal. Domestic legislation has developed rules such as thin capitalization 
rules, interest stripping rules or earnings stripping rules, with the aim of avoiding the harmful 
effects that the different cross-border tax treatments of both incomes could create. The risk 
of a tendency to equate the treatment of both incomes is substantial. The UN MTC and the 
OECD MTC rules regarding the cross-border taxation of passive investment income still 
maintain the position that dividends should be economically taxed twice and only once in 
relation to interest.   
 
The BEPS Report puts the issue of interest squarely into focus. In addition to the harmful 
effects of economic double non-taxation as a result of recourse to hybrid instruments, BEPS 
is also expected to attack base erosion via the limitation of interest deductions and other 
financial payments.  
 
Notwithstanding the relevance of the work carried out by BEPS on the matter, it is necessary 
to contextualize that work according to the parameters laid down in this research. The BEPS 
Project never questioned the actual parameters in relation to the taxation of debt versus equity 
in DTCs between developing and developed countries, namely that dividends are 
economically taxed twice and interest only once. If we consider the proposal that was laid 
down in this research in relation to dividend income, the outcome is that income derived from 
debts, and also income derived from equity, will be economically taxed only once. However, 
and by maintaining the essential differences between both, even in a scenario in which equity 
and debt are both economically taxed only once, interest will still be a deductible expense at 
source. The deductibility of interest at source is of the essence of that financing resource and 
it must be considered as a right that has been granted by source countries – in the context of 
this research: developing countries – that enables them to make it less costly for local 
borrowers to obtain debt capital from foreign investor residents located in developed 
countries. Restricting the deduction of interest due to the absence of taxing rights of source / 
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developing countries regarding cross-border interest income can put cross-border debt capital 
financing in a disadvantageous position when it is compared to local debt capital financing.534  
 
The scenario expected by this research for the treatment of debt and equity in DTCs between 
developing and developed countries is similar to that which now exists within the EU. The 
elimination of withholding taxes at source for dividends and interest (only for dividends 
derived from FDI in the case of EU, and for all dividends in the case of this research), 
exemption or credit at the residence country in the case of dividends and taxation at the 
residence country in the case of interest. The BEPS proposals on this matter are not included 
in the MLI, but they are currently being considered by the EU Member States for the purposes 
of their domestic laws.535 The same could take place in relation to developing countries in a 
context that is similar to that which is expected by this research. Under the logic of this 
research, developing countries should consider the use of limitations on interest deductions 
as a valuable tool for dealing with abusive situations. However, it should not be construed as 
a mechanism to recover taxing rights that have been renounced under a DTC that has been 
signed between them and a developed country. 
  
Related debt creates a scenario for potential fiscal losses and inequities by offering an easy 
substitution for equity investments at no cost. The potential problem arises when a related 
party provides excessive and expensive debt capital to another related party and therefore 
substantial interest is paid in return,536 i.e. either to one shareholder of the borrower or a 
related party. The determination of related parties can be a difficult exercise to undertake. 
Although the payment can be formally made to a third party, complexities arise when a 
related party guarantees the debt. Guarantees come in many different forms and the relevance 
of the guarantee can be difficult to ascertain in practice.537  
 
534 Kaserer, Christoph. Restricting Interest Deductions in Corporate Tax Systems: Its Impact on Investment 
Decisions and Capital Markets, Technische Universität München, Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial 
Studies, 2008. 
535 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016, laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.193.01.0001.01.ENG  
536 Barnes, Peter. Limiting Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments, United Nations, 2014. Available 
at:  http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/20140604_Paper7_Barnes.pdf. 




This work expects that the combination of the proposals regarding the cross-border taxation 
of interest income, alongside those which have already been proposed in relation to the 
taxation of dividend income, will reduce opportunities for tax abuse by default. Without 
prejudice to the fact that the proposals contained in this research conclude by allocating 
taxing rights regarding income derived from debt and equity in different ways according to 
different situations, the overall economic impact on either equity or debt will be more similar 
than the ones that exist under the current parameters.  As stated, the only measure that will 
make the difference is the sovereign right of source countries to grant the right to deduct – 
either fully or partially - the interest as a tax expenses at source.  
 
5.2 PRIMARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GENERATING INTERESTS 
 
 
Where does the primary economic activity of interests take place? 
 
In order to determine where the economic activity related to interest takes place, it is 
necessary to look at the origin of the interest. As in the case of dividends, the view of this 
research is that the origin of the interest is shared between two countries. That is, the origin 
of the interest is partially located in the place where the debtor produces the interest income, 
e.g., the place in which he exercises a substantial business activity538 for which the debt 
capital is being used, and partially in the residence country of the lender. The country of 
residence of the lender has legitimate reasons to justify that the origin of the income is linked 
to its territory. The main reason is due to the fact that the payment of interest on debt capital 
is made possible by the use of the capital economically linked to the country of the lender, 
thus without the existence of that capital,539 non-debt capital will be available, and non-
interest income will arise. In other words, if the lender had not invested its money, the 
investment would not have generated any interest. Kemmeren argues that interest is not 
 
538 Kemmeren, Eric C.C.M. Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models, The Netherlands, 
Pijnenburg, 2001. 
539 OECD, Working Party No. 11 of the Fiscal Committee (France and Belgium). Report on the taxation of 
Interest, 1959. Available at: http://www.taxtreatieshistory.org/    
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produced by capital but by the debtor’s activity by means of the deployment of that capital.540 
That argument is correct to an extent, but it is also possible to argue that debtors would not 
be able to deploy that capital if it was not for the existence of that capital. Kemmeren states 
that the origin of the interest is exclusively located in the place where the borrower/debtor 
produces the interest income.541 This research, deviating from Kemmeren’s conclusion in 
this regard, states that it is also possible to find an economic nexus or link of the interest 
income with the country where the lender / creditor resides. Thus, as in the country of 
residence of the borrowers, the expectations of the countries of residence of the lenders to 
make the recipients of the income generated participate in the public expenses of their 
countries by reason of their possession are, for this research, valid.  
 
Kemmeren has also stated that the place in which the debtor produces the interest income is 
not necessarily in the debtor’s country of residence.542 However, if the debtor exercised its 
business activity in its state of residence, then the state of origin and the state of residence of 
the debtor naturally coincide. In the analysis of the problem, this research will use the basic 
and most common case of international borrowing where the creditor / lender is either a 
natural or a legal person. In both cases, the final beneficial owner of the interest resides in 
the other contracting state. According to the same reasoning, it is assumed in both situations 
that the country of residence of the borrower is the country in which the debt capital has been 
invested. Further complexities can exist, for example, when the final beneficial owner of the 
interests resides in a third country or when the debt has not been invested or expended in the 
country where the debtor resides. Those cases will not be considered here because the aim of 
this research is to propose a new core principle regarding the taxation of interest and the idea 
is that this research will focus on that main rule. Those cases will be left for further research 
on the topic. 
 
Related debt, i.e. shareholders’ loans agreements, and non-related debt are different. On the 
basis of special information, shareholders’ loans are not simply granted alternatively to third 
party debtors on the general market depending on the interest rate and the risk of insolvency. 
 
540 Ibid, 539. 
541 Ibid, 539.  
542 Ibid, 539.  
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When a related party – a parent company or a shareholder – makes a decision to grant a 
related loan, it not only considers the expected interest and the security of the repayment, but 
it also simultaneously considers the expected returns from its participation in the debtor’s 
equity. 543 Thus, from an economic point of view, committing to a shareholder loan is the 
same as committing to an equity investment.544 This, considering the ongoing framework of 
rules that govern the international taxation of debt and equity, ends in the erosion of the 
source countries’ tax bases as a consequence of the taxpayer’s ability to influence the 
allocation of profits for tax purposes by choosing between debt and equity finance from 
subsidiaries.545 
 
Notwithstanding the differences between related and non-related foreign debts, both types of 
debt are considered by this research to be useful ways of financing businesses in developing 
countries’ economies. Foreign related debt cannot be considered as unnecessary. One 
demonstration of this is the fact that it is a mechanism recognized under all rules that govern 
the limitation of deductibility of interest at source. Even more, all of them recognize the legal 
right to deduct (with some limitations), as a tax expense at source, the interest that is derived 
from foreign related debt. The availability and use of debt is widely recognized as an 
important element of a healthy business environment. Indeed, a lack of credit can deter 
economic growth.546 Developing countries should not give different tax treatment to both 
types of debt unless there is some abuse. If both agreements, i.e. unrelated loan or shareholder 
/ related loan agreements, are agreed under commercial conditions, both are legitimate ways 
of being financed.  
 
This research prefers to differentiate between beneficial and less or non-beneficial debt 
financing for businesses in countries that are undergoing a process of development. To this 
 
543 Schön, Wolfgan; Bakrozis, Andreas; Becker, Johannes; Beuchert, Tobias A; Boer, Martin; Dwenger, Nadja; 
Gerten, Andreas; Haag, Maximilian; Heidenbauer, Sabine; Hohmann, Carsten; Jehlin, Alexander; Kopp, Karin 
E.M; Kornack, Daniel; Lagdali, Nadia; Marguart, Christian; Mueller, Lukas; Castelon, Marta; Osterloh-Konrad, 
Christine; Paxinou, Natalia; Porhlhausen, Carlo; Redeker, Philipp; Röder, Eric; and Roesener, Astrid. Debt and 
Equity in Domestic and International Tax Law – A Comparative Policy Analysis, British Tax Review 2, 2014.  
544 Huizinga, Harry; Laeven, Luc; and Nicodème, Gaëtan. Capital Structure and International Debt Shifting, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 88, 2007.  
545 Ibid, 544.  




end, beneficial debt will be understood as debt that is invested or expended in the borrower 
country for business purposes and which creates productive activities within the borders of 
the borrower residence country. By way of contrast, non-beneficial debt will be understood 
as abusive debt or debt that is not being invested in the borrower country for business 
purposes, and if does, do not create productive activities within the borders of the borrower 
residence country. As has already been stressed in this research, cross-border debt must aid 
in the development of the host developing country.     
 
5.3 RENUNCIATION OF PRELIMINARY RIGHTS 
 
 
In practice, the Netherlands is probably the only developed country that has succeeded in  
negotiating DTCs with developing countries, where the main rule regarding interest taxation 
is that interest will be taxed only by the country in which the lender is resident, e.g. as is the 
case in the DTC between Bahrain and The Netherlands that was signed on 16 April 2008 and 
effective as from 1 January 2010;547 the DTC between Georgia and The Netherlands that was 
signed on 21 March 2002 and effective as from 1 January 2004;548 the DTC between Kuwait 
and The Netherlands that was signed on 29 May 2001 and effective as from 1 January 
2001;549 and the DTC between Macedonia and The Netherlands that was signed on 11 
September 1988 and effective as from 2 January 2000.550 Notwithstanding that in the case of 
Bahrain and Kuwait, non-taxation at source has it origin in the fact that those countries do 
not tax that income under their domestic law, the cases of Georgia and Macedonian are 
somewhat surprising. It is known that the Netherlands seeks only the state of residence 
taxation in its treaties, but is willing to make concessions in treaties with developing 
 
547 Double Tax Convention between Bahrain and The Netherlands, 2008, Article 11: “1. Income from debt 
claims arising in a Contracting State and beneficially owned by a resident of the other Contracting State shall 
be taxable only in that other State.”  
548 Double Tax Convention between Georgia and The Netherlands, 2002, Article 11: “1. Interest arising in a 
Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State.”  
549 Double Tax Convention between Kuwait and The Netherlands, 2001, Article 11: “1. Interest arising in a 
Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State 
if such resident is the beneficial owner of the interest.”  
550 Double Tax Convention between Macedonia and The Netherlands, 1988, Article 11: “1. Interest arising in 
a Contracting State and paid to a resident of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other 
State if such resident is the beneficial owner of the interest.” 
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countries. Can this practice be considered as a proper tax policy in DTCs between developing 
and developed countries? According to the current research aims, the answer is yes. By 
granting only one level of taxation over cross-border interest income, the source / developing 
country could provide better conditions for foreign lenders and therefore facilitate easy 
access to foreign debt to their residents. That renunciation must be accompanied with certain 
conditions so as to grant easy access to foreign debt.  
 
The elimination of withholding tax at source leads to the removal of probably the highest 
barrier for cross-border financing551 in DTCs between developing and developed countries. 
For the purposes of this research, the potential benefits for developing countries – acting as 
source countries or countries where the interest arises – as a result of the elimination of 
withholding taxes, definitely justifies the intent to agree on only one tier of taxation, i.e. only 
at the residence level. The conclusion of a DTC under the traditional parameters of interest 
taxation – two tiers of taxation, i.e. low withholding tax at source plus residence taxation – 
maintains the same barriers that domestic legislation has in a scenario when there is no DTC. 
If source / developing countries renounce those rights, it will be less costly for borrowers to 
obtain debt capital from investors that are resident in developed countries. It also means the 
removal of the harmful effects of the additional costs that are associated with the practice of 
grossing up.552 As a consequence of the elimination of withholding taxation at source, the 
competition between lenders from both contracting states leads to a more level playing field 
and the most probable outcome will be, in addition to the reduction of the costs that are 
associated with debt financing, the free circulation of debt capital between the two 
contracting states. 
 
The idea is that the source country will renounce its preliminary taxing rights in pursuit of 
certain benefits. As regarding dividends, the author’s proposal is to facilitate and promote 
 
551 Mintz, Jack M. How Tax Barriers Stifle North American Capital-Market Efficiency -- and How Their 
Removal Would Deepen NAFTA Integration, 2003.  Available at: 
https://www.cdhowe.org/sites/default/files/attachments/other-
research/pdf/dismantiling%20tax%20barriers.pdf 
552 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Paragraph 2 of Commentary on Article 11: 
“In order to avoid that problem, creditors will, in practice, tend to shift to the debtor the burden of the tax levied 
by the State of source on the interest and therefore increase the rate of interest charged to the debtor, whose 
financial burden is then increased by an amount corresponding to the tax payable to the State of source.” 
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foreign investment within the borders of developing countries, while at the same time 
respecting an appropriate balance regarding the allocation of taxing rights. Hence, when, in 
a scenario between a developing and a developed country, the analysis of where the primary 
economic activity relating to the interest takes place has already been carried out, and, 
consequently, it is clear which country (borrower / source or lender / residence) deserves the 
preliminary rights to tax according to the origin of the income, then it is time to partially or 
completely renounce those rights with the aim of facilitating access to foreign debt by 
residents of the borrower / source / developing country. This can be achieved by granting an 
exemption at source and by giving exclusive taxing rights to the lender / residence country. 
Since this approach will be granted at the DTC level, it also ensures legal security and 
certainty for international lenders / investors and it assimilates the tax treatment of local and 
cross-border debt investors.  
 
Following the approach outlined above, the borrower / source country must refrain from 
taxing interest at the first tier at source, i.e. making the existence of cross-border juridical 
double taxation impossible. By doing so, the proposal achieves only one tier of taxation – in 
the lender / residence country – and therefore, the income will economically taxed only once. 
The total elimination of even the possibility of the existence of cross-border juridical double 
taxation is in the hands of the borrower / source country and this can be done by relinquishing 
the right to tax the foreign lender on interest income.  
  
Exemption at source will achieve an important reduction in the costs and barriers that are 
associated with cross-border debt financing. Furthermore, the corresponding free circulation 
of debt capital from the developed country to the developing country will effectively help in 
the development process of the borrower / source / developing country. The eradication of 
the withholding tax at source has the effect, from an economic perspective, of dismantling 
the greatest barrier for developing countries in relation to accessing cross-border debt. 
However, and according to this research’s approach of granting beneficial tax treatment to 
foreign investors only when there is a real benefit for the source / developing country (access 
to cross-border debt that helps in the development process of the country), exemption at 




This proposal differentiates between interest income that arises from non-beneficial debt, i.e. 
interest derived from debt capital that is not used in business activities in the borrower / 
source / developing country’s economy (or interest that derives from tax-abusive debt 
transactions) and interest income that arises from beneficial debt, i.e. interest derived from 
debt capital that is used in business activities in the borrower / source / developing country. 
Thus, considering that interest is per se a deductible expense at the payer level and, since 
according to this proposal the idea is to eliminate taxation at source and therefore leave 
exclusive taxing rights only to the lender / residence country, it is essential, in order for this 
proposal to be successful, to avoid granting beneficial tax treatment to interest that is derived 
from debts that do not effectively aid in the development process of the borrower / source / 
developing country or to interest that derives from tax abusive transactions.  
 
Source taxation will be applied to interest income that derives from debt capital not being 
used in business activities in the borrower / source / developing country, or interest that 
derives from tax abusive debt transactions. By reinstalling a withholding tax at source, the 
system will ensure real incentives for beneficial debt financing, i.e. debt capital that is 
effectively entering, with no tax abusive conditions, into the borrower / source / developing 
country’s economy and, therefore, aiding in the development process of those countries. This 
measure does not prevent additional measures from being enacted in domestic legislation that 
pertains to restrictions on the deductibility of interest at source.  
 
The transition from the primary to the secondary rule will be the consequence of the 
application by the borrower / source / developing country of an economic-substantive test, 
i.e. the impact of the foreign debt capital in the economy of the source country and of an 
arm’s length test in order to determine if related debt operations are agreed and fulfilled on 
similar terms to those entered into by independent parties (in order to avoid mispricing). 
Furthermore, it is also contingent on an agreement nature test that will be used in order to 
determine if the interest derives from an actual debt instrument or if it derives from a hybrid 
instrument (so as to avoid base erosion and non-taxation). 
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By renouncing this right, this proposal expects that the subscription of a DTC between a 
developing and a developed country will effectively encourage the residents of developed 
countries to finance businesses in developing countries. This research does not share the view 
of considering the approach of exempting interest income taxation at source and taxing 
interests income at the residence country as an approach that is more beneficial to the resident 
country than to the source country. DTCs must be beneficial to both signatory countries. 
While the source / developing country will benefit from the positive economic impact of the 
free circulation of debt capital from developed countries, i.e. more resources to create, for 
example, more business, and as a consequence, more employment and more development 
accompanied with revenue at source derived from VAT or taxation of business profits, the 
resident country must also receive certain benefits. What was achieved regarding dividends 
by removing barriers on the repatriation of benefits will be achieved in relation to interest by 
granting exclusive taxing rights to resident countries. This leaves countries of residence in a 
better position than the situation that they currently face under the current UN MTC. The fact 
that such exclusivity potentially means more revenue for resident countries when compared 
to the revenue expectations under the current UN MTC criteria means a benefit for the 
resident / developed country as a consequence of signing a DTC with a developing country.  
 
5.4 TESTS  
5.4.1 ECONOMIC-SUBSTANTIVE TEST 
 
 
As was stated in the analysis of dividends, i.e. that it is impossible to analytically separate 
the equity of the host company from the underlying business activities of the host company, 
in this case it is also impossible to separate debt capital from such activities. The UN MTC 
must include a test that is able to determine the real impact of the foreign debt – debt provided 
to the borrower company by a foreign unrelated / related party – in the economy of the host 
country. 
 
The aim of this economic substantive test is to differentiate between beneficial and less or 
non-beneficial foreign debt for countries that are in the process of development, i.e. debt as 
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part of the source country’s development process. It is necessary to determine the economic 
sector in which the debt is being used so as to determine if the foreign debt is actually having 
a positive effect on the economy of the source country.  
 
Such test can only be properly developed by economists and its promulgation naturally 
depends on each host / developing country’s economic characteristics.553 As regarding  equity 
/ dividends, it is impossible to define a concept of beneficial or non-beneficial debt capital 
applicable to all developing countries’ economies. Although each economy has different 
needs, the idea here is to not restrict the concept of useful debt only to the main business 
sector of the country. All productive sectors must be considered.  
 
With regard to the definition of beneficial and of non-beneficial debt, they will be left 
undefined in order for this to be decided by each country in accordance with the 
characteristics of their economies. The idea of this test is to promote access to foreign debt 
in order to finance business sectors that have a positive effect on the source country’s 
economy and, consequently, to positively assist, either directly or indirectly, in the host 
country’s development. In order to achieve this, it will be essential to ascertain the underlying 
business activities of the borrower company in the source country.   
 
By differentiating between beneficial and non-beneficial debt, the test will help to determine 
to which debt the DTC will grant, from a tax perspective, better tax conditions. Thus, if the 
foreign debt is considered by the borrower residence country as being used in the generation 
of productive activities within the borders of the source country, the source country will 
exempt the foreign lender from tax at source by eliminating the withholding tax on interest 
income. On the other hand, the source country will tax interest income that arises from debt 
that is considered by the host country to be a non-beneficial debt with a withholding tax.   
 
 
553 See: Soto, Marcelo. Capital Flows and Growth in Developing Countries: Recent Empirical Evidence, 
OECD Development Centre, Working Paper N°160, 2000.  Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/development/pgd/1922938.pdf ; De Gregorio, José; Edwards, Sebastián; and Valdés, 
Rodrigo.  Controls on capital inflows: do they work?, 2000. Valdés-Prieto, Salvador and Soto, Marcelo. The 
Effectiveness of Capital Controls: Theory and Evidence from Chile, 1998.  
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The elimination of the first tier of taxation does not mean that the effective tax rate of the 
foreign lender will be lower than the effective tax rate in a scenario where the foreign lender 
is taxed on interest income not only by the borrower residence country but also by the lender 
residence country. Interest will still only be economically taxed once, but instead of being 
shared between the borrower residence country and the lender residence country, taxing 
rights will be afforded exclusively to the lender residence country. The most positive direct 
effect of this measure will be the reduction of costs for the borrower’s residents in developing 
countries with the elimination of the grossing up practice, i.e. the elimination of the biggest 
commercial barrier to accessing foreign debt financing. The goal is to ensure that foreign 
lenders can compete in the borrower / source country without having to incur higher 
associated costs. The “gross up” practice cannot be a solution in this context. From one 
perspective, it eliminates the administrative barrier for the foreign lender, but from another 
perspective, there is an imposition of an important commercial barrier, i.e. the burden of the 
withholding tax is added as an additional cost of the loan.     
 
Modern DTCs, instead of facilitating the access to foreign debt for domestic business, have 
only focused on the amount of taxing rights that are to be allocated to each contracting state. 
The exemption of interest income at source in DTCs between developing and developed 
countries is, according to the traditional way of thinking, contrary to the legitimate rights of 
developing countries.  
 
As was stated in relation to dividends, the incorporation of a test is a means to go one step 
further than what is usually prescribed by DTCs. For the author, the relevance of the impact 
of the resources in the borrower / source / developing country is crucial for determining which 
debts must be treated preferentially in order to achieve: (1) access to foreign resources by 
businesses carried out in developing countries, and (2) incentives for lenders that are resident 
in developed countries to lend resources to businesses that are located in developing 
countries. 
 





The risk of base erosion as a result of abusive debt financing agreements requires, in the first 
instance, the economic substantive test to be complemented with an arm’s length test. The 
purpose of this test is to avoid mispricing by determining if related debt operations are agreed 
on similar terms to those entered into by independent parties. Thus, if the foreign debt passes 
the economic substantive test, it becomes necessary to determine if the interest that arises 
from that debt will have the effect of eroding the tax base of the borrower / source country. 
The interest deduction at source will erode the tax base of the source country if the terms of 
the loan have not been agreed in accordance with market conditions. Specifically, the test 
must analyse how much the borrowing entity could borrow if it were borrowing from an 
independent third party and if the price at which the amount is lent is similar to the pricing 
of independent party operations. Thus, the test is not only restricted to the quantum of the 
loan but also to the price at which the amount is actually lent. Notwithstanding that the ability 
to grant the right to deduct interest expenses at source is a matter for domestic law to 
determine, this proposal will deny the beneficial tax treatment granted in the DTC to the 
amount of debt that exceeds those parameters. As stated, when the sanction is a result of 
interest arising from non-beneficial debt, this measure does not prevent imposing additional 
measures in domestic legislation pertaining to restrictions on the deductibility of interest 
expenses at source. 
 
The author is aware that the main problem of this proposal is the likelihood that it will be 
successfully applied by developing countries with low tax administrative capacities. What 
was solved in the case of equity investments by including an alternative temporary measure 
approach cannot be achieved in the case of debt. However, it is expected that the experience 
of developing countries at the domestic level with the application of thin capitalization rules 








5.4.3 AGREEMENT NATURE TEST 
 
 
In a scenario where the proposals that have been promulgated in this research regarding the 
taxation of dividends and interest are in force, the benefit for hybrid instruments can be even 
higher than those that are currently achieved under the existing parameters. The fact that the 
general rule regarding dividend taxation will be taxation at the first and only tier as business 
profits, in addition to the lack of a withholding tax at source and exemption at residence, plus 
the fact that the general rule regarding interest taxation will be deduction at source, no 
withholding tax at source, and taxation at the first and only tier at the residence makes the 
outcome a dream situation for planners. Thus, a measure to determine the nature of the 
agreement is essential. The idea is to neutralize the effects of hybrid arrangements at the DTC 
level. Under the proposed scenario, the exchange of information between the two contracting 
states is of crucial importance. If there is no certainty that what the borrower / resident 
country considers as interest will also be considered as interest by the lender / resident 
country, the risk of triple non-taxation will render this proposal useless.  
 
The nature test therefore ends up being the analysis of the agreement and the determination 
of the tax consequences of the analysis. The source / borrower country must be sure that the 
tax treatment that the lender / resident country will give to the payment that arises from the 
agreement is in accordance with the real nature of the transaction. Adding an administrative 
burden to the source / borrower country does not seem, therefore, to be fair. Consequently, 
the source / borrower country will grant the tax benefits on the condition that the taxpayer 
provides a certificate issued by the tax authorities of the lender / resident country and which 
states that the payment from such an agreement is considered as interest and will be treated 
accordingly. In a DTC between a developing and a developed country, the administrative 
burden will be, in most cases, the responsibility of the developed country. According to the 
author’s proposal, lenders resident in developed countries will be in a better position if one 
compares the proposed treatment with the treatment they currently receive under the current 
UN MTC rules. Thus, a greater administrative burden, i.e. the analysis of the agreement and 
the determination of the tax treatment of the corresponding payment, does not seem to be 
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disproportionate, nor does it appear to be a measure that can affect the free access of foreign 
debt resources for businesses in developing countries. 
 
The proposed rule respects the principle that anti-avoidance rules do not seek to address the 
characterization of the instrument itself. By requiring the certificate, the rule only seeks to 
address the tax consequences of the hybrid mismatch arrangement.  
 
An alternative solution could be the inclusion of an obligation regarding the accounting 
standards used by residents (only from those involved in cross-border finance transactions) 
of contracting states that have a DTC according to the parameters proposed by the author. 
By doing so, it would be possible to ensure that transactions are catalogued and therefore 
treated equally in both contracting states. 
 
Both measures follow the same trajectory as the BEPS Project. Even though the 
consequences of hybrid instruments would be more harmful in a scenario as that provided by 
the author, rather than in the BEPS proposal (the actual state of the art), the objective is 
nevertheless the same: avoiding base erosion through the operation of hybrid mismatch 
arrangements. Even more – in this specific case the conclusion of a DTC between a 
developing and a developed country – these measures must also act as rules that either allow 
or disallow access to the benefits of that DTC. Without these access rules, abusive tax 
structures could achieve deduction at source, no withholding tax, and exemption at residence.  
 





The approach of limiting the role of DTCs so as to allocate taxing rights when most domestic 
legislation already does this, does not seem to be enough however. What is more, it is 
aggravated by the fact that the actual system maintains the greatest barrier to cross-border 




Those who advocate improving the actual situation by increasing source taxation of interest 
income through a withholding tax rely on the benefit theory by considering the fact that the 
borrower resident country facilitates the lender’s access to the market and therefore it 
deserves a portion of the taxing rights over the income. However, they forget that source 
countries have already taxed or will tax the profits that arise from businesses that are financed 
by those resources. The hypothetical revenue problem of source countries in such a scenario 
– deduction at source and the elimination of withholding tax – is mitigated, from a revenue 
perspective, by the fact that the easy access to foreign debt capital will increase the business 
profits of local businesses at source. However, the real benefit that this proposal is expected 
to bring is further assistance in the process of development. 
 
Considering the fact that taxation of interest at source under domestic legislation would be 
the rule in the cases where there is no DTC in force, the limitation of sovereignty regarding 
interest taxation that source / developing countries will face by concluding a DTC with a 
developed country must be economically counterbalanced. The easy and affordable access 
to foreign debt (in terms of non-additional cost and administrative burdens) will make foreign 
debt comparable to local debt, thereby increasing the existence of foreign beneficial debt and 
therefore it will have the effect of aiding in the development process of the source / 
developing country’s economy.  
 
Thus, it can be affirmed that it is necessary to revise the system of interest taxation that is 
prescribed by the UN MTC so that it can then be advocated. The fact that DTCs that follow 
the UN MTC have no effect in granting easy and affordable access to foreign debt from 
developed to developing countries naturally reinforces this proposal. The UN MTC must 
include, amongst its aims, the granting of easy and affordable foreign debt for domestic 
business in developing countries with the expectation that this will assist in that country’s 
development process.  
 
This research proposes a new article regarding the taxation of interest income for the UN 




(1) in order to incentivize the use of the UN MTC as the MTC to be followed in DTCs 
between developing and developed countries, the treatment of interest income must 
be beneficial for all actors, that is, to the lender residence country, to the borrower 
resident / developing country, to the lender, and to the borrower; 
(2) the income must be economically taxed only once; 
(3) taxing rights in relation to interest should be allocated in a coherent manner, 
irrespective of whether they arise in a developing or in a developed country;554 and 
(4) The business that is carried out by the borrower company within the borders of the 
source country, the arm’s length conditions of the agreement, and the avoidance of 
base erosion are the elements that must be considered in order to determine the real 
impact of the debt capital in the economy of the host country.  
 
As a consequence, this research proposes the following modification to Article 11 of the UN 
MTC in order to regulate the taxation of income from interest in DTCs between developed 






1. Interest derived from beneficial debt arising in a Contracting State and paid to a resident 
of the other Contracting State shall be taxable only in that other State.  
 
2. However, interest may also be taxed in both Contracting States when they derive from 
non-beneficial debt, or if they derive from hybrid agreements, or if by reason of a special 
relationship between the payer and the beneficial owner or between both of them and some 
other person, the amount of the interest, having regard to the debt claim for which it is paid, 
exceeds the amount which would have been agreed upon by the payer and the beneficial 
owner in the absence of such relationship. In this last situation, paragraph 1 shall apply only 
to the last-mentioned amount.  
 





3. The term “interest” as used in this Article means income from debt claims of every kind, 
whether or not secured by mortgage and whether or not carrying a right to participate in the 
debtor’s profits, and in particular, income from government securities and income from 
bonds or debentures, including premiums and prizes attaching to such securities, bonds or 
debentures. Penalty charges for late payment shall not be regarded as interest for the 
purposes of this Article.  
 
4. The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the interest, being 
a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other Contracting State in which 
the interest arises, through a permanent establishment situated therein, or performs in that 
other State independent personal services from a fixed base situated therein, and the debt 
claim in respect of which the interest is paid is effectively connected with (a) such permanent 
establishment or fixed base, or with (b) business activities referred to in (c) of paragraph 1 
of Article 7. In such cases the provisions of Article 7 or Article 14, as the case may be, shall 
apply.  
 
5. Interest shall be deemed to arise in a Contracting State when the payer is a resident of 
that State. Where, however, the person paying the interest, whether he is a resident of a 
Contracting State or not, has in a Contracting State a permanent establishment or a fixed 
base in connection with which the indebtedness on which the interest is paid was incurred, 
and such interest is borne by such permanent establishment or fixed base, then such interest 
shall be deemed to arise in the State in which the permanent establishment or fixed base is 
situated. 
 
6. The terms “beneficial” or “non- beneficial debt” used in this Article can be defined as 
follows: (a) Beneficial Debt: [the definition will be defined, according to their economic 
reality, by each developing country that subscribes this Model]; (b) Non-beneficial Debt: 
[the definition will be defined, according to their economic reality, by each developing 
country that subscribes this Model]. The definitions should be based on an economic-




7. To enjoy the one tier taxation level granted by this Article, the lender must obtain from the 
tax authorities of his country a certificate stating that for that country the payments of such 
agreement are considered as interest and therefore will be treated accordingly.  
 
5.6 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSAL 
 
 
The main objective of this proposal is to grant, through the UN MTC, more beneficial tax 
conditions to lenders that are resident in developed countries other than the conditions that 
are normally granted to them by domestic legislation. The proposal is based on the 
assumption that developing countries are willing to relinquish taxing rights over interest 
payments if the outcome of that decision leads to a positive increase in beneficial foreign 
debt investment that will assist in that country’s development process.     
 
The current UN MTC approach requires developing countries to partially relinquish their 
rights without necessarily obtaining positive results in relation to easy and convenient access 
to foreign debt. That outcome is usually also achieved by domestic laws without requiring a 
substantial limitation of taxing rights over interest income by the host / developing country. 
The domestic law approaches of developing countries regarding cross-border interest 
taxation normally tends, as MTCs do, to reduce withholding tax.  
 
The aim of this proposal is to reduce the three tax events of cross-border interest taxation, 
i.e. deduction in the hands of the borrower, source and residence taxation in the hands of the 
lender, to only two tax events, i.e. deduction in the hands of the borrower and residence 
taxation in the hands of the lender. By doing so, it will be possible for the lender to be treated 
equally as in domestic borrowing situations. The proposal achieves not only a level playing 
field, but also the elimination of the withholding tax barrier, and therefore, the costly 




Lastly, the proposal takes care of base erosion by negating beneficial treatment to interest 
agreed in tax abusive terms. Investors are also deprived of opportunities for tax abuse as a 
result of the beneficial tax treatment for equity and debt.  
      
As has already been stated in relation to dividends, this proposal modifies one of the 
traditional principles of MTCs with regard to interest. The allocation of taxing rights is no 
longer the direct result of the analysis of the primary economic activity analysis. The primary 
economic activity analysis serves as a tool for developing countries to know what they have 
and what they will lose or gain by signing a DTC that is based on this new MTC approach.  
 
Regarding interest, the result of the primary economic activity analysis was that, despite the 
strong logic of the position that the origin of the interest is always in the source country, 
because that is the country where the debtor produces the interest by using the debt capital to 
finance substantial business activity, it is also possible to find substantive arguments that 
suggest that the origin of interest may be located in the residence country, e.g. the existence 
of the capital. 
 
Finally, instead of sharing taxing rights as a result of the foregoing, the proposal calls for the 
renunciation of those preliminary taxing rights by source / developing countries with the aim 

















PART VI.  ROYALTIES: TESTS, NEW PROPOSAL, ROYALTIES TAXATION and the 
UN MODEL   
 
6.1 PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS: DEFINITION OF ROYALTIES  
 
 
The lack of a clear line between business income, service income, and royalty income is not 
conducive to achieving an appropriate approach for the purposes of DTCs in general. 
Furthermore, in DTCs concluded between developing and developed countries, it distorts the 
allocation of taxing rights in relation to royalty income. To a certain extent, this is due to the 
historical absence of proper concepts / definitions underlying the allocation rules that are 
contained in DTCs. However, it is worth pointing out that the 2017 UN MTC includes a new 
specific article for the treatment of technical services: new Article 12A. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, a proper delimitation of the incomes that should be covered by the royalty article 
compared to those that should be covered by the business income article is still necessary.  
 
Issues related to the definition are not exclusive to the UN MTC. Buitrago demonstrates the 
many misunderstandings that are related to the characterization of royalty income in her work 
on the concept of royalties in DTCs.555  The criteria for determining whether the proceeds of 
certain GRPs are to be regarded as royalty income in DTCs are somehow missing or they are 
not strong enough. The issues are further heightened by the use of civil law terminology that 
is used to define the income covered by the article, and the economic nature and functions 
normally related to passive income. Furthermore, she points out that the lack of delimitation 
is also related to the disagreement on the criteria regarding the allocation of taxing rights 
 
555 Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. El concepto de cánones y/o regalías en los Convenios para Evitar la Doble 
Imposición sobre la Renta, Valencia: Revista de Derecho Fiscal, 2007. p. 477. 
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between two contracting states and the economic importance and justification of the 
withholding tax to the source state – two core issues that are duly analysed in this research.  
 
Under the OECD MTC, developed countries are able to eliminate barriers to the trade in GRP 
that generate royalty income by allocating the taxing right to the country of residence of the 
beneficial owner of the payments i.e., no withholding tax at source. This approach, in 
absolute terms, is commensurate with this research. For developed countries, this approach 
has worked and there have been doubts about the necessity of including a separate article that 
deals solely with royalty income as opposed to rental income. The issue is a technical in 
nature and is therefore not a political question.  
 
The disagreement is also about the reasons for and the underlying purposes of the distribution 
of the potential tax revenue. As to Buitrago, the current definition of royalties in DTCs and 
MTCs lacks a clear rationale. She contends that the lack of delimitation is, amongst others, 
due to the disagreement on two different issues. The first regards the basic allocation of 
taxing rights between two contracting states and the economic importance and justification 
of the withholding tax to the state of source. In this respect she points out that the origin of 
the royalties has been considered to be either in the state of residence or the state of the 
source, or in both. The residence state claims the provision of the intellectual element, the 
creation and maintenance of the intangibles, and the investment in research and development 
whilst the source state argues to be the place where the use or exploitation of intangible assets 
occurs, the immediate economic origin, and the country from where payments come from 
and not necessarily the first user of intangibles. In addition to the theory of the origin and 
recognition of an intellectual element, Buitrago sums up other grounds claimed for the 
allocation of royalties, such as the existence of a technological or technical component, the 
contribution to the development of a country or the payment for such development, as well 
as the promotion of culture. She points to how DTCs become an instrument for the direction 
of the economic and social policy of the states, in particular when the arguments in favour of 
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the contribution to the development or the diffusion of culture and technology transfers are 
the leading ones.556 
 
The second issue concerns the disagreement about the reasons for and underlying purposes 
of the distribution of the potential tax proceeds. Buitrago  establishes that the arguments used 
whilst interpreting the royalty article, regarding its reasons and purposes, can be divided into 
two different groups. One set of reasons focuses either on the country in which the investment 
for the creation and safeguarding of the GRP were made, as well as the costs associated with 
the infrastructure used to do so (the state of residence), or in the country in which the GRP 
are used and the income arises (the state of source). The other elements used include: the 
recognition of an intellectual element, the existence of technological or technical elements, 
the contribution to the development of a country, the encouragement of a country’s culture, 
and even the entry of copyrights or patents in a public register.  In regard to this second set 
of arguments, Buitrago indicates that "it is difficult to specify the contribution that the reason 
for the distribution of income may represent in the interpretation of the concept of royalties, 
particularly in qualification problems”. The contribution to the development or promotion of 
technology transfers can be a reason for the attribution to one or another country, but they do 
not explain in any case, for example, that the taxation of computer programs must be carried 
out as literary, technical, or scientific work due to the greater or lesser contribution to 
technological or cultural development. It could perfectly be argued that, to the extent that 
royalties are higher and are assigned to the state of source, the greater the investment that the 
latter could make in technology would also be, as Directive 2003/49 / EC seems to recognize 
with the attribution of royalties to Spain in favour of the technological development plan. But 
Buitrago agrees with Brokeling, indicating that the Directive is more in line with supporting 
the idea of economists on the substitution of technology provided by the development of 
local research, given that the more royalties come from a specific state, the fewer research 
and development activities are carried out in it, which in turn would decrease the payment of 
royalties to that state. But apart from this circumstance, which does not seem to give any 
 
556 Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. El Concepto de Cánones y/o Regalías en los Convenios para Evitar la Doble 
Imposición sobre la Renta, CISS-Kluwer, Spain, 2007, p. 374. 
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further light to the interpretation, the context of CDIs does not usually deduce a particular 
purpose of the royalties article. 557 
 
Because of this, Buitrago claims that it is important to have clarity on the core of the 
definition prior to the distribution, by doing so DTCs can overcome many issues related to 
the interpretation and characterization of the income. While her work sheds some light on 
the scope of the definition, tackling issues related to the characterization and how it impacts 
the developed and the developing world, this research looks into the allocation rules and the 
purpose of the allocation. This author believes that it is fundamental for developing countries 
to review the allocation rule by establishing how the contribution to the development can be 
made through DTCs and the royalty article. The contribution to development is from my 
perspective and for the purposes of this research, the most important element that should be 
taken into consideration for the determining the criteria for the allocation of taxing rights in 
a DTC between developing and developed countries, thereby justifying – contrary to 
historical developing countries approach – the attribution of exclusive taxing rights to the 
country of residence. 
 
Despite the many issues engendered by the royalty income article, the OECD has stuck to 
the original scope of the article with very few corrections. The main one pertains to the 
exclusion from the definition of royalties of “payments for the leasing of containers” as well 
as “payments for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment”.558 559 560 The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs considered that the income 
generated from leasing industrial, commercial and scientific equipment should more 
logically fall under the rules in relation to taxing business profits (Article 7).561 Since then, 
 
557 Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. El Concepto de Cánones y/o Regalías en los Convenios para Evitar la Doble 
Imposición sobre la Renta, CISS-Kluwer, Spain, 2007, p. 372. 
558 While the definition of the term royalties in the 1963 Draft Convention and the 1977 DTC included 
“payments for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment”, the reference to 
these payments was subsequently deleted from the definition. Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation 
Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997. p. 782.  
559 This was the 1992 OECD Model that finally removes any reference to “equipment” from the definition of 
Royalties.  
560 Holmes, Kevin. International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction to Principles and 
Application, IBFD, 2007. p. 264. 
561 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Paragraph 4 Commentary on Article 7. 
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the definition of royalties found in the OECD MTC is framed in the following terms: 
“payments of any kind received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any 
copyright of literary, artistic or scientific work including cinematograph films, any patent, 
trade mark, design or model, plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning 
industrial, commercial or scientific experience”. By so doing, the OECD Committee on 
Fiscal Affairs ensures that those types of business income are subject to the rules that are 
applicable to the taxation of business income. 
 
The exclusion of payments relating to the leasing of containers points in the direction of 
restraining the scope of the royalty income definition to GRP that have an intellectual 
element. It seems that the OECD has correctly limited the definition to payments for the use 
of intellectual property, including copyrights, patents, know-how562 and secret processes. 
This definition of royalties relates, in general, to rights or property which constitutes different 
forms of literary and artistic property, the elements of intellectual property specified in the 
text of the article and information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience. 
Rent in respect of cinematograph films is also treated as royalties without prejudice to the 
fact that such films are exhibited in cinemas or broadcast on television. 563 
  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, many developed countries (including EU Member States) 
still follow the OECD MTC 1963 in this respect.564 In DTCs with or among developing 
countries, it is also common practice.  
  
In an attitude that is only justified by a short-term tax policy view, the UN MTC still 
maintains a reference to “payments for the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial 
or scientific equipment” in its definition of royalties. The above might be the consequence of 
the UN’s belief in the effectiveness of the UN MTC as a tool for increasing source taxation, 
 
562 Association des Bureaux pour la Protection de la Propriété Industrielle (ANBPPI) states that know-how is:  
“all the un-divulged technical information, whether capable of being patented or not, that is necessary for the 
industrial reproduction of a product or process, directly and under the same conditions; inasmuch as it is 
derived from experience, know how represents what a manufacturer cannot know from mere examination of 
the product and mere knowledge of the progress of technique.”  
563 Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997. p. 782.  
564 Holmes, Kevin. International Tax Policy and Double Tax Treaties: An Introduction to Principles and 
Application, IBFD, 2007. p. 264. 
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allowing Article 12 to function more effectively as a “source country rule”.565 That logic 
assumes as correct the idea that by leaving those payments under Article 12, source countries 
would be able collect more revenue. As is stated throughout this research, the author’s view 
is that the free trade of GRP that generate royalty income could effectively aid in the 
development of the developing country with the aggregate and positive effect of collecting 
more revenue from the increase of, for example, business profits at source. There is a lack of 
analysis regarding the benefits of those source rules, i.e. withholding tax at source according 
to a broad definition of royalty income, compared with the potential benefits of development 
and revenue from business profits.  
 
Since the OECD MTC and the UN MTC allocate taxing rights on royalty income differently 
(the OECD MTC grants exclusive taxing rights to the residence country, whereas the UN 
MTC allocates taxing rights between the source and the residence country by granting a 
limited withholding tax on a gross basis to the source country), the hypothetical elimination 
of the phrase “the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment” 
from the UN MTC definition would result in a restriction of the source countries’ right to 
tax. This was not a real concern for the representatives of developed countries in the OECD 
when the phrase was eliminated from the definition of royalties contained in the OECD MTC. 
The removal of these payments from the scope of Article 12 of the OECD MTC resulted in 
those payments falling within the scope of Article 7 on business profit. Therefore, from the 
perspective of the allocation of taxing rights and in accordance with the OECD MTC 
structure, nothing has changed. Because it is unlikely that the performance of these types of 
services can be considered as a permanent establishment, the residence country normally 
retains full taxing rights in relation to those services. In other words, the level of taxing rights 
of source countries in a DTC based on the OECD MTC has remained the same, even after 
the removal of those services from the definition of royalties. However, if the same phrase 
were to be removed from the UN MTC definition, the source country that has entered into a 
DTC based on the UN MTC would actually lose taxing rights.  
 
 
565 United Nations, Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters. Eleventh Session, 
Geneva, October 2015. The character and purpose of Article 12 with reference to “industrial, commercial and 
scientific equipment” and software-payment related issues. Discussion Paper: Prepared by Wilkie, Scott J. 
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The clarification of the tax treatment of income derived from services related to the leasing 
of containers and the use of containers, or the right to use industrial, commercial or scientific 
equipment, i.e. to treat them as business income and not as royalty income, is commensurate 
with the notion of taxing income according to its nature and origin.  
 
Some developing countries insist on including business income within the scope of the 
royalty article. The reason for this is that source countries are tempted to use the broadest 
concept of royalties in order to extend their level of taxing rights. In the case of Chile, all of 
the DTCs in force include, under the scope of royalties, the phrase “payments for the use of, 
or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment”.566 It is noteworthy that 
although Chile is one of the more developed economies in Latin America (it has been an 
OECD member since 2010), it is still a developing country. Whether following the OECD 
approach to the allocation of royalty income is better for Chile is something that needs to be 
more intensely scrutinized. However, as was indicated above, Chile does not follow the 
OECD’s approach in relation to the allocation of royalty income. Even more, some countries 
take the view that the expression “information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific 
 
566 DTC between the Republic of Chile and Australia signed the 10th of March of 2010; DTC between the 
Republic of Chile and the Republic of Austria signed the 6th of December of 2012; DTC between the Republic 
of Chile and the Kingdom of Belgium signed the 6th of December of 2017; DTC between the Republic of Chile 
and Brazil signed the 3rd of April of 2001; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Government of Canada 
signed the 21st of January of 1998; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Colombia signed 
the 19th of April of 2007; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Korea signed the 20th of 
October of 2003; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Croatia signed the 24th of June of 
2003; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Kingdom of Denmark signed the 10th of February of 2005; 
DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Ecuador signed the 26th of August of 1999; DTC 
between the Republic of Chile and the Kingdom of Spain the 7th of July of 2003; DTC between the Republic 
of Chile and the Republic of France signed the 7th of June of 2004; DTC between the Republic of Chile and 
Ireland signed the 2nd of June of 2005; DTC between the Republic of Chile and Malaysia signed the 3rd of 
September of 2004; DTC between the Republic of Chile and New Zealand signed the 10th of December of 
2003; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Paraguay signed the 30th of August of 2005; 
DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Peru signed the 8th of June of 2001; DTC between the 
Republic of Chile and the Republic of Poland signed the 27th of March of 2004; DTC between the Republic of 
Chile and the Republic of Portugal signed the 7th of July of 2005; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed the 12th of July of 2003; DTC between the 
Republic of Chile and Russia signed the 19th of November of 2004; DTC between the Republic of Chile and 
the Kingdom of Sweden signed the 4th of June of 2004; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Swiss 
Confederation signed the 2nd of April of 2008; DTC between the Republic of Chile and the Kingdom of 
Thailand signed the 8th of September of 2006. 
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experience” includes certain technical services.567 The inclusion of the new Article 12A goes 
in the direction of taxing service / business / active income in a separate Article but in the 
same way as royalties. 
 
The allocation of royalty income is intertwined with issues of income characterization.  This 
is an Achilles heel in the application of DTCs between developed and developing countries 
and in DTCs between developing countries. This is due to the fact that developing countries 
tend to broaden the scope of the royalty article by including payments related to technical 
assistance, technical services and certain other services. This makes income characterization 
more complex and it creates a grey area due to the already complex issues inherent in 
characterizing the concept of know-how.568  In this type of contract, one of the parties agrees 
to impart to the other its special knowledge and experience which remains unrevealed to the 
public. As has been confirmed by Vogel, it is recognized that the grantor is not required to 
play any part itself in the application of the formulas granted to the licensee and that grantor 
does not guarantee the results thereof.569 This type of contract can be contrasted with 
contracts for the provision of services. Payments received as consideration for services 
rendered do not constitute royalties. However, in practice, know-how contracts normally 
include some service elements. The most typical case is that of a franchising contract. In 
these types of contracts, the franchisor imparts its knowledge and experience to the 
franchisee, as well as some technical assistance which in certain cases is backed up with 
financial assistance and the supply of goods.570 Thus, in the case of mixed contracts, it is 
necessary to determine the applicable tax rule according to the information contained in the 
contract or by means of a reasonable apportionment. However, and especially if the source 
country is a developing country, if one part of what is being provided predominantly 
constitutes the principal purpose of the contract and the other part is merely an ancillary and 
unimportant part of the contract, then it is justifiable to apply the OECD tax rule included in 
 
567 United Nations BEPS Project: Taxation of Services. Report by Coordinator Liselott Kana. Committee of 
Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Seventh Session, 2016. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP1_Services.pdf 
568 Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. El concepto de cánones y/o regalías en los Convenios para Evitar la Doble 
Imposición sobre la Renta, Valencia: Revista de Derecho Fiscal, 2007. p. 85. 
569 Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997. p. 783. 
570 Ibid, 570.  
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the commentaries on the characterization of the payments following that of the main part in 
relation to the whole amount of the consideration.571    
 
The argument behind the UN MTC, in the case of business income that is treated as royalty 
income and also on the basis of the approach of some developing countries of considering 
the consideration for services rendered as royalty income, is a policy that is (incorrectly) 
aimed at protecting the tax base of countries that import intangibles, i.e. normally developing 
countries. Under this misconception, developing countries demonstrate that they are 
interested in a broad concept of royalties so that they can levy tax on more income at source. 
It does not make sense for the fiscal policy of a developing country, with regard to the 
agreement of a DTC with a developed country, to be based on short-term revenue 
expectations rather than on the country’s development. For the author, this is not a reasonable 
policy and it is a consequence of having lost sight of the role, effects and aims of DTCs 
between developing and developed countries. In Latin America, this view has been highly 
criticized by Buitrago and Hoyos. In their view, the policy adopted by the Andean 
Community and the way that policy was implemented in Colombia has not helped in the 
development of the country.  One of the issues they pointed out was the shift of the tax cost 
to the domestic taxpayers, obliging them to engage in grossing up, which in turn makes the 
technical and technological development more expensive since they cannot be credited or 
deducted.572 And, this comes only when the additional and burdensome administrative 
requirements for the registration of the contracts and of payments abroad have been complied 
with.  Furthermore, in her view, the conflict simply grows, considering the terrible 
mischaracterization issues related to the inclusion of technical services, technical assistance 
and other services in the definition of royalties for the purposes of tax treaties. As for 
Buitrago, the high risk of withholding taxes resulting in excessive double taxation is 
 
571 Ibid, 570. 
572 See: Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. Propiedad intelectual en la mira de la política comercial y tributaria. 
Lecciones de Derecho Tributario Inspiradas por un Maestro (en homenaje a don Eusebio González García), 
2010; Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. Políticas Públicas y Tributación Internacional, Foro Economía del Derecho 
de Autor, 2010; Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. Propiedad Intelectual y Desarrollo tras el Acuerdo sobre los 
ADPIC, Revista EPI, 2009. 
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aggravated by the fact that withholding taxes are imposed on gross revenues, whereas income 
taxes are imposed on net earnings / profits.573  
 
By broadening the definition of royalties, the UN has managed to broaden the base. This 
intention is very clear in the MTC, which states that it favours the retention of greater “source 
country” taxing rights under a tax treaty — the taxation rights of the host country of 
investment — in comparison to those of the “residence country” of the investor.574 The 
royalty article emphasizes this approach by allocating taxing rights to both countries: the 
source country and the residence country. The broadening of the tax base is therefore a highly 
conflicting issue in this debate.  
 
An example of the above is illustrated by Kim Brooks in his work entitled: “Tax Treaty 
Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries: A Comparison of Canada and 
Australia`s Policy”.575 This study begins from the premise that high income countries 
(developed countries for the purposes of this research) should further the cause of reducing 
global inequality by ensuring that in their DTCs with low income countries (developing or 
not developed countries for the purposes of this research) they do not usurp much-needed 
revenues by reducing the ability of the low income country to collect tax on income with a 
source in that low income country. The statement quoted assumes, as an underlying premise, 
that developed countries should use their DTCs to assist developing countries and that tax 
revenue is what developing countries need. Even though there are some generous voluntary 
practices, it is not a principle that can justify such a tax policy. A DTC must be designed on 
the basis of the real economic benefits that the conclusion of such an agreement can provide 
to each signatory country, which for the author, in the case of developing countries, cannot 
be anything other than development. 
 
 
573 Buitrago Diaz, Esperanza. The impact of international direct taxation on the economic exploitation of 
copyrights, SERCI, 2010. Available at http://www.serci.org/2010/buitrago.pdf 
574 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 
Developed and Developing Countries, 2017.  
575 Brooks, Kim. Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries: A Comparison of 
Canada and Australia`s Policies, eJournal of Tax Research, Vol 5, 2007.  
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What is surprising is the fact that the UN approach is shared not only by developing countries 
but also by some BRIC countries. In 2001, the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs led a 
study based on the characterization of 28 e-commerce transactions. A working group of the 
OECD determined that only three of those transactions could be identified as royalties (under 
the UN MTC shared taxation between the source and the residence country; under the OECD 
MTC exclusive rights to tax for the residence country), while the rest could only be 
characterized as business profits576 (under the UN and the OECD MTCs these are not taxed 
at source unless the taxpayer has a permanent establishment in the source country). The 
Ministry of Finance of India report concluded that 14 out of the 28 e-commerce transactions 
could be categorized as royalties.577  
 
The case of Brazil is even more extreme. Although not a policy shared by the UN, it is worth 
mentioning that Brazilian DTCs include fees for technical assistance and technical services 
in their definition of royalties. Until 2014, the rule was applied without any distinction being 
made by the Brazilian tax authorities. The criteria changed two years after the decision that 
was adopted by the Superior Court of Justice in the Special Appeal number 1.161.147/RS578 
where, in a case involving the contracting of services from overseas without any transfer of 
technology, the understanding prevailed that Article 7 of the DTC should be applied.  For the 
author, from the perspective of a DTC’s structure, this is a significant problem as it is not 
only a misconceived interpretation of the UN MTC but also a way of thinking about 
developing countries’ (and even BRIC) negotiators.      
 
As indicated above, one of the main issues in the UN context is how to increase “source” 
country taxation.579 The Committee has referred to a number of alternatives for doing so, 
including a provision for permanent establishment services and giving a broader scope to the 
definition of royalties than that which is currently applicable in the context of the OECD. 
 
576 OECD. Tax Treaty Characterisation Issues Arising from E-Commerce and Taxation, 2001. Report issued 
by the Technical Advisory Group on Treaty Characterisation of Electronic Commerce Payments to Working 
Party Nº1 of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 2001, Annex 2.  
577 India. Report of the High-Powered Committee on Electronic Commerce and Taxation, 2001, Annex 2.  
578 Dated 17 May 2012. 




The current trend seems to be towards the inclusion of all types of tangible assets instead of 
the odd classification of industrial, commercial or scientific equipment.580 This goes far 
beyond the proposals made by the UN to the royalty article in 2016581. This approach 
therefore needs to be rebalanced.  
 
A clear scope is absolutely necessary if the idea is to develop a fair approach to the allocation 
of taxing rights in DTCs between developing and developed countries. This, in addition to 
the analysis of where the primary economic activity generating royalties arises and the 
evaluation of the real economic benefits that the transfer of technology can create in the 
source country, are, for the author, the core elements of a fair MTC regarding the allocation 
of taxing rights in relation to royalty income. This is because tax treaties in developing 
countries should not simply focus on only implementing technical solutions to technical tax 
problems, but should also respond to policy and contribute to development.  
 
For the author, the statement that the origin of royalties is shared between the two countries 
is valid regarding the GRP that are covered by the definition.  Furthermore, in all cases it 
should be possible to more or less identify the relationship between the time and resources 
that have been invested by the owner in developing those intangibles in its country of 
residence, and of the conditions provided by the source country to exploit the intangible, with 
the royalty income.  
 
Despite there being a number of arguments that could be raised as to the proper definition of 
royalties, this research will assume that the definition provided by the OECD MTC is 
accurate. The UN MTC offers a broader definition of royalties, whilst the OECD MTC has 
curtailed its definition to include to some GRP which are primarily of an intangible-
intellectual character.   
 
 
580 United Nations, Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters Twelfth Session, 2016. 
Available at: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/12STM_CRP8_Royalties.pdf, p. 11.  




For the sake of clarification, the adjusted definition will be as follows: “payments of any kind 
received as a consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic 
or scientific work including cinematograph films, any patent, trade mark, design or model, 
plan, secret formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or 
scientific experience”.582 In other words, the exploitation – payments of any kind received as 
consideration for the use or the right to use – of rights or property constituting different forms 
of literary and artistic property, the elements of intellectual property specified in the 
definition and information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific experience,  
constitute royalties. 
 
It is undeniable that there is still a need for further precision. For the purposes of this research, 
however, this definition is sufficient as it draws a reasonable line between royalty income 
and active income (income derived from services and business). This notwithstanding, the 
author does not share the view that the incorporation of Article 12 A in relation to the 
allocation of taxing rights (a subject not discussed in this work because it relates to the 
allocation of taxing rights of active income), helps to curtail the definition of royalties. 
Ultimately, if some business incomes are included within the scope of Article 12, that should 
not distort the outcome of this proposal, namely that, unless the income is covered by Article 
12 A, most of those forms of income should not be taxable at source either as business income 
(Article 7) or as royalty income (Article 12). 
 




The OECD MTC approach of fully allocating taxing rights to the country of residence, i.e. 
developed countries where residents possess technology, has its origin in the economic 
benefits provided to each signatory country as a result of the DTC. In the period immediately 
after World War II, Western European countries needed to attract technology from the United 
 
582 OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, 2017. Article 12 paragraph 2. 
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States in order to rebuild and modernize their war-ravaged economies.583 Regardless of the 
bargaining position of the United States, the ultimate goal of the DTCs concluded during that 
period was to contribute to the development of European economies. This was not achieved 
by granting more taxing rights, but rather by facilitating the transfer of technology.584 
Therefore, in order to facilitate the trade of GRP that generate royalty income, European 
countries were willing to give up their taxing rights in relation to this royalty income.  
 
This logic simply reaffirms what this research states concerning the study that was carried 
out by Kim Brooks.585 The approach of the DTCs concluded immediately after World War 
II was not to usurp much-needed revenues by reducing the ability of source countries to 
collect tax, the aim was rather to grant real economic benefits to those source countries. This 
was done by concluding DTCs with countries where the technology was developed. The 
underlying principle behind that policy is the one that must now govern the conclusion of 
DTCs between developing and developed countries. 
 
The same can be said regarding Lee Sheppard’s statement in his publication “Revenge of the 
Source Countries, part IV: Who Gets the Bill?”, where he affirms that the international tax 
system has been set up in order to preserve residence-based taxation by rich capital-importing 
countries at the expense of everyone else.586 It seems to this author, based on the remarks 
mentioned above, that the facts present in that statement may not be entirely correct. The 
origin of the approach to the allocation of taxing rights regarding royalty income 
demonstrates that the original underlying purpose was the economic benefits that source 
economies could obtain by concluding a DTC with a developed country, rather than the 
amount of revenue they could collect. If, according to that logic, a DTC determines that 
residence countries should maintain their rights to tax, then there is nothing wrong with that 
decision. However, Lee Sheppard’s statement is accurate from the perspective of the 
 
583 Irish, Charles R. International Double Taxation Agreements and Income Taxation, The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol 23, 1974. 
584 Vogel, Klaus. Klaus Vogel on Double Taxation Conventions, 3rd ed., 1997. p. 1163. 
585 Brooks, Kim. Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries: A Comparison of 
Canada and Australia’s Policies, eJournal of Tax Research, Vol 5, No. 2, 2007. 
586 Sheppard, Lee. Revenge of the Source Countries, part IV: Who Gets the Bill?, Tax Note International, 2005. 
p. 411.  
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allocation of taxing rights according to the international tax criteria used by the UN MTC 
since then, i.e. the determination of the level of taxing rights according to revenue 
expectations rather than the real economic benefits. The full allocation of taxing rights to the 
resident exporting country can be regarded as fair if the conclusion of the DTC engenders a 
real economic benefit to the source importing country, i.e. in the context of this research, to 
the developing country.  
 
The Human Development Report issued by the UN in 2002587 stated that, in that year, the 
residents of countries with high human development were granted an average of 250 patents 
per million people. By way of contrast, only seven patents per million people were granted 
in medium human development countries and no patents were granted in low human 
development countries. As a consequence, similar disparities can be observed in relation to 
the receipt of royalty and licence fees. In 2003, in high human development countries, an 
average of approximately US$80 per person was received from royalties and licence fees. By 
way of contrast, an average of only 30 cents per person was received in medium human 
development countries and no royalties were received in low human development 
countries.588 589 Thus, due to the non-reciprocal exchange of GRP that generate royalty 
income between developed and developing countries, if the transfer from the developed to 
the developing country does not bring about any real economic benefits to the source country, 
subscribing to a DTC with a developed country under an actual UN MTC means the 
maintenance of domestic law barriers for trade in GRP, and also, a mechanism to transfer 
taxing rights from developing to the developed countries.  
  
Exclusive taxing rights for the residence country facilitates the transfer of GRP that are able 
to generate royalty income from suppliers in resident countries (developed countries in the 
context of this research) to investors in source countries (developing countries in the context 
of this research). As in the case of interest income, one of the main arguments in support of 
 
587 United Nations, Human Development Report, 2002. Available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/263/hdr_2002_en_complete.pdf 
588 Ibid, 585. 
589 Brooks, Kim. Tax Treaty Treatment of Royalty Payments from Low-Income Countries: A Comparison of 
Canada and Australia’s Policies, eJournal of Tax Research, Vol 5, No. 2, 2007.  
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this approach is if withholding taxes are imposed on royalties, the licensor will demand that 
the tax must be paid by the licensee in the source country, i.e. grossed up.  
 
In order for the transfer of GRP that generate royalty income to be regarded as beneficial, it 
needs to be useful to the source country, otherwise it does not make sense for source 
developing countries to give up their taxing rights. Thus, if there is a real economic benefit 
to the source developing country, this proposal supports the idea of granting unlimited and 
exclusive taxing rights to the residence country. In so doing, international trade and 
investment, in this specific case, the transfer of royalty-generating GRP, e.g. technology, will 
be unhindered. 
 
6.3 PRIMARY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY GENERATING ROYALTIES 
 
One of the main questions underlying the taxation and allocation of royalty income pertains 
to the origin of royalty income. Where does the primary economic activity of royalties take 
place? In order to determine where the economic activity related to royalties takes place, it 
is necessary to look at the origin of royalties. As in the case of dividends and interest, the 
view of this research is that the origin of royalties is shared between two countries. That is, 
the origin of income from royalties is partially in the place where the investment for the 
creation (or the cost associated with the acquisitions), and the costs related to safeguarding, 
as well as the costs associated with the infrastructure used for, the creation and conservation 
of royalty-generating GRP income were made; and partially in the place where the GRP that 
generate royalty income is used. This is determined on the basis of the conditions provided 
by the source country to exploit those GRP, i.e. the infrastructure, the educated workforce 
that helps in the exploitation of those GRP and, naturally, the market place for the licensee. 
Thus, although one should acknowledge the legitimate rights of the source country – because 
the payment of royalties is the direct consequence of the use of those GRP – it is undeniable 
that those payments are also possible due to the existence of those GRP. In other words, if 
the licensor had never developed or acquired the GRP, it would not have generated any 
income. Thus, as in the country of residence of the user of the GRP, the expectation of the 
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country of residence of the developers or owners of the GRP to make the income generated 
participate in the public expenses are, for this research, valid.  
 
Eric Kemmeren opines that the origin of royalties lies exclusively in the place where it has 
been produced.590 However, he postulates that for the purposes of the allocation of taxing 
rights, royalties should be divided into four parts: (1) compensation for write-offs on the 
original market value of the intangible property concerned;591 (2) compensation for 
maintaining the intangible property; (3) compensation for bearing the risks; and (4) an 
interest component.592 In so doing, he concludes that some (1, 2 and 3) of these components 
must be attributed to the country in which the owner of the intangible performs the activity, 
i.e. typically the country in which the intangible property has been developed and, therefore, 
it should be taxed accordingly. He believes that the state where that development is carried 
out should be considered to be the country of origin, i.e., the residence country. In addition 
to all of foregoing, Kemmeren argues that the interest component (4) must be attributed to 
the country in which the intangible is being used, i.e. the source country. He proposes, by 
way of an example, that a standard could be included in the DTC on the basis of which the 
interest part could be determined, e.g. Libor plus X.  
 
Kemmeren solved the problem of the legitimacy of source country taxation by dissecting the 
retribution into more than one element. For this research, it seems that he could not overcome 
the paradigm that the user of the GRP cannot simply produce royalty income, i.e. in his 
words, “the overwhelming relevance of the intellectual element in the production of the 
income”. The underlying reasoning behind that conclusion is that the developer or owner of 
the GRP produces royalty income through the exploitation of those GRPs and the user of 
those GRP only uses the intellectual element derived from someone else in order to produce 
business income. Kemmeren’s reasoning begins by assuming that the economic activity that 
 
590 Kemmeren, Eric C.C.M. Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models, The Netherlands, 
Pijnenburg, 2001.  
591 The write-off is based on the costs of the production of the intangible property.  
592 For Kemmeren this element only exists in the case of periodic payments. He correctly states that a person 
who receives royalty income for the use or the right to use an intangible property is economically receiving a 
lump sum in a deferred way. Therefore, an interest component is probably undeniable.  
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gives rise to the income is related to the creation of the intangible property. He literally states 
that “the cause of the royalty income received is the creation of the intellectual property”.593  
 
An alternative approach, similar to Kemmeren’s, may be to allocate taxing rights depending 
on the right of the owner of the GRPs (developer or acquirer) to deduct the expenses of the 
development or to depreciate the costs associated with the acquisition of those GRPs in its 
country of residence. It could be argued that preferential rights should be given to the country 
of residence until the expenses related to the development or the costs associated with the 
acquisition of those GRP are covered by the inflows deriving from the licence agreements. 
It could also be required that a reasonable profit margin after costs be generated.  
 
Notwithstanding that the outcome of Kemmeren’s proposal, or the alternative, it must be 
asked whether they can be considered as fair (i.e. to grant exclusive taxing rights to the 
residence country over three of the four elements of the retribution and exclusive taxing 
rights to the source country over only one of them; or to grant preferential taxing rights to 
the residence country only until the expenses of the development or costs associated to the 
acquisition of those GRPs has been already covered). This author suggests that, from an 
allocation of taxing rights perspective, and with the aim of eliminating barriers to the trade 
in those GRP so as to achieve real benefits for source / developing countries, a fair result 
would be better achieved by granting exclusive taxing rights to the residence country. The 
country of source must renounce those rights. Both proposals share the same problem, that 
despite the level of source taxation which will nevertheless occur, the problem of the “gross 
up” practice will remain an enormous barrier to the free circulation of GRP that generate 
royalty income between developed and developing countries. 
 
Kemmeren also stated that the place in which the intangible has been produced is not 
necessarily the country of residence of the owner of the intangible. This is a quite a common 
topic in the discussion relating to the taxation of royalties and a great deal has been written 
about issues related to the recipient and the beneficial owner, as well as the many abuses of 
 
593 Kemmeren, Eric C.C.M. Principle of Origin in Tax Conventions: A Rethinking of Models, The Netherlands, 
Pijnenburg, 2001.  
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DTCs on this basis. BEPS deals with that situation. Considering that the aim of this research 
is only to focus on the allocation of GRP that generate royalty income under DTCs concluded 
between developing and developed countries, it will be assumed that the basic case of an 
international transfer of GRP in which the owner of those GPR (developer or acquirer) – 
whether a natural or legal person – resides in the same country where the expenses and costs 
associated with those GRP have been incurred. Exceptional situations can affect the analysis 
of the main rule. Those cases will be left for further research on the topic, however. The case 
does not consider situations where the GRP have not been exploited in the country where the 
licensee is resident. It indeed assumes that the country of residence of the licensee is the 
country in which the GPR that produce the income is exploited. 
 
6.4 RENUNCIATION OF PRELIMINARY RIGHTS  
 
 
What happens in practice differs from this research proposal regarding the taxation of royalty 
income in DTCs between developing and developed countries, i.e. one tier of taxation. By 
way of contrast to interest income, it is difficult to find DTCs signed between developing and 
developed countries where the source country waives the right to tax royalty income. What 
is common in DTCs between developed countries, however, is not common in those DTCs 
signed between developing and developed countries. 
 
The elimination of a withholding tax at source, as regarding interest, means the elimination 
of probably the highest barrier to the cross-border transfer of GRP that generate royalty 
income from developed to developing countries. The author is convinced that the potential 
benefits for developing countries – acting as source countries or countries where the GRP 
that are developed in developed countries are exploited – as a result of eliminating the 
withholding tax, would definitely justify the intention to agree on only one tier of taxation, 
i.e. only by the country where the GRP have been developed or acquired / the residence 
country. The conclusion of a DTC under the UN MTC’s conception of royalty taxation – two 
tiers of taxation, i.e. low withholding tax at source plus residence taxation – would maintain 




Furthermore, as was already pointed out in relation to dividends and interest, this change 
would make it less costly for residents in developing countries to access, for example, useful 
technology developed by residents of developed countries. As a consequence, this would lead 
to more chances for these countries to move away from being categorized as developing 
countries and they would gradually move, through development, towards being considered 
as belonging to the category of developed countries. The grossed-up practice regarding 
royalty payments might be, as regards interest, the greatest barrier to the free circulation of 
intangibles between developed and developing countries. The removal of withholding taxes 
on royalties –  source taxation –  would benefit developing countries since it would eradicate 
the additional costs (gross up) associated with the use of GRP covered by the royalty article.  
 
In so doing, the source country would renounce its preliminary taxing rights in pursuit of 
certain benefits. As discussed in relation to dividends and interest, the author’s proposal is to 
facilitate and promote foreign investment in developing countries, which could be achieved 
by ascertaining the appropriate approach in relation to the allocation of taxing rights. Hence, 
in a scenario between a developing and a developed country, the analysis of where the 
primary economic activity that relates to the royalty income takes place is already carried out 
and, therefore, it will be clear which country, i.e. (1) the country where the investment for 
the creation or the cost associated with the acquisitions, and the costs related to safeguarding, 
as well as the costs associated with the infrastructure used for the creation and conservation 
of GRP that generate royalty income were made; or (2) the country where the GRP that 
generate royalty income are used deserves the preliminary right to tax according to the origin 
of that income. It is now time for developing countries to give up those rights with the aim 
of facilitating the access of their residents to, for example, technology developed by the 
residents of developed countries. This can be achieved by granting an exemption at source 
and endowing the residence country with exclusive taxing rights in relation to that 
technology.  
   
Following the approach outlined above, the source country must refrain from taxing royalty 
payments made to the residents of developed countries with which they have concluded a 
 
 238 
DTC. If this is the case, cross-border juridical double taxation would be eradicated. This 
proposal relies on one tier of taxation at the level of the beneficial owner of the GRP, i.e. the 
country where the investment for the creation, or the cost associated with the acquisitions, 
and the costs related to safeguarding, as well as the costs associated with the infrastructure 
used for the creation and conservation of the GRP that generates the royalty income were 
made.   That income will only be economically taxed once. The total elimination of cross-
border juridical double taxation depends on the source country and can be done by 
relinquishing the right to tax the foreign licensee on any royalty income. 
 
As indicated previously, a great deal has been written about the issues surrounding the 
recipient and the beneficial owner, as well as the many abuses of DTCs on this basis. Both 
the OECD MTC and the UN MTC rely on the beneficial owner concept in order to avoid 
granting  benefits provided in the MTC to taxpayers that do not deserve those benefits – a 
phenomenon known as ‘treaty shopping’. This mechanism is founded on the premise that the 
real economic recipient or owner of the GRP is a resident of the residence country or the 
country where the intangible has been developed. Thus, if this is not the case, the source 
country / the country where the intangible is used may tax (in the case of the OECD MTC) 
or tax without limitations (in the case of the UN MTC) the royalty payments to a resident of 
the residence country / country where the intangible has been developed.   
 
This proposal goes one step further in relation to the functionality of the beneficial owner 
concept. A proper backstop for a DTC between developing and developed countries should 
not be restricted by the residence, or lack thereof, of the real economic recipient or owner of 
the GRP. This proposal attaches more weight to the economic impact of the transaction in 
the economy of the source country / country where the GRP are used.     
 
Exemption at source can achieve an important reduction in the costs and barriers associated 
with the cross-border transfer of GRP that generate royalty income, for example technology, 
from developed to developing countries. Accordingly, exemption would effectively help in 
the development process of the source country / country where the GRP are used. In line with 
what was stated in relation to interest, the eradication of the withholding tax at source 
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removes the greatest tax barrier for developing countries regarding access to technology in 
developed countries, at least from an economic perspective. This, combined with the main 
principle of this proposal, i.e. to grant beneficial tax treatment to foreign investors only when 
there is a real benefit for the source / developing country, results in the logical outcome that 
the benefit of exemption at source will only be granted to the cross-border transfer of GRP 
that generate royalty income and which effectively assist in that country’s development 
process. Therefore, and as was stated in relation to interest, exemption at source would not 
be the rule for all cases.  
 
This proposal differentiates between royalty income that derives from non-beneficial GRP 
for the source / developing country’s economy (or royalty income that derives from tax-
abusive transactions), and royalty income that derives from beneficial GRP for the source / 
developing country’s economy. Thus, considering that royalty payments are a deductible 
expense at the payer level per se, and given that according to this proposal there will be no 
taxation at source – thereby leaving exclusive taxing rights only to the residence country / 
country where the GRP are owned – it follows that the success of this proposal is contingent 
on the avoidance of granting beneficial tax treatment to royalty income that derives from 
GRP that do not effectively assist in the development process of the source country or to 
royalty income that derives from tax-abusive transactions. 
 
Source taxation will be applied to royalty income that derives from GRP not being used in 
business activities in the borrower / source / developing country, or royalty income that 
derives from tax-abusive transactions. By reinstalling a withholding tax at source, the system 
will ensure real incentives for transferring beneficial GRP, i.e. GRP that effectively enter the 
source / developing country’s economy with no tax-abusive conditions and, therefore, 
contribute to the development process of that country. This measure does not prevent the 
promulgation of additional measures in domestic legislation that relate to restrictions on the 
deductibility of royalties at source.  
  
The transition from the primary to the secondary rule will be the consequence of the 
application by the source / developing country of an economic-substantive test, i.e. the impact 
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of the GRP in the economy of the source country; and of an arm’s length test, i.e. to determine 
if the related transfer of GRP are agreed and fulfilled on similar terms to those that would be 
entered into by independent parties (so as to avoid mispricing).  
    
By renouncing this right, this proposal expects that subscribing to a DTC between a 
developing and a developed country will effectively encourage the owners of royalty-
generating GRP to license those GPR to residents of developing countries. As was stated 
regarding interest income, this research does not share the view of considering the approach 
of exempting royalty income taxation at source and taxing royalty income at the residence 
country as an approach more beneficial to the resident country than to the source country. 
DTCs must naturally be beneficial to both signatory countries. While the source / developing 
country will benefit from the positive economic impact of the free circulation of GRP, e.g. 
technology, from developed countries, i.e. technology to improve local businesses, and as a 
consequence, higher employment and more development accompanied with revenue at 
source derived from VAT or the taxation of business profits, the resident country must also 
achieve certain benefits. This would similarly achieve what was achieved in relation to 
dividends by removing barriers to the repatriation of benefits, and in relation to interest by 
granting exclusive taxing rights to resident countries. This leave countries of residence in a 
better position than the position that they currently face under the current UN MTC rules. As 
was also stated in the context of interest, the fact that such exclusivity may potentially mean 
more revenue for resident countries compared to the revenue expectations under the current 
UN MTC criteria, this constitutes a benefit for the resident / developed country as a result of 
signing a DTC with a developing country.  
 
6.5 TESTS  
6.5.1 ECONOMIC-SUBSTANTIVE TEST 
 
As was stated in the analysis of dividends and interest, namely that it is impossible to 
analytically separate the equity of the host company from the underlying business activities 
of the host company, and that it is also impossible to decouple debt capital from such an 
activity, it follows in the case of royalties that is impossible to analytically separate the GRP 
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that generate royalty income from the underlying business activities of the host company. 
The GRP that are used by the host company – whose rights derive from a licence contract – 
are part of the assets of the host company and they are used in order to generate business 
income. The UN MTC must include a test that is able to determine the real impact of the 
GRP that are transferred to the host company – GRP provided to the host company by a 
foreign unrelated / related party – on the economy of the host country. 
 
The aim of this economic-substantive test is to differentiate between beneficial and non- 
beneficial foreign intangibles for countries that are undergoing a process of development, i.e. 
intangibles / technology as part of the source country’s development process. It is necessary, 
therefore, to determine the economic sector in which the intangibles are being used in order 
to determine if those intangibles are indeed having a positive effect on the economy of the 
source country.  
 
Such a test can only be properly developed by economists and the test would naturally depend 
on the characteristics of each host / developing country. As was discussed in relation to  
equity / dividends and debt / interest, it is impossible to define a concept of beneficial or non-
beneficial GRP applicable to the economies of all developing countries. Even though each 
economy has different needs, the concept of beneficial GRP should not be limited to the main 
business sector of the country. All productive sectors must be considered.  
 
With regard to the definition of beneficial and non-beneficial GRP, they will be left undefined 
so that they can be decided by each country in accordance with the characteristics of their 
economies.  The idea of the test is to promote access to foreign GRP, e.g. technology, in 
order to promote those business sectors which have a positive effect on the economy of the 
source country and, consequently, to directly or indirectly assist in the host country’s 
development. In order to achieve this, it will be essential to ascertain the underlying business 
activities of the licensor company in the source country.  
 
By differentiating between beneficial and non-beneficial royalty-generating GRP, the test 
will help to determine, from a tax perspective, to which licenses the DTC will grant more 
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favourable tax conditions. Thus, if the foreign GRP is considered by the host source country 
as an asset that is used in the generation of productive activities within national borders, the 
source country will exempt the foreign owner from tax at source by eliminating the 
withholding tax. On the other hand, the source country will tax the royalty income that arises 
from GRP with a withholding tax in relation to those GRP considered by the host country to 
be non-beneficial. 
 
The elimination of the first tier of taxation does not mean that the effective tax rate of the 
foreign investor will be lower than the effective tax rate in a scenario in which it is taxed on 
royalty income not only by the residence country, but also by the host country. In this latter 
scenario, royalties will still only be economically taxed once, but instead of being shared 
between the residence country and the source country, the taxing rights will be exclusively 
afforded to the residence country. As in the case of interest income, the most positive direct 
effect of this measure will be the reduction of costs for licensor residents in developing 
countries with the elimination of the grossing-up practice, i.e. the elimination of the biggest 
commercial barrier regarding access to foreign GRP that are capable of generating royalty 
income. The ultimate goal is to ensure that the foreign owners of GRP that generate royalty 
income are able to compete in the licensor / source country without having to incur higher 
associated costs. As was also stated in relation to interest, the “gross up” practice cannot be 
considered as a solution here. While the administrative barrier for the foreign investor is 
eliminated, at the same time an important commercial tax barrier is imposed, i.e. the burden 
of the withholding tax is added as an additional cost to the licence contract.     
 
Modern DTCs, instead of facilitating the access to foreign GRP that could be exploited by 
domestic business, have only focused on the amount of taxing rights that are to be allocated 
to each contracting state.  As regards dividends and interest, the exemption of royalties at 
source in DTCs between developing and developed countries is considered, according to the 
more traditional way of thinking, contrary to the legitimate rights of developing countries.  
 
As stated in the chapters that discussed dividends and interest, the incorporation of a test is a 
means to go one step further than what is usually prescribed under a DTC. For the author, 
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the relevance of the impact of the resources in the source / developing country is crucial for 
determining which GRP licences must be treated more favourably from a tax perspective in 
order to achieve: (1) access to foreign GRP for business carried out in developing countries 
and (2) incentives for foreign investors that are resident in developed countries to agree to 
transfer their GRP to businesses that are located in developing countries. 
 
6.5.2 ARM’S LENGTH TEST  
 
 
As in the case of abusive debt financing structures, the risk of base erosion as a result of an 
abusive royalty agreement requires the economic-substantive test to be complemented with 
an arm’s length test. The purpose of this is to avoid mispricing by determining if related 
licence agreements are agreed on similar terms to those that would typically be entered into 
by independent parties. The royalties deduction at source will erode the tax base of the source 
country if the terms of the royalty agreement have not been agreed in similar terms as those 
that would be agreed between independent parties in a comparable transaction. As in the case 
of interest, since the ability to grant the right to deduct expenses for royalties at source is a 
matter for domestic law to determine, this proposal will deny the beneficial tax treatment 
granted in the DTC to the amount of royalties that exceeds those parameters. As was stated 
when the sanction was a result of royalty income arising from non-beneficial GRP, this 
measure does not prevent domestic law from imposing additional measures in relation to 
restrictions on the deductibility of royalty expenses at source. 
 
In addition to the problem described in the case of interest, i.e. the likelihood that it will be 
successfully applied by developing countries with low tax administrative capacities (fully 
applicable to the case of royalties), in the case of royalties it is necessary to aggregate the 
problem of the determination of the proper compensation that is to be given to the developer 
/ owner / licensor of the GRP.  In setting an at arm’s length royalty rate, it is important to 
distinguish, as precisely as possible, what GRP is actually being licensed. Once the GRP is 
identified, the rights granted to the licensee and their relative value must be determined. The 
property may be an ordinary GRP, i.e. those granted not only to related but also to unrelated 
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parties, or it may be an exclusive GRP, i.e. those that are exclusively granted to related 
parties. For the former, this proposal considers, as an optimal method for determining an at 
arm’s length royalty fee, the use of comparable uncontrolled GRP made to unrelated parties 
under which identical GRP have been transferred. Such licences can be identified where the 
developer / owner / licensor has licensed a third party to use the technology under terms that 
are identical or similar to those granted to the related party, or where the inter-company 
licensor has received the technology from a third party. If such licence agreement is 
identified, adjustments can be made for differences in order to determine an inter-company 
at arm’s length royalty rate. However, for the latter scenario, it is difficult to determine an at 
arm’s length royalty fee that is based on a comparable analysis due to the non-existence of 
data derived from comparable uncontrolled transactions. This forces the author to propose 
the use of the profit split method instead of the comparable uncontrolled price method.  
 
Regarding the likelihood of the tax authorities of the developing country being able to 
successful audit the proposed systems, it is expected, as was also the case for interest, that 
the experience of developing countries with the application of transfer pricing rules can help 
in the application of this test at the domestic level.  
 
 




As was stated in relation to dividends and interest, limiting the role of DTCs to allocating 
taxing rights when most domestic legislation already does so, does not seem to be enough. 
By doing so, developing countries maintain the greatest barrier to the cross-border transfer 
of GRP that generate royalty income from developed to developing countries, i.e. a 
withholding tax.  
 
As was argued in relation to interest, those whom advocate improvements to the above 
scenario by increasing the source taxation of royalty income through a withholding tax, 
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relying on the benefit theory by considering the fact that the grantee’s country of residence 
(source country) facilitates the grantor’s access to the market and therefore deserves a portion 
of taxing rights over the income, forget that source countries have already taxed or will tax 
the business profits that arise from the use of those GRP. The hypothetical revenue problem 
of source countries in a scenario such as that which is proposed by the author – deduction at 
source and the elimination of withholding tax – is mitigated, from a revenue perspective, by 
the fact that easy access to foreign intangibles / technology will increase the business profits 
of local businesses at source. However, assisting in the process of development is the real 
benefit that this proposal is expected to engender. 
 
As was previously stated concerning interest, if we consider that the taxation of royalties at 
source under domestic legislation would be the rule in cases where there is no DTC in force, 
the limitation of sovereignty regarding royalty taxation that source / developing countries 
will face by concluding a DTC with a developed country – according the author’s proposal 
– must be economically counterbalanced. The easy and affordable access to foreign GRP (in 
terms of non-additional cost and administrative burdens) will help in the development 
process of the source / developing country’s economy.  
 
Thus, it can be affirmed that it is necessary to revise the system of royalty taxation that is 
currently in force under the current UN MTC rules. The fact that DTCs that adhere to the UN 
MTC have no effect in granting easy and affordable access to foreign GRP from developed 
to developing countries naturally reinforces this proposal. The UN MTC must include, 
amongst its aims, easy access to foreign GRP that are capable of generating royalty income 
for domestic businesses in developing countries with the expectation that this will assist in 
the country’s development.  
 
This work proposes a new article regarding the taxation of royalty income for the UN MTC, 
respecting a general framework in accordance with the following guidelines: 
 
(1) in order to incentivize the use of the UN MTC as the MTC that is to be followed in 
DTCs between developing and developed countries, the treatment of royalty income 
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must be beneficial to all actors, that is, to the grantor residence country, to the grantee 
resident / developing country, to the grantor lender, and to the grantee; 
 
(2) that income must only be economically taxed once; 
(3) taxing rights in relation to royalties should be allocated in a coherent manner, 
irrespective of whether they arise in a developing or in a developed country; and  
 
(4) business carried out by the grantee within the borders of the source country and at 
arm’s length conditions of the agreement are the elements that will be considered by 
the author in order to determine the real impact of the intangibles / technology in the 
economy of the host country.  
 
As a consequence, the author proposes a modification to Article 12 of the UN MTC so as to 
regulate the taxation of income from royalties in DTCs between developed and developing 




                                                        ROYALTIES 
 
 
1. Royalties derived from the licensee beneficial goods, rights, or properties arising in a 
Contracting State and which are ultimately owned by a resident of the other Contracting 
State shall be taxable only in that other Contracting State.  
 
2. However, royalties may also be  taxed in both Contracting States when they derive from 
the licensee of non-beneficial goods, rights, or properties, or if by reason of a special 
relationship between the licensor and the licensee or between both of them and some other 
person, the amount of the royalty, having regard to the license of goods, rights, or properties 
for which it is paid, exceeds the amount which would have been agreed upon by the licensee 
and the licensor in the absence of such relationship. In this last situation, paragraph 1 shall 




3. The term “royalties” as used in this Article means payments of any kind received as 
consideration for the use of, or the right to use, any copyright of literary, artistic or scientific 
work including cinematograph films, any patent, trade mark, design or model, plan, secret 
formula or process, or for information concerning industrial, commercial or scientific 
experience. 
 
4.  The provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not apply if the beneficial owner of the 
royalties, being a resident of a Contracting State, carries on business in the other 
Contracting State in which the royalties arise, through a permanent establishment situated 
therein, or performs in that other Contracting State independent personal services from a 
fixed base situated therein, and the right or property in respect of which the royalties are 
paid is effectively connected with (a) such permanent establishment or fixed base, or with (b) 
business activities referred to in (c) of paragraph 1 of Article 7. In such cases the provisions 
of Article 7 or Article 14, as the case may be, shall apply. 
 
5. Royalties shall be deemed to arise in a Contracting State when the payer is a resident of 
that Contracting State. Where, however, the person paying the royalties, whether he is a 
resident of a Contracting State or not, has in a Contracting State a permanent establishment 
or a fixed base in connection with which the liability to pay the royalties was incurred, and 
such royalties are borne by such permanent establishment or fixed base, then such royalties 
shall be deemed to arise in the Contracting State in which the permanent establishment or 
fixed base is situated. 
 
6.  The terms “beneficial” or “non- beneficial goods, rights, or properties” as used in this 
Article can be defined as follows: (a) Beneficial goods, rights, or properties: [the definition 
will be defined, according to the economic reality, by each developing country that 
subscribes to this Model]; (b) Non-beneficial goods, rights, or properties: [the definition will 
be defined, according to their economic reality, by each developing country that subscribes 
to this Model]. The definitions should be based on an economic-substantive test and on an 




6.7 RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSAL 
 
The main objective of this proposal is to grant, through the UN MTC, more beneficial tax 
conditions to the owners of GRP that are capable of generating royalty income in developed 
countries than the conditions that are normally granted by domestic legislation to these 
owners when they agree to license these GRP to residents in developing countries. The 
proposal is based on the assumption that developing countries will be willing to relinquish 
taxing rights over royalty payments if the outcome of that decision is a positive increase of 
beneficial foreign GRP that will help in the developing countries’ development process.     
 
As was also stated regarding interest, with regard to royalties, the current UN MTC approach 
requires developing countries to partially relinquish their rights without obtaining positive 
results, such as easy and convenient access to license foreign GPR. That outcome is usually 
also achieved by domestic laws without requiring a substantial limitation of taxing rights 
over royalty income by the host / developing country. The domestic law approach to 
developing countries vis-à-vis cross-border royalties’ taxation normally tends, as MTCs do, 
to reduce the withholding tax.  
 
The aim of this proposal is to reduce the three tax events of cross-border royalty taxation, i.e. 
a deduction in the hands of the grantee, source and residence taxation in the hands of the 
grantor, to only two tax events, i.e. a deduction in the hands of the grantee and residence 
taxation in the hands of the grantor. By doing so, it will be possible for the grantor to be 
treated equally than would ordinarily be the case for domestic licences. The proposal 
achieves not only a level playing field, but also the elimination of the withholding tax barrier, 
and therefore, the costly “gross up” phenomenon.  
 
Finally, the proposal eschews base erosion by negating the beneficial treatment to royalties 




As was stated regarding dividends and interest, this proposal modifies one of the traditional 
principles of MTCs. The allocation of taxing rights is no longer the direct result of the 
analysis of the primary economic activity analysis. The primary economic activity analysis 
serves as a tool for developing countries to determine what they have and what they will lose 
or gain by signing a DTC that is based on this new UN MTC approach.  
 
Regarding royalty income, the result of the primary economic activity analysis carried out 
by the author was that, despite the strong logic of the position that the origin of the royalties 
is always in the country of residence, because that is the country where the owner invested 
time and resources in developing or acquiring the intangible, it is also possible to find 
substantive arguments that support the view that the origin of royalty income is in the source 
country, e.g. the conditions provided by the source country to exploit the intangible. 
  
Lastly, instead of sharing taxing rights, the proposal calls for the renunciation of those 
preliminary taxing rights by source / developing countries with the aim of achieving benefits 
for all actors. 
 
PART VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Taxing rights are of paramount concern for developing countries when they are negotiating 
a DTC with developed countries. Indeed, and according to several if not all UN Member 
States, the inequitable distribution of income between source and residence countries needs 
to be recalibrated in favour of source countries. As a consequence, one of the main issues in 
the work of the UN on cross-border taxation focuses on how to increase source country 
taxation.594 If the goal of developing countries is to increase their taxing rights, then it cannot 
be concluded that DTCs are a suitable solution for them. It is indeed easier and less expensive 
to avoid signing DTCs with developed countries, and to leave the determination of the level 
of rights to tax and the responsibility of avoiding double taxation to domestic legislation.   
 





The renunciation of taxing rights regarding passive investment income, due to the application 
of a DTC between a developing and a developed country under the current tax framework, 
has not been the direct consequence of thorough economic analysis. It does not incentivize 
trade and investment, and therefore, it does not help in the development process of the host 
country. In order to decide whether developing countries should subscribe to DTCs with 
developed countries, it is necessary to determine the economic impact of doing so in the 
developing country. By doing this, it is then possible to determine whether or not it is 
necessary for developing counties to agree to a DTC with a developed country.  
 
The author revised the work regarding the role of international taxation on the economic 
progress towards development. Even though international organizations, such as UNCTAD 
and the OECD, share the goal of positively affecting the economic progress of developing 
countries through international tax rules, the author’s disagreement with their methods has 
being stated throughout this research. One of the most pertinent conclusions that arises from 
this research, and which is not in accordance with most contemporary international tax 
discussions, is that the better way to achieve the real protection of the tax base of developing 
countries is through the renunciation to tax in DTCs with developed countries, when the 
outcome of the DTC is an increase in trade and investment. The certainty and (supposed) 
equality of treatment granted by DTCs in fact must be ancillary to the main goal. Both effects 
are useless if there is no concomitant increase in trade and investment. 
 
It has been demonstrated how the domestic tax measures of developing countries include, as 
the basis of their rationale, the idea of increasing trade and investment as a direct or indirect 
goal. With that said, the author has highlighted the lack of any reference to that goal, 
especially regarding the treatment of passive investment income in DTCs that have been 
signed between developing and developed countries. 
 
This research has addressed the analysis of the economic allegiance and benefit theory, and 
has stated their influence on the current state of the art. George Schanz developed the 
economic allegiance theory in 1892, stating that the economic link between the income and 
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the country could be based on mere consumption or on a business / investment criterion. For 
Schanz, if the consumption criterion is chosen, then it is the residence country that should 
enjoy the taxing rights. By way of contrast, if the business or investment criteria are used, 
then it is the source / host country that should enjoy the taxing rights. The author agrees with 
Schanz’s theory, but states that the economic allegiance must be complemented in the case 
of DTCs between developing and developed countries, and regarding passive investment 
income, with the following minimum expectations: (1) an increase in foreign investment, (2) 
access to useful foreign debt capital, and (3) access to useful / necessary technology. The 
combination of the above derives from the following premise: “In the design of an MTC to 
be used to subscribe to DTCs between developing and developed countries, the treatment of 
passive investment income must consider the economic impact of the investment / transaction 
in the host / source country. Therefore, if there is a proven and useful economic impact in the 
host / source country, this country must grant beneficial tax treatment to the foreign investor”. 
 
The historical origin of the problem is clear. Notwithstanding the recommendation that was 
made in 1923 by the LN group of economists “exemption of income going abroad” in the 
search for the location of the true economic interest of the taxpayer, the influence of the DTCs 
in force in 1925 naturally determined the LN Technical Expert’s approach on the topic. The 
above was expressly ratified by them when they recognized that the decision was taken for 
purely practical purposes and it was made with no reference to any economic theory or 
doctrine. The election of the “classification and assignment of income” as the method to 
determine the economic allegiance of the taxpayer with the country considering developed 
countries’ interpretation of where does the primary economic activity that gives rise to the 
income belong, ended as the approach that is still being used by most DTCs today. The above 
criterion was incorporated into the 1928 Geneva MTC, and it was further recommended by 
the OECD in its 1963 MTC, and by the UN in its 1980 MTC. The emergence of developing 
countries’ interests in the 1943 Mexico MTC was driven by different factors, which are 
different to what developing countries face today. The evolution of domestic laws has had a 
direct effect on the above. All the above was ratified by Peggy Musgrave, who emphasized  




Regarding CIN or CEN, it was concluded that if the resident country decides to follow the 
CEN principle, then it will nullify any intention of a host / source country to incentivize 
foreign investment through tax concessions. On the contrary, if the resident country decides 
to follow the CIN principle, that approach does not nullify the host / source country’s 
intentions to incentivize foreign investment through tax concessions. On this matter, the 
author has concluded that the positive evolution of the domestic legislation of developed 
countries has granted source countries the right to be sovereign regarding their own tax 
policy.  This change in the status quo started in 1981 following the incorporation of the 
participation exemption system in New Zealand.  
 
Regarding the effects of DTCs on the increase of foreign investment, the analysis started 
from the assumption that the increase of investments between treaty partners is, at least for 
developing countries, an economic starting point in the decision as to whether or not to sign 
a DTC. From the author’s perspective, the traditional belief of developing countries that 
DTCs between a developing and a developed country actually increase foreign investment 
has not been substantiated with reference to any scientific research. The only indirectly 
related study on this topic (Chisik and Davies) states that as the asymmetry of foreign 
investments grows, the scope for cooperation decreases, and negotiated withholding taxes 
tend to be higher as a result. The above demonstrates the natural, but in the author’s opinion 
wrong, intent of achieving fairness through the increase of source countries’ withholding 
taxes. Just a wrong conventional solution to the problem of the allocation of taxing rights. 
Eric Neumayer concluded, only applicable to middle-income countries, that countries with 
more DTCs with major capital-exporting countries benefit from a higher overall FDI and 
receive more FDI inflows as well as a higher share of inflows. While it is not applicable to 
the reality of all developing countries, Neumayer’s study demonstrates that in the analysis of 
the economic impact of DTCs between developing and developed countries, it is necessary 
to differentiate between developing countries. Even more, and which is also a factor 
considered by the author in this research, he considered that each country has different 





The author analysed this principle in the proposal not by differentiating according to the level 
of development of each developing country, but by focusing instead on the real impact of the 
investment in the host / source / developing country. The most conclusive work on the topic 
is that carried out by Paul L. Baker. He concluded that DTCs have no effect on foreign 
investment from developed to less developed countries. He raised a crucial element that has 
been considered by the author in this research, namely the fact that developed countries 
unilaterally provide for the relief of double taxation.  
 
This work also addressed, through an historic study of the subject-matter, the undesired 
influence of the OECD MTC on the UN MTC. The author explored the history of DTCs and 
sought to answer the question: to which country does the economic activity that gives rise to 
the income belong? That historic development demonstrates the undeniable influence of the 
OECD MTC on the UN MTC. As was stated by the author, the failure of the current approach 
to the taxation of passive investment income in DTCs between developing and developed 
countries does not come from the wrong answer to the question mentioned above, but from 
the fact that the UN MTC has not evolved to the point of considering the economic benefits 
that an agreement as such should bring to the signatory countries, especially to the host / 
source / developing country. 
 
The MTC of the League of Nations took a combined approach by taking the economic 
allegiance theory as its economic basis, and using the classification and assignment method 
chosen by the committee of Technical Experts to then allocate taxing rights. The author raised 
the evident influence of the nationality of the members of both groups on these approaches. 
The influence of the UK and the USA were determinative factors on the vision of the 
Committee of Technical Experts. That influence, combined with the similar levels of 
economic development among the League of Nations members, and the assumption of 
reciprocal trade and investments flows between treaty partners were, at least from the 
author’s perspective, the reasons why that approach has been successful for the negotiation 




The OECD MTC was developed according to the needs of the 20 OECD members in 1963. 
The aim was to increase economic interdependence and cooperation amongst the member 
countries in the post-war period. It was recognized by the Fiscal Committee of the OEEC 
(1958-1961) that the taxation of dividends, interest and royalties was their most difficult task. 
They argued that the economic analysis of where the economic activity that gives rise to the 
income belongs was only one of the various elements involved in the analysis. They opted 
for a practical solution that was supported by the fact that OEEC countries in those years 
were on a level playing field in terms of development. The above fixed, for good, the 
existence of a shared system of taxation – dividends and interest – between the source and 
the residence country. 
 
In the historical analysis, the author highlighted some of the valuable contributions made by 
developed countries. As stated in this research, these contributions were probably due to the 
fact that developed countries were facing similar economic realities at that time. On 19 
January 1959, the Italian delegation sent a confidential note to the Fiscal Committee of the 
OEEC regarding the taxation of dividends. This note proposed a reduction in the rate of tax 
on dividends at source when the recipient took an active and direct part in the economic life 
of the source country. Italy supported the idea that dividends derived from a controlled 
investment were the result of a more active than passive activity. They voted for analysis of 
dividends on a case-by-case basis and then, on that basis, to properly allocate taxing rights. 
The formal proposal was to reduce source taxation when the recipients were not participating, 
in an active way, to the country’s economic life / passive investment. That approach, 
integrated with the source country’s development, could end with the undesired effect of 
shifting tax revenue from developing to developed countries.  
 
On 2 December 1958, a note from Belgium was circulated amongst the Fiscal Committee of 
the OEEC regarding their criteria on the principles that should be adopted to govern the 
allocation of rights on royalty income. Notwithstanding that the outcome of their proposal 
was different from that which the author is currently proposing, Belgium nevertheless 
contributed to the discussion on the source of royalty income. Belgium considered that there 
was no justification for giving the exclusive right to tax royalties to the country of residence 
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of the grantor. Belgium supported the view that it seemed to be correct to allow the country 
in which the rights are used to levy a reasonable tax on the net income obtained by the foreign 
grantor by virtue of such use.   
 
Despite these inspiring interventions, the reality demonstrated that in stark contrast to the 
great work that the OEEC had done by analysing the nature of the income and then attributing 
taxing rights to the residence or to the source country by considering the economic benefits 
of those transactions, the OEEC focused on the different tax systems of the member countries 
at that time, and made its proposals accordingly.  
 
On the evolution of the OECD MTC, an important change took place in 1992. The author 
views this change as the best demonstration of how the tax policy behind the UN MTC 
operates. This influence that the OECD MTC has had on the UN MTC is undeniable. 
However, as a result of this change, the UN MTC evolved in a way which was evidently 
guided by the preference of having taxing rights instead of allocating taxing rights according 
to the nature of the income and thereby privileging the easy flow of investments. In all other 
aspects regarding the taxation of passive investment income, the UN MTC almost followed 
the OECD MTC approach in this regard. 
 
The OECD recognizes that the harmful effects of double taxation on cross-border trade and 
investment are so well known that it is necessary to stress the importance of removing the 
obstacles that double taxation presents for the development of economic relations between 
countries.  The approximate balance in the reciprocity of investment flows and, therefore, the 
rights to tax, means that DTCs between two developed countries do not force a non-reciprocal 
limitation of taxing rights.  The OECD achieves this goal by improving market conditions so 
that they are conducive to increased trade and investment between treaty partners.  
 
The UN decided to add non-reciprocal limitations to tax in the UN MTC and the imposition 
of higher withholding taxes was their tool for doing so. The above contradicts the recognition 
made by the ECOSOC in 1967 regarding their conviction that DTCs between developed and 
developing countries can promote investment flows which are beneficial for the economic 
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development of the latter, especially if those DTCs provide favourable tax treatment to such 
investments on the part of the countries of origin, both by outright tax relief and by measures 
which would ensure them the full benefit of any tax incentive allowed by the country of 
investment.  
 
Specific measures such as tax sparing clauses and matching credits were also analysed over 
the course of this research. It was concluded that they are not constructed in such a way so 
as to achieve what this current proposal is looking for. These clauses ensure that the tax 
incentives offered by the host country accrue to the foreign investor and not to the 
development of the host country. Moreover, they are susceptible to tax abuse and short-term 
investments. The author stressed the fact that in order to achieve development, there must be 
more than tax incentives, and tax incentives should only be granted to beneficial investments. 
In this part of the research, the author arrived at the conclusion that foreign investment must 
help in the development of developing countries’ economy, in other words, that is 
perfectively possible to have foreign investment that does not contribute to the development 
of the host / source country’s economy, and therefore, development. Elements such as 
knowledge, experience, culture and various other external elements are much more relevant 
in this regard than revenue is.  
 
Further to this, and specifically regarding BITs, the legal profile of the author prevented him 
from entering into the interesting challenge of, in the case of developing and developed 
countries, merging DTCs and BITs. However, and following an analysis of the doctrine and 
history of BITs, the author concluded the necessity to unveil the complementary role of DTCs 
and BITs by including the aims of BITs within the UN MTC. 
 
Regarding the role of withholding taxes in DTCs between developing and developed 
countries, the author made salient the contradiction of creating double taxation through a 
DTC by recognizing the right to tax non-residents on their passive investment income at 
source through a withholding tax. It was confirmed that the main objective of withholding 
taxes is to avoid tax evasion. The above, as well as the fact that source countries have centred 
the discussion on raising withholding taxes, is why this mechanism neither achieves a fair 
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allocation of taxing rights nor is capable of attracting foreign investment. The fact was also 
added to the discussion that withholding taxes are applied on a gross basis instead of on a net 
basis, thereby ensuring the existence double taxation, which is in turn aggravated by the fact 
that the UN MTC leaves the tax rate of withholding taxes regarding passive investment 
income open to treaty negotiations.  Ultimately, the author analysed the approach of the UN 
MTC of imposing sanctions on discrimination in Article 24 and creating discrimination in 
Articles 10, 11 and 12. The above is due to the potential difference on the final tax rate of 
residents and non-residents, especially when one considers that countries imposing 
withholding taxes on non-residents do not make refunds based on the tax position of the 
recipient.  
 
In the analysis of the approach adopted by BRIC countries, it was proven with reference to 
data, i.e. DTCs subscribed by BRIC countries since 2001, that these countries have negotiated 
less source taxation. This, however, has not been done with the aim of facilitating trade, but 
instead by focusing on signing DTCs with developing or less developed countries. In simple 
terms, they are acting as capital-exporting countries, and therefore, their negotiation 
behaviour cannot be taken as examples for the purposes of developing countries according 
to the parameters of this research. 
 
Ultimately, the author worked on the proposals. Considering the research cited, the author 
concluded that only two works have considered the increase of foreign investments in the 
host country as an important element of DTCs. That evidenced the necessity of reinforcing 
the causal relationship between DTCs and the increase in foreign investment. Regarding the 
international flow of investments from developed to developing countries that has 
undoubtedly increased in the last 50 years, it was concluded that such increases have not been 
caused by DTCs. As the worst case scenario, it has shifted taxing rights away from 
developing to developed countries due to the parallel increase of DTCs between them. 
 
Considering all of the above, the author developed the principles that sustain this research 
and the resulting proposals. In order to achieve fairness, it was considered that the 
individual’s whole faculty should be taxed and that such faculty should be economically 
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taxed only once. Taxing rights should be assigned to one signatory country or divided 
between the two signatory countries according to the relative link of each country to the 
corresponding income. By taxing only once, non-discrimination will be guaranteed and so 
too will the economic obstacle of over-taxation. These principles are similar to those used in 
the EU market.  The paradigm that has to change is the “harmful effect of juridical double 
taxation”.595 The new guiding paradigm, at least regarding dividend taxation, must be the 
“harmful effect of economic double taxation”.  The proposals must analyse where the primary 
activity of the income takes place and guarantee that the income will be taxed only once. In 
order to achieve that aim, an economic-substantive test or, in some cases an alternative 
presence test, or other such tests, must apply.    
 
Firstly, and regarding the proposal on the taxation of dividends, the proposal achieves the 
elimination not only of juridical but also of economic double taxation. As a complement to 
achieve this goal, the author proceeds from the premise that is worthwhile for DTCs between 
developing and developed countries to differentiate between beneficial and non-beneficial 
foreign investment, i.e. productive and counterproductive foreign investments for developing 
countries, instead of differentiating between FDI and FPI.  In essence, the author decided to 
propose the elimination of a withholding tax at the host / source country for both types of 
equity investments and an exemption or indirect credit at the home / residence country. This 
approach should be used alongside an exemption for the ultimate beneficial owner in the case 
of beneficial investments and a deduction from the personal income tax base of an amount 
proportional to the corporate income tax paid by the distributing entity at source in the case 
of non-beneficial foreign investments.  
 
The author carried out an analysis of where the primary economic activity of dividends takes 
place, which allowed the author to determine which country deserves the preliminary rights 
to tax according to the origin of the income. Once the above was completed, the author 
included the necessity of whether to partially or completely limit those taxing rights 
according to whether or not they would promote foreign investment, neutral tax treatment, 
 
595 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Model Double Taxation Convention between 




legal security, legal certainty and repatriation benefits. The level of limitation on taxing rights 
will depend on the impact of the investments in the host / source country. To that end, the 
proposal includes the application of an economic-substantive test, and in some cases, the 
application of a temporary test. Consequently, it was concluded that if the foreign equity is 
considered by the host country to be a beneficial investment, then the elimination of 
economic double taxation by the home / resident country will be ensured by exempting those 
dividends from tax. On the other hand, if the foreign equity is considered by the host country 
to be a non-beneficial investment, the elimination of economic double taxation by the home 
/ resident country will be achieved by granting an indirect credit.  
 
The new Article 10 of the UN MTC, which was proposed by the author, is expected to 
guarantee benefits to all actors; it forces both signatory countries to renounce taxing rights in 
order to achieve benefits, and it ensures that the income will be taxed only once.   
 
Secondly, and regarding the proposal on the taxation of interest, the proposal also achieves 
the elimination of juridical double taxation. Interest income does not create economic double 
taxation. The differences in the treatment of cross-border equity finance and cross-border 
debt finance are naturals. Dividends and interest are different types of income per se, due to 
the fact that they derive from different types of financing instruments.   
 
On the issue of hybrid finance, the author has concluded that the UN MTC, the OECD MTC 
or the BEPS have come up with a suitable solution in this regard. Specifically regarding the 
BEPS, and in line with the logic of this research, the author concluded that it starts from the 
assumption that the system governing the international taxation of equity and debt is actually 
correct. The above can be valid in a scenario between two developed countries, but not in a 
scenario between a developing and a developed country. All of the above is justified by the 
fact that the actual system does not incentivize the increase of international borrowing, and 
therefore, there is no benefit to developing countries after they renounce taxing rights. The 
right of the borrower to deduct interest payments as expenses must be understand as a 
measure that is granted by the source country to make it less costly for their residents to 
access foreign debt. This proposal expects to reduce the tax cost differences for taxpayers 
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between cross-border debt and equity. By doing so, the tax arbitrage will be reduced, and 
consequently, the erosion of the tax base – related debts – will not be an unsolvable problem, 
like it is today.  
 
As in the case of dividends, the author carried out an analysis of where the primary economic 
activity of interests takes place, which allowed the author to determine which country 
deserves the preliminary rights to tax according to the origin of the income. In addition, and 
as was also done regarding dividends, the necessity of partially or completely limiting those 
taxing rights according to the aim of promoting foreign investment, neutral tax treatment, 
legal security, legal certainty and repatriation benefits were taken into account.  
 
The level of limitation on taxing rights will depend on the impact of the debt in the host / 
source country. The author concluded that beneficial tax treatment will not be granted to 
interest that arises from debt capital that does not effectively help in the development process 
of the borrower / source / developing country. Consequently, the conclusion was that if the 
foreign debt is considered to be a beneficial debt, the elimination of juridical double taxation 
by the host / source country will be ensured by exempting interest from tax – elimination of 
withholding tax. On the other hand, if the foreign debt is considered to be a non-beneficial 
debt, source taxation will be re-installed. What was achieved regarding dividends by 
removing barriers on the repatriation of benefits, will be achieved regarding interest by 
granting exclusive taxing rights to resident countries.  The potential increase of revenue for 
resident countries is one of the benefits of signing a DTC with a developing country. Lastly, 
and regarding the revenue balance at source, the author concluded that this is achieved 
through the taxation of business profits at source, and therefore, applying a withholding tax 
over interest income at source cannot be justified as being necessary to achieving that 
balance.  
 
The new Article 11 of the UN MTC, which was proposed by the author, is expected to 
guarantee benefits to all actors; it forces the source country to renounce taxing rights in order 




Thirdly, and regarding the proposal on the taxation of royalties, the proposal achieves the 
elimination of juridical double taxation. Royalty income does not, therefore, create economic 
double taxation.  
 
The analysis carried out in this work covered the problem of the definition of royalties in the 
UN MTC and the OECD MTC. The author concluded that since the UN MTC and the OECD 
MTC allocate the taxing rights on royalty income differently, the hypothetical elimination of 
“the use of, or the right to use, industrial, commercial or scientific equipment” from the UN 
MTC would result in a reduction of the right to tax for source countries. According to the 
same line of reasoning, the author explained why this was not a real concern for 
representatives of developed countries when the phrase was first removed from the OECD 
MTC.  For the author, the determinant factor is the fact that since the likelihood that the 
performance of these types of services could be considered as a permanent establishment was 
low, the residence country normally kept fully taxing rights. The above increases taxing 
rights to countries exporting technology / intangibles. In other words, the level of taxing 
rights of source countries in a DTC based on the OECD MTC remained the same after the 
removal of those services from the definition of royalties. However, if the same phrase were 
to be removed from the UN MTC definition, the source country would in fact lose taxing 
rights. 
 
Since the proposals contained in this research on royalties, as in the case of dividends and 
interest income, are based on the logic that royalty income should be taxed only once, and as 
in the case of interest income, it should be the source country that renounces taxing rights, 
the author expressed his view on the OECD MTC approach to royalty income taxation, i.e. 
exclusive taxing rights should be granted to the country of residence. The historic truth 
demonstrates that the ultimate goal of the DTCs concluded immediately after  World War II 
was to achieve the development of economies in Europe. For the author, that same logic 
applies to the proposals contained in this research.   
 
As in the case of dividends and interest, the author carried out an analysis of where the 
primary economic activity of royalties takes place, which allowed the author to determine 
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which country deserved the preliminary rights to tax according to the origin of the income. 
In addition, and as was also done regarding dividends and interest, the necessity of partially 
or completely limiting those taxing rights according to the parameters of promotion of foreign 
investment, neutral tax treatment, legal security, legal certainty and repatriation benefits was 
included in the assessment.  
 
The level of the limitation on taxing rights will depend on the impact of the intangible in the 
host / source country. It was stated that beneficial tax treatment should not be granted to 
royalty income that does not arise from intangibles that effectively help in the development 
process of the borrower / source / developing country. Consequently, the author concluded 
that if the intangible is considered to be a beneficial intangible, then the elimination of 
juridical double taxation by the host / source country would be ensured by exempting royalty 
from tax – thus elimination of withholding tax. On the other hand, if the intangible is 
considered to be a non-beneficial intangible, source taxation will be re-instated. The same 
rule was proposed for the situation in which the beneficial owner of the royalties does not 
reside in the other contracting state, and regarding royalties that derive from beneficial or 
invest in non-beneficial intangibles, where there is an intentional erosion of the tax base of 
the source country.  
 
What was achieved regarding dividends by removing barriers to the repatriation of benefits 
will be achieved, similar to the case for interest, by granting exclusive taxing rights to resident 
countries. The potential increase of revenue for resident countries is one of the benefits of 
signing a DTC with a developing country. Lastly, and regarding the revenue balance at 
source, this research has concluded that this is achieved through the taxation of business 
profits at source, and therefore, applying a withholding tax over royalty income at source, as 
was stated regarding interest income, cannot be justified as being necessary to achieving that 
balance.  
 
The new Article 12 of the UN MTC, which was proposed by the author, is expected to 
guarantee benefits to all actors; it forces the source country to refrain from allocating taxing 
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rights in order to achieve certain benefits, and it ensures that the income will be taxed only 
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